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This study examines policy processes and outputs in Scotland and Wales in order to 
test the thesis that a distinctively 'inclusive' and 'holistic' policy style will emerge in 
the new, meso-level institutional setting. To this end, the study develops a 'joined-up 
governance (JUG) approach' to examining policy processes and outputs and applies 
this to the policy areas of special educational needs (SEN) and adult community 
learning (ACL) in the two nations.
This approach reveals a marked variation in the nature and extent of joined-up 
thinking and action between policy areas (though less between jurisdictions) and 
uses an examination of seven 'moderating variables' to uncover the conditions in 
each case study that may influence the degree of horizontal and vertical 
coordination. It is shown how one of these variables -  scale -  has great explanatory 
utility, and this contributes to the main finding that some distinctively inclusive and 
holistic features can be detected in the emerging policy styles in Scotland and Wales.
The study also reflects on the theoretical implications of a JUG approach. It is 
argued that interests-based accounts of the policy process, such as those put forward 
in the policy network literature, can be complemented by an approach which 
acknowledges trust-, as well as resource-based relationships, specifically in a 'joined- 
up' policy context.
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Introduction
In the decade since the first devolved elections were held, in May 1999, the face of 
territorial politics in the UK has changed considerably: debates on such sensitive and 
seemingly intractable issues as Scottish independence have been revitalised; 
conceptions and expressions of national identity have been revisited; and a wider and 
deeper regional politics has emerged in each of the devolved jurisdictions. Not content 
with having reordered the politics of the Union, devolution has also redesigned the 
administrative architecture of the state. Although the Scottish Parliament and National 
Assemblies for Wales and Northern Ireland are at variance in terms of institutional 
design, legislative power and executive competence (reflecting the asymmetry of the 
devolution settlements in the three nations), they each operate at an intermediate level 
of government that lies somewhere between the central and local tiers of national 
administration (Rawlings 1998). Constitutional change has not only created a fresh 
political context, then, but an entirely new layer of government: elected institutions 
now operate, for the first time in the UK, at a regional, or 'meso' level.1
The introduction of this meso layer may have far-reaching constitutional 
consequences for the UK, particularly when devolution is viewed as forming part of a 
wider European trend towards regionalisation. Over recent decades, meso-level 
institutions have proliferated in Europe's historic regions and elected forms of 'meso-
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government' have become part of the constitutional furniture of most Western 
European states (Sharpe 1993). Devolution for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
has merely added to an already long list of Regions (France), Lander (Germany), Fylker 
(Norway), Regioni (Italy) and Comunidades Autonomas (Spain) in what for some is now 
a 'Europe of the Regions' (Petschen 1993; Bullman 1994; Jones & Keating 1995; Keating 
1998). In the context of a European Union where the criteria for allocating prized 
structural and other funds have favoured regional rather than national units, 
governments from Brittany to Bavaria have become increasingly assertive on the 
national and supranational stage (Harvie 1994). Indeed, the growing power and 
influence of 'the meso' is challenging traditional notions of nation state governance to 
such a degree that critical questions are being posed about the very nature of the 
unitary state (Bennett 1989; Leonardi & Nanetti 1990). The strengthening position of 
the Scottish National Party in the UK, with its open agenda for independence being 
advanced from a position of previously unattainable political power, is only the most 
recent example of the pressure now being applied to national sovereignty from below.
Aside from these well-documented risks to the constitutional integrity of the UK, 
however, the introduction of meso-govemment may have equally important 
implications for the devolved nations themselves. This is because meso-govemment 
has for some time been associated with a quite distinctive approach to policy-making. 
Such governments have generally demonstrated an ambition to engage with a broader 
range of interests than central states, and particularly with those in the so-called 'third' 
sector (see e.g. Raffe 2005; Hirst 1997; NIEC 1996; for Spain, see Gibbons 1999: 135; for 
France, see Cole 2001). Rather than seek to impose an agenda on the regional policy 
space, the archetypal meso instead acts as 'strategy-maker', 'arbitrator' and 
'consensus-builder' within that space, promoting and facilitating cooperation between 
actors positioned differently within broad networks of stakeholding groups (Amin & 
Thomas 1998: 199). In this way, the meso aims to cultivate a 'public philosophy of 
dialogue, power-sharing and negotiation' so that it may construct and guide a 'social 
coalition in favour of change' (Marquand 1997: 27-28). Such claims have a solid 
empirical basis. Alistair Cole (2001: 716) has shown that the emergence of a 
strengthened layer of meso-govemment in France, for example, has caused the
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education policy process in Brittany to become accessible to a wider range of interests. 
'There is much evidence of meso-level change', Cole observes, and this is embodied in 
'a  more networked policy style'. Political and administrative decentralisation in France 
has produced 'genuine negotiations within a regional policy space' between the 
elected regions and 'the social partners.'
The meso is also associated with a strong commitment to achieving a high degree of 
horizontal and vertical policy coordination, what in the UK has become known as 
'joined-up' or 'holistic' government, and elsewhere as 'connected government' 
(Australia), 'networked government' or 'policy coherence' (Canada) (see e.g. Eberts 
2008; Peach 2004; Bogdanor 2005b; Stoker 2005). There are certain social problems -  
among them drug addiction, social exclusion and youth offending - that cut-across 
traditional departmental boundaries and straddle the different layers of government. 
To borrow the terminology of Perri 6 and his colleagues, such problems are 'wicked', 
both in their impact and apparent intractability.2 Although policy coordination has 
certainly been a prominent goal of many central governments in the last decade or so - 
not least the successive New Labour administrations led by Tony Blair in the UK -  
there is little evidence to suggest that joined-up government (JUG) has yet been 
achieved in that setting. Many central governments, including in the UK, have 
inherited a nineteenth century model of organisation that is rigidly departmental and 
structured around 'functions and services' rather than 'solving problems' (Wilson 2000: 
3). As Eugene Bardach (1998: 232) has noted, almost nothing about the traditional 
'bureaucratic ethos' of central government makes it 'hospitable to interagency 
collaboration.' Those operating at the meso-level have recognised that many features 
of meso-govemment, not least its freedom from the prohibitive scale of national 
bureaucracy, presents a unique opportunity for achieving levels of coordination that 
are virtually impossible at the centre. Vemon Bogdanor (2005a: 16) has explained this 
with reference to the Greater London Authority (GLA), within which the Mayor of 
London (who has far fewer executive powers than any national government) has 
recognised an opportunity to act as 'facilitator ... bringing together government 
agencies and the voluntary and private sectors so as to avoid fragmentation'.
In as much as a general policy style can be attributed to any group of institutions or
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layer of government, meso-govemment can therefore be said to have developed a style 
that is distinctively 'inclusive' and 'holistic': it actively seeks the involvement of a full 
array of actors in the policy- and decision-making process; it bases policy decisions on 
negotiation with and between actors positioned differently within networks of 
interested groups; and it aims to develop coordinated forms of policy formulation and 
delivery that together guard against the debilitating consequences of 
departmentalism.3 By introducing an elected form of meso-govemment to the UK, the 
architects of devolution raised the prospect that a new, more inclusive and holistic 
approach to policy-making would emerge in the new jurisdictions.
1.1 Devolution and a distinctive policy style: rhetoric and reality
Given the experiences of their meso-level European cousins, it came as little surprise 
that some supporters of devolution shared a vision of a more collaborative policy­
making ethos in the brave new world of devolved government. The language of 
inclusiveness and holism certainly pervaded the rhetoric surrounding and emanating 
from the new institutions in their early years of existence. In Scotland, those with an 
interest in the political and administrative architecture of the new Parliament spoke of 
the opportunity for 'far-reaching reorganisation to improve capacity for tackling 
complex policy issues, including ... involvement of outsiders, and structuring the 
machinery of government around a small number of broad policy goals' (Leicester and 
Mackay 1998: 3). Before the election of the first Scottish Parliament, in May 1999, it was 
widely predicted that the new Executive would act with 'the freedom to innovate 
[and] improve policy-making' because it would 'rethink relationships with local 
government, business, the voluntary sector, and the citizen' (Leicester & Mackay 1998: 
2). Subsequent studies suggested such predictions had a foundation in something 
more than mere optimism (e.g. Keating 2003, 2005; Keating et al 2003). Although in 
terms of substantive policy output there remain consistencies between the 
administrations in Edinburgh and London, some early 'differences of style and 
emphasis' have been noted, with a more 'consensual' and 'negotiated' style emerging 
during the period of the first Scottish Parliament under the leadership of Donald 
Dewar's Scottish Labour Party (Keating et al 2003: 129-130). David Raffe (2005) puts
4
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forward what became known as the 'National Debate' on education in Scotland as a 
practical example of early attempts by the Scottish Executive to 'introduce a new, more 
open and participative style of politics' (see also, Paterson 2000).
Dewar's administration also took some important initial steps to bring a new 
coordination to policy formulation and delivery. Jack McConnell, then Minister for 
Finance, announced the creation of a Modernising Government Fund (MGF) to the 
Scottish Parliament on 23rd February 2003. The fund provided £25m, later increased to 
£26m, for innovative public sector projects aimed at improving the quality, 
effectiveness and efficiency of public services in Scotland (Scottish Parliament 2002). 
Furthermore, preliminary research showed that white papers and legislation drawing 
links between 'the immediate focus' and 'other policy sectors' were prominent, and 
there was some evidence that certain cross-cutting issues, like social exclusion, had 
been successfully 'mainstreamed' (Keating 2003: 8). As Richard Parry and Audrey 
McDougal (2005) describe, the Scottish Executive also embarked on what it called a 
'cultural change' programme in the first Parliament, which was designed to ensure 
that the Executive could deliver the targets contained in the Labour-Liberal Democrat 
coalition's policy programme A  partnership for a better Scotland: partnership agreement 
(SE 2003). The change agenda was based around four core concepts: leadership; 
outward focus, including working with stakeholders; delivering outcomes; and 
developing corporate processes and procedures.
A similar picture is emerging in Wales. The National Assembly was designed to be 
a 'modem, progressive and inclusive democratic institution' (NAW 1997, emphasis 
added) and the first Assembly government certainly placed that aim at the centre of its 
vision:
We cannot achieve anything working alone ... We value the links we have forged with 
local government, business, trade unions and the voluntary sector and will continue to 
work with and through them in developing and implementing our policies.
NAW (2003a: 11)
Long-standing members of the government, like Andrew Davies, formerly the 
Minister for Economic Development and now with the Finance and Public Service 
Delivery portfolio, were particularly keen to stress their personal commitment to 
'engaging with civil society and the voluntary sector' when developing policy in their
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particular spheres of interest throughout the Assembly's first two terms (Davies, 
evidence the Richard Commission, November 7th 2002). Indeed, the language of 
inclusion was de rigueur as the makers of devolution became the first to practice 
politics in the new context.
JUG was also given a position of some prominence in the policy agenda of the first 
Assembly government, which promised 'co-ordinated responses to [the public's] 
needs, which often cut across the boundaries between public agencies and spheres of 
government' (NAW 2001a: 3). The Community Strategies initiative, for example, had the 
aim of 'coordinating the provision of services and initiatives to tackle the problems 
areas face in a coherent and integrated way' (NAW 2005a); similarly, the Health, Social 
Care and Well-Being Strategies envisaged a 'shared role' for Local Authorities and Local 
Health Boards (LHBs) and 'a joined-up approach to addressing the factors influencing 
health' (NAW 2003b: 6); and in its flagship education and lifelong learning policy 
paving document, The Learning Country (NAW 2001a: 21), the Assembly Government 
committed itself to developing 'education strategic plans [that] properly provide for 
multi-agency working ... to link the contributions of health, education and social 
services'. This commitment to JUG in policy-making was matched by a clear message 
that multi-agency partnership working should be at the heart of policy 
implementation and service delivery. The Making the Connections (WAG 2004) agenda 
had three very clearly articulated aims. The first was to place 'citizens at the centre', so 
that services would be more responsive to users' needs and people and communities 
would be involved in designing the way services are delivered. The second was to 
deliver 'better public engagement7, so that every person would have the opportunity 
to contribute to and connect with the hardest to reach. The third, and most pertinent, 
aim was to allow 'the Welsh public service to work together', so that more and better 
coordination between providers could deliver more efficient and effective services.
However, while the rhetoric of inclusive and holistic policy-making was and is 
abundant in post-devolution Scotland and Wales, research comparing that rhetoric 
with reality is not. In Scotland devolution was met with an avalanche of academic 
interest. As a reflection of an understandable initial interest in devolution as an 
historic constitutional change, there was an early research focus on nation-building,
6
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changing conceptions and expressions of national identity (e.g. Hearn 2002; Keating 
2002b) and on political parties and the party system (Holmes 2007; Laffin 2007; 
McEwen 2005, 2002; Hassan 2002; Bennie 2000; Bradbury et al 2000). Michael Keating 
and a catalogue of collaborators that includes Paul Caimey, Linda Stevenson and 
Katherine Taylor (e.g. Keating et al 2003), also produced a substantial body of 
empirically-based research which examined policy-making in the devolved Scotland. 
Caimey conducted comparative analysis in a number of policy areas, with a focus 
most notably on health (2007a; 2007b; 2009), and also examined the role of the 
Committees of the Scottish Parliament (2006a). Caimey7 s work on tobacco policy, for 
example, examined evidence of "policy transfer" (see Dolowitz and Marsh 2000) 
between the devolved and central government settings, and arrived at some 
interesting findings, including that there is some evidence of policy transfer from 
Scotland to Westminster in tobacco policy, as a opposed to the reverse of that 
processes in many of the other policy areas he has chosen as case studies, including 
housing stock transfer and higher education student tuition fees (2006b; for tobacco 
policy transfer see 2007a). Indeed, health policy was a popular focus for early 
empirical work in Scotland (see also e.g. Simeon 2003). Margaret Amott led a separate 
group of scholars whose focus was on the development of some quite specific aspects 
of education policy, including questions around the governance of Scottish schools in 
the devolved era (2008; with Menter 2007; 2005; with McKeown & Ransom 2003). 
However, this relatively extensive Scottish literature has not interrogated those claims 
reprised above that the devolved context is a better site for coordinated, inclusive 
policy-making. Furthermore, there has been no systematic or rigorous research into 
JUG in the devolved Scotland to date. Claims of a distinctively Scottish policy style 
have consequently not been adequately examined.4
The devolution literature in Wales is arguably less well-developed. There was the 
same initial interest in devolution as a constitutional change and a similar early 
research focus on nation-building, changing conceptions and expressions of national 
identity (e.g. Jones & Osmond 2003; Osmond 2004) and public support for the 
National Assembly (Jones and Scully 2003; Pattie et al 1999; Trystan et al 2003). As the 
devolution project gathered momentum, there was considerable interest in how
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political parties are dealing with the challenge of a new political and policy context in 
Wales, particular with regard to questions around so-called "multi-level governance" 
(Davies & Williams 2009; Morgan et al 2008; Osmond 2008, 2007; Betts 2007; Laffin & 
Shaw 2007; Laffin et al 2007; Laffin, Shaw & Taylor 2005; Laffin, Taylor and Thomas 
2004; Lynch 2004; Taylor 2003; Thomas 2003; McAllister 2001, 2000). There has also 
been a small number of rigorously-researched, empirically-based studies of the new 
Welsh policy space (e.g. Cole et al 2003; Cole 2004; with Baudewyns 2004; with Jones & 
Storer 2003; Huggins et al 2000; Chaney & Fevre 2001; Chaney 2003; Stafford 2008; 
Bradbury & Stafford 2008).5 As with the Scottish literature, however, there is no 
through-going attempt within this literature to conduct a rigorous analysis of the 
emerging policy style in Wales and certainly no interrogation of the claim that such a 
style may become distinctively inclusive and holistic. However, some studies did 
wander into this territory while pursuing other central research questions. Alistair 
Cole (2004; with Baudewyns 2004; Cole et al 2003) led some detailed comparative 
work on devolution and decentralisation in Wales and Brittany which conducted 
nearly one hundred interviews with actors located differently in the Welsh policy­
making community. One of the findings of the research -  and a pertinent one for the 
types of policy relationships identified and discussed later in this study (see chapter 5: 
114-124) - is Cole's (2004: 359) relatively positive evaluation of the state of the 
emerging Welsh civil society:
There is some evidence that the first term of devolution ... provided the mobilizing 
project necessary to embed the Welsh polity and to build Welsh civil society, in the 
long run potentially overcoming an important social capital deficit. There is a more 
cohesive party system, the equilibrium of which is favourable to making the devolved 
institutions work. There is the 'team Wales’ approach, signifying the building of new 
institutions as part of the devolved family and the diffusion of emerging referential 
frames. There are much closer contacts between Welsh Assembly government officials 
and Assembly sponsored public bodies than in the pre-devolution era (Cole et al 2003). 
There is the appearance, finally, of all-Wales organizations within civil society and the 
gradual recognition by professional organizations ... [of] the need to take devolution 
into account in their own organization
Cole (with Jones & Storer 2003) also conducted research into the nature of the 
emerging National Assembly civil service, drawing some useful conclusions about the 
lack of policy-making capacity within the fledgling service. Although contributors to
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the research commented on a generally difficult relationship with Whitehall 
departments, there was an interesting take on the nature of relationships between 
policy actors in Wales. As one interviewee put it, 'we've got better structures in Wales 
than in England. We've got Team Wales, we're small and we work closely together' 
(Cole, Jones & Storer 2003: 227). Given this study's central thesis, a general comment 
Cole added to the findings of this research may be significant. The interview data, he 
explained, showed that:
All the key players know one another personally and there are close linkages not only 
between civil servants and ministers, but also among politicians, officials and 
representatives of Welsh Civil Society.
(Cole et al 2003:227)
This apparent social dimension to policy relationships is retuned to frequently in the 
analysis of policy processes and outputs in both Wales and Scotland in the following 
chapters. There was also some highly relevant early work on the inclusive nature of 
governance in the devolved Wales undertaken by Paul Chaney (2003; with Fevre 2001). 
This identified the potential for a new 'partnership' to emerge between the 
government and third sectors and investigated the extent to which that had happened 
in Wales over the first months of a new pattern of governance. The findings, while 
preliminary, indicated that there was already some evidence of 'active engagement of 
some third sector representative groups (Chaney & Fevre 2001: 131).6 Despite these 
tantalising glimpses into the workings of an emerging Welsh policy style, however, 
there was no rigorous examination of JUG in the devolved context.
Alongside this empirical work, a number of frameworks for conducting descriptive 
evaluation of policy development in the devolved context were developed. This 
literature focused in large part on the extent to which devolution has enabled policy­
makers in Scotland and Wales to develop distinct responses to policy problems. Much 
of this work was undertaken in the context of Keating's (e.g. 2002a; with Hepburn & 
Caimey 2009) 'policy convergence-divergence' analytical framework and was largely 
the preserve of scholars with a base in or principal focus on Scottish devolution (2002a; 
Greer 2001; Simeon 2003; for a study that has employed the framework in a 
comparative empirical study of policy-making in Scotland and Wales, see Stafford 
2008)7 However, while Ian Stafford (2008: 76) is certainly correct that this framework
9
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provides 'a useful starting point for comparative policy analysis in post-devolution 
UK', it does not have any great utility for exploring this study's key research 
questions. For this reason, the analysis which follows chapter 5 and 6 is framed by a 
new approach to evaluating public policy in the devolved context. The detail of what 
is termed a 'joined-up governance approach' is provided in chapter 3 (61-65).
In summary, there was clearly a shared vision that a new and distinctive approach 
to policy-making would develop in both Scotland and Wales in the early years of 
devolution. However, the extent to which this new policy style has emerged in both 
nations has not been subjected to rigorous or detailed comparative analysis, 
particularly with regard to JUG. Although the newness of the devolved institutions 
creates a clear imperative to be cautious when drawing conclusions of any kind, the 
empirical work undertaken by Keating, Caimey, Cole and others demonstrates that 
legitimate and valuable research into the policy-making in the devolved institutions is 
possible now. On this basis, and at the ten year anniversary of devolution, the time is 
now right for a detailed, comparative study of the emerging policy styles in post­
devolution Scotland and Wales.
1.2 JUG in the devolved context: the case of education and lifelong learning
This study examines the impact of devolution on policy processes and outputs in 
Scotland and Wales and, more specifically, tests the thesis that a distinctively inclusive 
and holistic policy style will emerge (or has emerged) in the new jurisdictions. In 
particular, the study focuses on attempts to 'join-up' government in Scotland and 
Wales since devolution and the extent to which these have been distinctive, either in 
their scope, nature, quality or success. It is important to note, however, that the study 
is one of British politics rather than a comparative regionalist study: Wales and Scotland 
are not necessarily comparable in terms of the size of the two countries, or the 
configuration, executive competence and legislative power of their new political 
institutions. The study therefore considers and investigates the impact of devolution 
specifically on the British policy terrain, even if the central thesis of a more inclusive 
and holistic policy style has its foundation in meso-level Europe.
10
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It is hoped the study will be valuable and timely in four main ways. First, there has 
been no rigorous comparative study of JUG in the devolved context in the UK. In this 
respect a recent (and authoritative) volume edited by Vernon Bogdanor, Joined-up 
Government (2005b), is instructive. Although the volume includes some discussion and 
analysis of attempts at JUG at the decentralised level in England, an analysis (or even 
an acknowledgement) of the devolved level in Scotland and Wales is almost entirely 
absent. The study will therefore make a contribution to the empirical literature on JUG 
by presenting the findings of original research conducted at the devolved level, but it 
is also intended that the study will make a contribution to the study of JUG more 
generally by developing a clear definition of the concept and a framework for 
descriptive evaluation that can facilitate systematic comparative analysis of JUG for 
the first time. Second, the study will make a contribution to the fledgling empirical 
literature on devolution and comparative public policy in the UK. There have been 
some excellent and exciting studies in this area in recent years, but there remains real 
scope for fresh empirical work. Third, while there is a growing literature on aspects of 
education policy in both jurisdictions, most notably with respect to schools and 
student tuition (e.g. Egan & James 2001; Jephcote & Salisbury 2007; Rees 2005; Phelps 
et al 2006; Morgan et al 2004), the two case studies chosen for detailed analysis, special 
educational needs (SEN) and adult community learning (ACL) -  important policy 
areas in their own right -  have thus far been somewhat neglected. The research may 
therefore be of use to education and lifelong learning policy-makers and practitioners 
because it places policy processes and outputs into vital comparative context and 
allows lessons to be drawn from experiences in other jurisdictions. Fourth, the study 
will make a contribution to the theoretical public policy literature through critical 
reflection on a range of key theories and the development of a conceptually innovative 
approach to policy-making in a new institutional context. In particular, the study 
conceptualises JUG in a way that may challenge the paradigmatic network theory of 
the policy process.
The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured in the following way: the 
next section details the key research questions, organised around the four main ways 
in which the research will contribute to the various empirical and theoretical
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literatures identified above. There then follows a concluding section which presents a 
summary of the remaining chapters.
1.3 Key research questions
The research is framed by a series of focused, comparative questions. These are 
organised around the four main ways in which the research seeks to contribute to the 
various empirical and theoretical literatures mentioned above.
A.. The emerging empirical and theoretical literatures on JUG:
i. What is JUG?
ii. Is JUG new, or distinctive in any way?
iii. How can 'joined-up-ness' be defined, measured and assessed?
iv. What are the specific features of policy-making at the devolved level that 
influence JUG? Is scale an explanatory factor?
v. How successfully have education and lifelong learning policy processes and 
outputs been joined-up in Scotland and Wales since devolution?
vi. How can any variation in the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and 
action between policy contexts be explained or accounted for?
vii. What are the continued obstacles to JUG in the devolved context?
B. The empirical literature on devolution and public policy in the UK:
i. How is SEN and ACL policy formulated and implemented in Scotland and 
Wales, post-devolution?
ii. How can any distinctive features of the respective policy styles be explained?
iii. What, more specifically, is the role of scale?
iv. Who are the key actors in the policy-making processes?
v. What strategies do these actors employ when seeking to influence policy- and 
decision-makers? How successful are they?
vi. How do these actors relate to one another and what is their respective 
influence on policy outputs?
vii. More specifically, what role do third sector organisations play in the policy 
process?
viii. How does the policy-making process compare across jurisdictions, including in 
Northern Ireland and the regional governance structures in England?
ix. What is the specific role played by the devolved legislatures in the policy 
process? Is this distinctive?
C. The empirical literature on devolved education and lifelong learning policy:
i. How has education and lifelong learning policy developed in Scotland and 
Wales since devolution?
12
Devolution and public policy: a joined-up governance approach
ii. What are the continuities with education and lifelong learning policy in the 
pre-devolution era?
iii. To what extent has devolution created distinct policy agendas in Scotland and 
Wales and to what extent have these been translated into distinct policy 
processes and outputs?
iv. What are the similarities and differences between SEN and ACL policy across 
jurisdictions and to what extent does knowing the degree of specificity of the 
case studies allow the research findings to be generalised?
D. The theoretical public policy literature:
i. How can a 'joined-up policy universe' be conceptualised?
ii. If JUG relies on policy actors pooling policy- and decision-making sovereignty, 
what is the mechanism -  the institutional glue -  that binds actors together in 
these relationships? More specifically, how far does inter-personal and inter- 
organisational trust explain the presence or absence of effective JUG?
iii. Does an interests-based account of the policy process adequately explain the 
nature of policy- and decision-making in the chosen case studies?
iv. What are the wider theoretical implications of JUG? Would a joined-up policy 
universe, should it be detected in any case study, represent an empirical 
challenge to the established network paradigm?
1.4 A summary of the chapters
The chapters that follow begin, in chapter 2, with the study's organising perspective. 
The development of the policy network concept is discussed and the British literature 
is surveyed. Particular attention is paid to the typology of networks posited by Rod 
Rhodes (1988; with Marsh 1992), ranging from the closed, highly integrated 
characteristics of his 'policy communities', to the more open and loosely integrated 
nature of his 'issue networks'. This is followed by a discussion of the literature on 
pressure groups in British politics and, in particular, the 'insider-outsider' distinction 
used by some writers (e.g. Grant 1999). It is argued that this literature puts forward 
what is essentially an interests-based explanation of the policy process, in which 
power and influence are derived from the resources actors can access or mobilise, and 
the realtionships which bind those actors together in networks take the form of 
'resource dependencies'.
The chapter then turns to the concept and doctrine of JUG and proposes a definition 
of the term based on a reading of the practitioner and academic literatures. It is argued 
that achieving JUG depends on policy actors agreeing to pool what is termed their 
'policy- and decision-making sovereignty' and that, for such a pooling to take place,
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high levels of inter-personal and inter-organisational trust must be established and 
sustained. This provides the basis for a Hierarchy of Joined-up Thinking and Action 
(HJTA) which is put forward as a set of indicators for measuring and assessing JUG. 
The chapter then puts JUG into historical perspective and argues that, though 
frustration with Whitehall departmentalism and a related interest in policy 
coordination are recurring themes in the history of UK public administration, there are 
some features of JUG that may mark it out as distinct from previous attempts to 
coordinate policy formulation and delivery.
An attempt is then made to reconclie JUG with the interests-based explanations 
contained in the network literature. It is argued that, while actors operating within 
networks are motivated by narrow institutional interests and held together in 
networks by various forms of resource dependency, those operating in a 'joined-up 
policy universe' are motivated by the broader interests of partnerships and held 
together by various forms of instituional and individual trust, a quite different gravity. 
The chapter concludes by asking whether successfully identifying this 'culture of 
collaboration' in Scotland and Wales might represent an empirical challenge to the 
network paradigm.
Chapter 3 outlines the applied research methods used to generate primary data and 
assimilate secondary material in order to test the study's central thesis. It also 
elaborates on the HJTA as a framework for organising and facilitating its analysis and 
the basis, therefore, of a 'JUG approach'. The chapter also introduces and provides 
some basic background to the case studies in each of the devolved institutions and 
explains why they were chosen as suitable tests of JUG.
The first section of the chapter introduces education and lifelong learning policy as 
the study's principal area of focus in Scotland in Wales and SEN and ACL policy as 
the areas chosen for detailed examination. This is followed by a more detailed 
discussion of the case study method, including the extent to which it might be possible 
to generalise research findings. The research design is then outlined, which combines 
document collection and analysis with a series of semi-structured interviews with key 
policy actors. The value of interview data in uncovering the nature of policy-making is
j
examined and the method used to identify potential interviewees is explained.
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The second section elaborates on the HJTA as a framework for effective descriptive 
evaluation of policy-making in each of the cases. It then considers a set of seven key 
variables which may influence the number and quality of trust relationships (and, 
concomitantly, the degree of joined-up-ness) and further facilitate systematic, 
comparative analysis from a JUG perspective of policy-making between policy areas, 
across jurisdictions and over time.
Chapter 4, the first of three substantive chapters, presents an analysis of the 
development of SEN and ACL policy in Scotland and Wales from the first devolved 
elections, in May 1999, to the most recent, in June 2007. It is argued that these policy 
areas are of particular interest for two main reasons: first, there has been considerable 
policy-making activity in SEN and ACL in both jurisdictions since 1999, meaning that 
there is a relatively well-developed evidential base to inform detailed comparative 
analysis; and, second, policy-making in the two areas has taken place in quite different 
contexts, meaning that the study's broader research questions around policy processes 
and outputs can be tested in different ways. To this end, particular attention is paid to 
policy developments which have salience for questions around JUG. In the area of 
SEN, the chapter focuses on the Coordinated Support Plan (CSP) in Scotland, a 
statutory measure designed to coordinate the contributions of an array of agencies 
with an interest in educational provision for children with additional support needs 
and, in Wales, Working Together, a multi-agency strategy developed to deliver better 
speech and language therapy (SLT) services for children and young people. In the area 
of ACL, the chapter focuses on the development of Individual Learner Accounts (ILAs) 
in Scotland, a mechanism designed to broker ACL to those with a need to develop 
their skills and, in Wales, the Community Consortia for Education and Training 
(CCETs), an institutional framework designed to encourage and facilitate partnership 
working among the statutory, private and third sectors at a sub-regional level. In the 
final section, the chapter locates these developments within the wider policy contexts 
in Scotland and Wales between 1999 and 2007 and explores some of the complex 
linkages that developed during that period between education and lifelong learning 
and a number of other broad policy goals.
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Chapter 5 measures the 'joined-up-ness' of the education and lifelong learning 
policy processes and outputs detailed in chapter 4, using the HJTA developed in 
chapters 2 and 3 as the framework for a descriptive evaluation. The analysis is 
organised according to the different levels of trust that make up the HJTA -  starting 
with the 'informational' level and progressing through 'prudential', 'contract and 
'goodwill' trust -  and is further divided by policy area and jurisdiction. The key 
finding is that trust relationships were successfully cultivated between policy actors of 
all types in both policy areas and in both jurisdictions during the period of study. 
Issues were routinely framed as cutting across portfolios and traditionally-defined 
spheres of interest and there were concerted efforts to ensure that all stakeholders 
were made to feel part of the process of finding joined-up solutions. This picture was 
particularly stark in Wales, where devolution delivered a step change in the frequency 
and quality of consultation experienced by less well-resourced policy actors. While the 
level of trust demonstrated in the majority of policy processes and outputs was 
generally restricted to the lower 'informational' or 'minimal' levels, there is also strong 
evidence of 'contractual' trust relationships, most commonly associated with funding 
mechanisms designed to ensure joint working at the policy implementation and 
delivery stage. As might be expected, there are fewer examples of processes or outputs 
which required or demonstrated the existence of the highest level of 'goodwill' trust, 
but those that can be identified are located almost exclusively within the SEN policy 
area in both jurisdictions. There is therefore significant variation in the nature and 
extent of joined-up thinking and action between the policy areas chosen as case 
studies and SEN policy is described as being 'more joined-up' than ACL policy.
Chapter 6 seeks to explain this variation by exploring the idea that conditions can 
be more or less favourable for JUG depending on a number of key variables. The first 
section of the chapter examines SEN and ACL policy processes and outputs in the 
light of the set of variables identified in chapter 3 as having the potential to influence 
the number and quality of trust relationships. It is then shown how two of these 
variables played out quite differently in the SEN and ACL cases in Scotland and Wales 
during the period of study, with the relatively low political sensitivity of SEN, 
combined with the relatively high level of existing consensus in the policy area
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allowing actors to pool policy- and decision-making sovereignty and demonstrate 
their commitment to the principles of JUG in conditions that did not seriously 
jeopardise their narrow institutional interests. Participation in a joined-up SEN policy 
process in Scotland and Wales is therefore described as having been 'institutionally 
safe'.
The second section of the chapter examines in some detail the significance of two 
further variables that are particularly relevant for a study of JUG in the devolved 
context; namely, the scale of the policy-making context and the age of the competent 
political institution. It is shown that the relatively small scale of policy-making in 
Scotland and Wales had a major influence on the formation of trust relationships in all 
of the case studies and a number of clear examples are identified where scale helped 
cultivate what Jasper Eshuis and Cees Van Woerkum (2003) call 'individual' trust (see 
chapter 2: 40-43). However, it is then shown how the positive impact of scale was 
counter-balanced to some extent by the relatively young age of both devolved 
institutions. This meant there was a lack of institutionalised relationships and forms of 
trust associated more established policy contexts had not emerged as a result.
The final section asks whether an understanding of how these key variables 
influence the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and action can help move the 
study of JUG towards a predictive model in which the degree of joined-up-ness -  at 
least in policy processes and outputs -  may be confidently forecast. It is concluded 
that, while identifying the degree of specificity in a given case study may add to the 
legitimacy and validity of generalisations drawn from its findings, further analysis 
must be conducted in a range of additional cases before a comprehensive 
understanding of the relationship between the conditions in a given policy context 
and the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and action can be claimed.
Chapter 7 reflects on the contribution a JUG approach can make to the way the 
policy process is described, explained and conceptualised. The first section of the 
chapter re-examines SEN policy processes and outputs in Wales through the 
conceptual lens of the network and finds that SEN policy actors participated in a 
network which shares some features of Rod Rhodes' (1988; with Marsh 1992) 
'producer' type. However, in the second section it is argued that the mechanism of
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"resource dependency", which is central to the network theory, only partially explains 
a number of these relationships, particularly those between traditionally-powerful 
government actors and small, relatively poorly-resourced actors in civil society.
The concluding section asks whether the network approach can provide a 
satisfactory explanation for the existence of close policy relationships that do not have 
a clear basis in "exchange". It is acknowledged that the tendency observed in the case 
studies for powerful actors to enter into these kinds of relationships only when they 
perceive there to be limited institutional risk suggests that, even where there is strong 
evidence of joined-up thinking and action, institutional interests remain the main 
dynamic of interaction between policy actors and, for this reason, viewing policy 
processes and outputs from a JUG perspective complements, rather than 
fundamentally challenges, the network literature.
The concluding chapter brings together a number of strands of analysis in search of 
some definitive answers to the key research questions outlined above. The chapter 
begins by describing the framework which was developed to effectively measure the 
relative "joined-up-ness" of policy processes and outputs in Scotland and Wales. This 
section returns to the working definition of JUG posited in chapter 2 and reviews the 
innovative framework for the descriptive evaluation of policy processes and outputs 
from a JUG perspective outlined in chapter 3. It is shown that, by arranging policy 
processes and outputs according to the type of inter-personal or inter-organisational 
trust that must exist for policy actors to agree to pool policy- and decision-making 
sovereignty, it was possible - arguably for the first time - to conduct systematic, 
comparative analysis of JUG across policy areas, between jurisdictions and over time.
The chapter then explains how this "JUG approach' was used to examine policy 
processes and outputs in the policy areas of SEN and ACL in Scotland and Wales 
between 1999 and 2007. It is shown how a marked variation in the nature and extent of 
joined-up thinking and action in the two policy areas was the starting point for an 
analysis of seven key variables which may influence JUG. This section pays particular 
attention to the variable of scale, both in terms of the numbers of actors involved in the 
policy- and decision-making process and their physical proximity to one another. It is 
claimed that the relatively small scale of the devolved context has created conditions
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that, on balance, are favourable for JUG. The main research finding is that the 
emerging policy styles in the devolved jurisdictions demonstrate some distinctively 
inclusive and holistic features which are to some extent a function of 'smallness'.
The chapter then turns to an important research question which focuses on JUG as 
an administrative doctrine more generally. This section asks whether the case studies 
offer any evidence that JUG represents a real departure from previous attempts to 
coordinate the business of policy- and decision-making. It is argued that, while a call 
for cultural change marks out the rhetoric of JUG from that associated with previous 
attempts at coordination, there is scant evidence that a set of behavioural rules which 
make pooling policy- and decision-making sovereignty a normalised and therefore 
expected mode of behaviour has become embedded. As such, the existence of a 
'culture of collaboration' is not supported by any robust empirical data from the case 
studies. However, it is argued that JUG has found a place in the collective 
consciousness of the policy-making community in Scotland and Wales and that 
'collaboration' is now an established synonym for 'good governance': policy actors in 
both nations see JUG as an ideal state to which to aspire, even if that aspiration is only 
translated into action under certain conditions.
The final section considers the ways in which the empirical and theoretical study of 
JUG and public policy in the devolved context might be taken forward. Care is taken 
not to endow the findings of what must be seen as isolated case studies with 
significance beyond their quite specific situation and a call is made for additional in- 
depth case study research to be conducted in a range of policy contexts so that the 
ways in which key variables influence the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and 
action can be better understood (particularly where they exist in combinations 
different to those identified in the SEN and ACL cases). It is also argued that potential 
linkages between a JUG approach and the paradigmatic network literature should be 
explored in order to deepen understanding of policy relationships in contexts where 
there is evidence of joined-up thinking and action.
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Notes to chapter 1
1 From the Greek mesos, meaning 'middle'. Other scholars have referred to a 'third' 
layer of government (e.g. Hepburn 2008), though this usage is avoided here to prevent 
confusion with the 'third sector'.
2 Although the specific term JUG is increasingly maligned as a voguish New 
Labourism - a sinister Mandelsonian creation devoid of any real meaning - the need to 
coordinate government activity to tackle cross-cutting issues remains a key strand of 
the public policy practitioner literature and may even have become embedded as a set 
of legitimised rules for good governance (see Chapter 2: 43).
3 The problems of developing hard typologies of national policy styles are discussed 
by Percy Allum (1995:402-406)
4 The development of devolved government in Northern Ireland is, for many reasons, 
a quite different case to Scotland and Wales. For much of its short life, the National 
Assembly at Stormont has been suspended and policy development, for that reason 
alone, is markedly less well developed. Indeed, many of the reasons put forward for a 
lack of empirical work during the first National Assembly for Wales still apply in large 
part to Stormont, which has produced comparatively little in the way of substantive 
policy output.
5 This literature is inferior to the Scottish devolution in terms of both scope and depth. 
Some of the most detailed work in Scotland was funded as part of the Economic and 
Social Research Council's (ESRC) Devolution and Constitutional Change programme, 
and it is unfortunate that a parallel Welsh study, funded as part of the same 
programme, published little significant data and only the most general of research 
findings (Loughlin & Sykes 2004).
6 It has been argued that the relatively limited empirical literature on Wales is 
reflective of the time it takes for genuine and observable patterns of policy-making to 
emerge in new institutional settings. The National Assembly, after all, has had 'very 
little time to develop new policies in any field' and, as a consequence, 'the evidential 
base for drawing any conclusions about the policy effects of a new pattern of 
devolution is pretty limited' (Rees 2002: 104). While this is certainly the case 
(devolution, as Ron Davies (1999) famously put it, is a process, not an event), the 
relative newness of the Assembly is an excuse that is itself running out of time. 
However, even the larger body of empirical work focussing on Scotland has been 
restricted to some extent by the age of the Parliament. This has thus far precluded 
much of the outputs-based research that is necessary to cut through the thicket of 
public policy rhetoric. This is acknowledged in the literature, which is careful to draw 
attention to the 'tender age' of the Scottish Parliament and is aware of the danger of 
arriving at 'premature judgements' (Arter 2002: 95).
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7 The framework that Keating (e.g. 2002a; with Hepburn & Caimey 2009) introduced 
for studying policy differentiation highlighted the importance of a range of structural 
factors that influence policy-making. These can be summarised as: the asymmetrical 
nature of the devolution settlements; the nature of intergovernmental relations; the 
political make-up of the central and territorial governments; the character of the 
(broadly conceived) policy communities in the new jurisdictions; the extent to which 
policy divergence is possible between jurisdictions with a common security area, 
common market and common welfare state; and the extent to which devolved 
functions are subject to EU law and political influence.
Keating then put forward a typology of policies that may be identified in the post­
devolution policy-making setting. The first type of policy that may be identified, he 
argued, were 'non-comparable policies' where an issue is specific or otherwise 
restricted to one particular region of the UK. He then identified 'policy autonomy' 
where different institutions may formulate policy in response to particular needs in, 
for example, education, social services or organisational matters. The third broad type 
was 'concurrent policy' where policy-makers in the different jurisdiction may be under 
the same pressures, either from UK-wide pressure groups or universally applied 
European regulation. The fourth type was 'policy uniformity', where 'practical 
considerations or external pressures' cause different jurisdictions to pursue a single 
line'. The final policy type was policy competition', which drew on the literature on 
policy transfer and policy learning. In this type, jurisdictions seek to innovate in policy 
formulation and delivery in order to demonstrate their credentials as independent- 
thinking, autonomous entities.
2
Organising perspective
When Tony Blair and New Labour swept to power in the UK, in May 1997, they 
brought with them the next "big idea' in public administration (Bogdanor 2005b). The 
call to 'join-up' government was a reaction to the rigid departmental mindset 
associated with Whitehall and its apparently debilitating consequences for the 
effective coordination of central government policy. In emphasising the need to join- 
up, Labour argued that better inter-agency coordination within government and 
greater collaboration between government, the legislature and institutions in civil 
society, were key to solving those 'wicked' problems that cut-across traditional, 
departmental boundaries: problems such as youth offending, drug addiction and 
social exclusion (Cabinet Office 2000a, 2000b, 2001; SEU 2002).
Joined-up government (JUG) proved a captivating, if controversial, slogan. While 
many embraced it as a pragmatic, common sense approach to reforming the business 
of government (see Hilpem 2002; Baroness Masham 2000), for others it typified a New 
Labour fetish for empty, media-friendly catchphrases: the concept was voguish, one 
critic argued, but vague (Hoggart 1998). By the early years of the new century, 
however, JUG was established as an administrative doctrine of some currency (Page 
2005). Politicians of all colours made rhetorical commitments to its core principles and 
some highly visible early initiatives were a public relations success (SEU 2002). 
Following what Christopher Pollitt (2003: 34) calls a 'small flood' of practitioner 
accounts and think tank publications (Cabinet Office 2000a, 2000b, 2001; CMPS 2000,
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2001; Mulgan et al 1997; 6 1997) a steady flow of academic work brought the study of 
JUG into the mainstream of contemporary political science (Kavanagh & Richards 2001; 
Flinders 2002; 6 et al 2002; Pollitt 2003; 6 2004; Bogdanor 2005b).
Despite this growing political, administrative and academic interest, however, JUG 
remains something of an enigma. There continues to be confusion over the nature and 
scope of its aims and the specification of its methods; there is no satisfactory 
framework for detecting its presence or for measuring variations in its degree; a debate 
continues over whether JUG describes a genuine departure in public administration, 
or merely the successful rebranding of a long established administrative doctrine; and 
it remains unclear how the idea of joined-up policy-making can be reconciled with 
established, interest-based conceptions of the policy process, such as those put 
forward in the policy network literature (e.g. Rhodes 1988; with Marsh 1992).
This chapter begins by discusssing the literature on goverance, networks and 
pressure groups as together forming the paradigmatic organising perpsective in the 
contemporary public policy literature. It is argued that this literature puts forward 
what is essentially an interests-based explanation of the policy process in which power 
and influence are derived from the resources actors can access or mobilise, and the 
realtionships which bind actors together in networks take the form of 'resource 
dependencies'.
The second section proposes a working definition of JUG based on a reading of the 
practitioner and academic literatures. It is argued that achieving JUG depends on 
policy actors agreeing to pool what is termed their 'policy- and decision-making 
sovereignty' and that, for such a pooling to take place, high levels of inter-personal 
and inter-organisational trust must be established and sustained. This provides the 
basis for a 'Hierarchy of Joined-up Thinking and Action' which is put forward as a set 
of indicators for measuring and assessing JUG. The chapter then puts JUG into 
historical perspective and argues that some features of the doctrine may mark it out as 
distinct from previous attempts to coordinate policy formulation and delivery.
In the final section an attempt is made to reconclie JUG with the interests-based 
explanations of the policy process put forward in the network literature. It is argued 
that, while actors operating within networks are motivated by narrow institutional
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interests and held together in networks by the mechanism of resource dependency, 
those operating in a 'joined-up policy universe' are motivated by the broader interests 
of partnerships and held together by mutual trust, a quite different gravity. The 
chapter concludes by asking whether successfully identifying examples of JUG in 
action might therefore represent an empirical challenge to the network paradigm.
2.1 Policy-making through the conceptual lens of the network
The concept, image and metaphor of the 'network' has become the new paradigm for 
the architecture of complexity across the whole of intellectual enquiry.
Kenis & Schneider (1991:25)
The group of public policy scholars referred to loosely as the 'British school' framed 
their analysis with a series of familiar questions: has prime ministerial government 
replaced cabinet government? How does the cabinet counter-balance prime ministerial 
power? Do officials dominate ministers, or vice versa? The focus was thus on a 
hierarchy of clearly-defined institutions and processes at the very heart of government; 
the various relationships between prime minister, cabinet, ministers, civil servants and, 
to a lesser extent, political parties, were seen as the pre-eminent and definitive 
dynamics of the policy- and decision-making process. Writers in the British school saw 
these policy relationships as having a liberal, constitutional footing, and used the 
Westminster model of British politics -  with its intricate rules for the conduct of 
policy- and decision-making - as an organising perspective. A number of versions of 
the model were p u t forward, but Andrew Gamble (1990: 407) identified its broad 
features as: Parliamentary sovereignty; strong cabinet government; accountability 
through elections; majority party control of the executive; 'elaborate rules' for the 
conduct of parliamentary business; institutionalised opposition; and 'the rules of 
debate'. The point is that subscribers to the Westminster model conceptualised the 
policy process as a series of zero-sum games in which all actors facilitate, but also 
Wimit, each other's ability to act (see Gamble 1990; Bevir & Rhodes 1999). 
fo more recent work, this approach has been criticised for placing too great an 
Phasis on the role of prime minister and cabinet: on the 'core of the core'. For 
^hn Smith (2000: 1), the very fundamentals of the traditional approach are defective: 
18 dnportant', he argues, 'to get away from ... the view that one person, or a select
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few, can run government' and to instead focus attention on a plurality of policy actors, 
including the representatives of private and non-governmental groups.
2.1.1 Policy networks: an interests-based account of the policy process
There is now something of a consensus that the corridors of power in Westminster and 
Whitehall form what is merely part of a wider and more fragmented policy process 
that is heavily reliant on a range of complex 'policy networks . that is to say, clusters 
of state and non-state actors, each with an interest, or stake in a given policy sector 
and, crucially, with the capacity to help determine policy success or failure (Petersen 
2003).1 Writers in the British school have also been criticised for basing their analyses 
on the Westminster model of British politics, and the notion that policy actors at once 
facilitate and delimit each other's ability to net is now widely dismissed as idealistic, 
'simplistic and flawed' (Thain 2002: 128; see also Marinetto 2003). Rod Rhodes (1988; 
with Marsh 1992), in particular, has taken strong issue with the idea of zero sum 
games, arguing that policy relationships within network structures are better 
conceptualised as a series of 'positive-sum g a m e s , in which policy is formulated and
implemented through the exchange of resources.
These resources may take a variety of form s- Representatives of an organisation 
may be able to guarantee the compliance (o r acquiescence) of that organisation s 
membership, particularly if it is configured a ro u n d  a hierarchical model, others may 
be able to provide unique expertise, or deliver" important services, that are vital for the 
effective implementation of a given policy. I n  Rhodes view, the capacity to mobilise 
resources of this kind determines an a c to r 's  bargaining position within a policy 
network because other actors within that n e tw o rk  may depend on those resources, not 
only for the effective implementation of policy"" generally, but also for the realisation of 
their own particular policy goals. Negotiation is therefore in the interests of all those 
who hold resources within networks b ecau se  h  can e^ad t° policy outcomes that 
benefit all concerned. Within the structure of tube network, then, it is the resources an 
actor can call upon that provide the dynamic o^f th e  policy-making process, and which 
ultimately form the basis of power. For Smith ( CL993: 7), power is a relationship based
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on dependence and not a zero-sum', and a policy network is frequently a mechanism 
for 'enhancing mutual power' rather than 'taking [it] from one or the other'.
The concept of the policy network and the explanatory mechanism of resource 
dependency together form what is now the paradigmatic organising perspective in the 
British public policy literature. The seeds of this dominance were sown in the 1970s, 
when Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky's (1974) study of networks in the UK 
Treasury and Jeremy Richardson and Grant Jordan's Governing Under Pressure (1979: 
74), both drew attention towards negotiations between state actors and a range of non­
state pressure groups, taking place within 'compartments' or 'segments'. Interest in 
this work had an influence on some major Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) research programmes in the 1980s. Most of the work carried out as part of the 
Intergovernmental Relations Initiative and the Local Governance Programme, for example, 
viewed the policy process through the conceptual lens of the network (Marsh & 
Rhodes 1992:10-18).
It was Rhodes' (1986, 1988) account of British inter-governmental relations that 
sparked the real interest, and Marsh and Rhodes' (1992) edited book collection on 
policy networks in Britain that marked the new paradigm. Other studies focused on 
particular policy sectors, such as agriculture (Smith 1990,1991,1992; Jordan et al 1994), 
education (Raab 1992), subnational government (Gray 1994), water (Richardson et al 
1992), community care (Hunter & Wistow 1987) and govemment-industry relations 
(Wilks & Wright 1987). There were also a range of theoretical contributions (e.g. 
Rhodes 1990; Jordan 1990; Marsh & Rhodes 1992; van Waarden 1992).
2.1.2 Distinguishing networks: classification and typology
A key strand of the policy network literature is the work on classifying networks for 
descriptive purposes. In broad terms, distinctions are drawn between networks based 
on two key characteristics. The first of these is what might be termed 'network 
membership'. This includes the 'stability' of membership, which refers to the extent to 
which members of a given policy network remain part of that network over time, and 
the 'accessibility' of membership, which refers to the extent to which the boundaries of 
the network are porous to the inward and outward movement of members. The
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second characteristic is what Rhodes calls "resource distribution" (1988: 212; see also 
1995, 1997, 2000). This refers to the nature and basis of interaction between network 
members in terms of the exchange of policy resources. Rhodes makes his clearest 
distinction between interdependent relationships, in which each of the actors involved 
has the capacity to mobilise resources on which another or others depend, and 
relationships based merely on consultation, which involve little or no exchange of 
resources. Rhodes posits a typology of policy networks based on different variations of 
these characteristics, and his "policy communities', "issue networks', "producer", 
"territorial" and "professional" networks have become the most widely used 
classifications in the literature.
The term "policy community' was used by both Heclo and Wildavsky (1974) and 
Richardson and Jordan (1979) to refer to highly integrated and exclusive networks, 
and Rhodes deviates little from their classic definitions.2 According to David Marsh 
(1998:14), Rhodes' policy community is characterised by:
a limited number of participants with some groups consciously excluded; frequent and 
high quality interaction between all members of the community on all matters related 
to the policy issues; all members have resources so the relationships between them are 
exchange relationships; the basic interaction is one involving bargaining between 
members with resources.
In terms of the characteristics noted above, then, Rhodes' policy community is a 
network with a highly stable membership, highly restricted access to membership, and 
interdependent relationships between members based on the resources they each 
"bring to the table' (Fig. 2.,1)
Fig. 2.1 Rhodes'policy community
The boundary of the network is non- 
porous. There are a small number of 
members and most relationships are 
interdependent. As such, interaction 
takes the form of bargaining or 
negotiation.
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The policy community is usually conceptualised as a three-way network (perhaps 
involving a government department, industrial organisation and trade union), but the 
historical example most frequently cited in the British literature involved only two 
actors. Smith has shown that agricultural policy-making in Britain from the end of the 
Second World War to roughly the end of the Thatcher era was dominated by the 
National Farmers' Union (NFU) and the Ministry for Agriculture Fisheries and Food 
(MAFF). These excluded other groups from the policy agenda and moved policy in the 
direction that best fitted their 'shared view of the goals of agricultural policy' (1992:47).
The most pertinent part of Smith's analysis is his explanation of how the NFU and 
MAFF were able to achieve this level of dominance. Put simply, Smith (1992: 48) 
argues that they together dominated the policy process because they also dominated 
the key policy resources. For most of the post-war period, the NFU 'performed the role 
of aggregating and limiting demands and then helped to sell the agreed policy to its 
members. In return, MAFF had to offer the farmers guaranteed prices.'
In contrast to his policy community, Rhodes' 'issue network'3 involves 'only policy 
consultation', and very little negotiation or bargaining. It is further characterised by:
the involvement of a large number of participants; fluctuating access for the various 
members; the absence of consensus and the presence of conflict; [and] an unequal 
power relationship in which many participants may have few resources, little access 
and no alternative.
The issue network is thus the polar opposite of the policy community.4 Its membership 
is highly volatile and fluid, and so there are very few institutionalised relationships; 
access is totally unrestricted and so the boundary of the network is both porous and 
difficult to discern; the relationships between members are generally not exchange 
relationships and are instead based almost entirely on consultation (Fig. 2.2).5
Marsh (1998:14)
invariably limited. The basic 
relationship is consultative.
The boundary of the network is 
porous. There are a large number 
of members and, although some 
may have resources, these are
Fig. 2.2 Rhodes' issue network
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Between his policy community and issue network poles, Rhodes identifies at least 
three further types of network. Marsh and Rhodes (1992: 14) distinguish 'producer7 
networks by:
the prominent role of economic interest (both the public and private sector) in policy 
making; their fluctuating membership; the dependence of the centre on industrial 
organisations for delivering the desired goods and for expertise; and the limited 
interdependence among the economic interests.
Such networks thus have a somewhat unstable membership, and a boundary that is 
porous to some inward and outward movement. There are certainly interdependent 
relationships between members, but these are restricted to relationships between the 
centre and the producers: there is no interdependence among the producers 
themselves (Fig. 2.3). This contrasts clearly with Rhodes' policy community, in which 
all members of the network -  or at least the great majority - develop mutually 
dependent relationships.6
Fig. 2.3 Rhodes' producer network
The boundary of the network is 
porous to an extent, with some 
fluctuation of membership. While 
there are interdependent 
relationships, these exist only 
between the centre and the producers.
2.1.3 Predictive theory or descriptive device? The explanatory utility of the network
Although there is now general agreement that policy networks exist and that it is 
possible to identify broad types of network, the explanatory utility of the concept -  its 
legitimacy and value as the basis of predictive theory - remains a matter of some 
contention (Marsh 1998: 3). At the heart of the debate is a simple question: does the 
'type' of policy network, classified according to typologies such as that posited by 
Rhodes above, have any causal effect on policy outcomes? Rhodes, of course, maintains 
that it does. The existence of a policy community, he argues, 'constrains the policy 
agenda' and 'shapes policy outcomes' in specific and predictable ways (with Marsh
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1992:197). It is Rhodes' view that policy developed within this kind of network will be 
more coherent, consistent and effectively implemented than policy developed in more 
loosely integrated settings.
Smith seeks to explain the development of agricultural policy in Britain using 
precisely this logic (1992: 49). The existence of a closed, stable, interdependent policy 
community, he argues, produced a certain consistency of policy outcomes in the post 
war period. Interestingly, Smith also imagines how agricultural policy would have 
differed had it been made in the context of other network types. If it had instead taken 
place within an issue network, he argues, it would have Tacked a single policy centre' 
and, as a consequence, would have produced far more pluralistic and 'less coherent' 
policy outcomes.7
However, despite an enthusiastic take up of Rhodes' invitation to develop the 
network concept as the basis for predicting the nature and direction of policy-making, 
a number of critics have emerged. Chief among these is Keith Dowding (1994; 1995; 
2001), though others, like Mark Thatcher (1998), have also voiced their concerns. 
Dowding (1994) has urged Rhodes and others not to 'stretch a good idea too far.' 
Attempts to explain policy outcomes based on the network concept fail, he argues, 
because:
... the driving force of explanation, the independent variables, are not network 
characteristics per se but rather characteristics of components within networks ... these 
components both explain the nature of the network and the nature of the policy process.
(1994: 9, original emphasis)
In Dowding's view, then, it was the complicit relationship between the NFU and 
MAFF, and not the fact that this existed in something called a 'policy community', 
which caused agricultural policy in Britain to develop in the post war period in the 
way it did.8
Given the controversy surrounding the explanatory utility of the network concept, 
it has often been used simply as an analytical tool: as a metaphor, rather than a model. 
As Tanja Borzel (1998) points out, although in their theoretical contributions to the 
British policy network literature many writers make a great play of the explanatory 
utility of the network concept, in their empirical contributions to that literature most 
(including Rhodes) limit themselves to using the network as a means of organising
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empirical material and communicating it to others (see e.g. Hardy, Wistow & Rhodes 
1990; Bennett and Krebbs 1993). Even Dowding (1995: 139, quoted in Marsh & Smith 
2000), the arch sceptic, has accepted that the network concept is 'heuristically useful'.
However, as the key conceptual tool of an interests-based explanation (or, more 
sceptically, description) of the policy process, networks are problematic for the study 
of JUG. This is because actors in genuinely joined-up policy processes (even if such 
things exist only in the realm of theory) are necessarily motivated by something other 
than their narrow interests and bound together by something other than resource 
dependency. JUG requires that poorly-resourced actors are active members of policy 
networks and, for this to happen in reality, it is necessary for richly-resourced actors to 
act in ways that are inconsistent with (or even contrary to) their immediate 
institutional interests. The potential conceptual friction between a network approach 
and the proposed JUG approach forms an important part of the discussion and 
analysis in chapter 7.
2.1.4 Strategies within networks: pressure groups and the rules of the game
From the discussion so far it is clear that private and non-governmental groups are 
recognised as playing increasingly important roles in the policy- and decision-making 
process, both in the rhetoric surrounding JUG and in the network literature. Although 
such actors are almost infinite in their variety, most can be characterised, in broad 
terms at least, as 'interest', or 'pressure' groups (see e.g. Richardson 2000). This section 
discusses the strategies such groups employ when seeking to influence public policy.
Wyn Grant (1999: 14) defines a pressure group as:
an organisation which seeks as one of its functions to influence the formulation and 
implementation of public policy, public policy representing a set of authoritative 
decisions taken by the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, and by local 
government and the European Union.
There are many hundreds of such groups currently active in the UK, and they range 
from mass membership organisations such as the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC), to much smaller groups such as the 
paternal rights campaigners, Fathers4Justice. However, it is not merely membership 
numbers that distinguish such groups. They also vary in the way in which they are
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configured; in the kinds of resources, if any, they can draw upon; in the issues they are 
interested in representing; and in the strategies they employ to influence public policy. 
There is therefore a clear need to classify these groups for descriptive purposes, and 
this is reflected in the pressure group literature, where a number of different 
typologies are put forward, both as a means of bringing analytical order to the study 
of pressure groups, and in the hope that they might 'lead to useful generalisations 
about [their] behaviour' (Grant 1999: 18). One of the most commonly used is a 
distinction between 'sectional' and 'cause' groups. Sectional groups represent a section 
of a given community and their function is to Took after the common interests of that 
section' (Grant 1999:18). Cause groups, on the other hand:
represent some belief or principle ... they seek to act in the interests of that cause. 
Theoretically their membership is not restricted at all ... anyone can join and by doing 
so signify his acceptance of that belief or principle.
Stewart (1958: 25)
A more useful distinction for this study, however, is that which is drawn between 
'insider' and 'outsider' groups. This distinction is concerned not with the aims of 
groups, or with how they are configured, but with the strategies they employ in order 
to influence public policy. Some groups have what Smith (1993: 9) calls a 'consultative 
relationship' with the centre. That is to say, their views are sought on policy issues as a 
matter of routine. Groups must earn this status by abiding by the 'rules of the game'; 
by 'not upsetting the closed nature of policy-making' and by observing the 'demands 
for secrecy'. By demonstrating this over time, such groups can achieve access to elite 
policy-making circles. However, in exchange for a privileged position 'inside' the 
policy process, pressure groups inevitably sacrifice some of their independence. By 
agreeing to take part in a game where the rules are set by someone else -  and by being 
threatened with disqualification should any of those rules be broken -  it has been 
argued that some insider groups are left with merely an 'outward shell' of autonomy 
(Nettl 1965, quoted in Grant 1999: 20).
So-called 'outsider' groups do not have the same kind of relationship with decision­
makers, but neither do they suffer from being at least partially emasculated by the 
process of incorporation into the policy process. Such groups seek to influence public 
policy through such activities as media manipulation, the organisation of boycotts,
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protests or demonstrations, and more controversial "shock tactics', which at the most 
extreme level have included trespass on or the destruction of private property.9 
Fathers4Justice (2006) is a clear example of an outsider group, having adopted a 
strategy this is:
based around [the] press ... raising awareness through publicity ... 'making the 
injustice visible' and mobilising a 'dads army' ... applying pressure to the system and 
MP's to bring around meaningful change [sic].
Such outsider status may be desirable if groups do not wish to be confined or, indeed, 
emasculated by the rules of the game, but could equally be undesirable if a group 
wishes to gain insider status but is excluded (see Gamer 1996: 83).
The insider-outsider distinction, however, has been criticised for a number of 
reasons and is, as Grant puts it, a "typology under attack" (1999: 21). The most 
commonly made criticism and, indeed, the most valid, is that it is relatively easy to 
achieve insider status and that a great majority of pressure groups can be classified in 
this way. Most recently, this criticism has been provided with a solid empirical basis. 
Edward Page's (1999) study of over three hundred UK pressure groups found that an 
overwhelming majority exhibited the key characteristics of the insider and that only a 
very small number could be classed as genuine outsiders. Page (1999: 205) argues that 
the implications of his findings are that the insider-outsider distinction is "at best an 
oversimplification and at worst misleading.'
Page and others may be right in observing that most groups enjoy some kind of 
insider status and that an outsider is a rare breed, but this does not mean that the 
insider-outsider distinction is redundant: it simply means it must evolve. Indeed, the 
evolutionary process has already begun. Grant Jordan and his colleagues at Aberdeen 
University have argued that insider status is easily achieved because its definition 
conflates the dimensions of "strategy' and "status' (Jordan et al 1992; see Grant 1999: 22). 
In order to separate these dimensions, Jordan et al put forward a number of sub-types 
within the insider classification (Table 2.1). By acknowledging that some 'insiders' 
have more influence on the policy process than others, and by linking this to the 
possession (or dispossession) of policy resources, Jordan et al successfully restore to
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the insider classification the exclusive quality that was originally intended for it and 
provide an adequate answer to the important concerns raised by Page.
Table 2.1 Sub-types of 'insider' groups*
'Core' insider groups
Characterised by bargaining/exchange relationships with 
policy-makers over a broad range of issues. Examples 
would be CBI and the NFU
'Specialist' insider groups
These are seen as reliable and authoritative, and also have 
bargaining/exchange relationships with policy-makers, but 
in much narrower policy niches. An example would be the 
British Poultry Meat Federation (BPMF)
'Peripheral' insider groups
Participation that has the insider form but carries with it 
little influence
The criticism, then, that insider status is too easily achieved for the classification to 
have any real analytical utility is acknowledged and effectively addressed by 
recognising different kinds of insider status. 'Core' and 'specialist' insiders are 
rewarded with a much greater say in the direction of policy than their 'peripheral' 
counterparts because they have the capacity to mobilise resources on which the centre 
depends for the effective implementation of policy. In the chapters that follow, this 
sub-division of the insider classification is shown to have great analytical value.
2.2 Joined-up government: definition and assessment
Although JUG has now entered the lexicon of UK public administration and even 
become a stock phrase of the popular media, it is a concept that continues to defy easy 
definition. As a Blairite mantra, JUG achieved a certain disposable quality; it was a 
throwaway line often used with apparently little understanding of its precise meaning 
or implications for the way in which government works. However, there are certain 
features of the concept that suggest a degree of coherence and this begins with the 
problems JUG promises to solve.
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2.2.1 A cure for the 'departmental disease': overcoming functional fragmentation
It has been understood for some time that central government in the UK is organised 
principally along functional lines (Albrow 1970: 88; Hood 1976: 17-20; 6 1997; Peters 
1998: 295-6; 6 et al 2002). Government departments and agencies generally have the 
capacity and authority to administer one or more clearly-defined processes -  
delivering medical care, say - and their remit is to manage those processes as 
efficiently as possible. As David Kavanagh and Dennis Richards (2001: 2) explain, the 
1918 Haldane Committee (Cmd 9230, 1918) firmly endorsed the existing convention 
that individual Ministers are accountable and responsible for their departments before 
Parliament. Under these conditions, it was perhaps inevitable that the institutional 
cultures, incentives and structures of departments became focused on efficiently 
carrying out one or more prescribed functions and not necessarily on finding solutions 
to specific (and shifting) social problems (6 et al 2002). Government departments and 
their immediate political leaders have developed what Page (2005: 141) calls 'silo 
mentalities', meaning that problems are 'defined, processed and handled ... on the 
basis of the intellectual and physical resources of the particular organisation that is 
handling [them]/
This functional division of labour represents a major systemic obstacle to effective 
policy coordination (Peters 1998; 6 et al 2002; Pollitt 2003). Where the performance of 
an agency is measured by how efficiently it carries out a prescribed function, it may 
bring certain institutional benefits to that agency to transfer or 'dump' problems and 
costs (intentionally or unintentionally) onto another agency or agencies. Perri 6 et al 
(2002: 37) give the example of the sharp increase in school exclusions in England over 
recent years. Here, they argue, policy decisions taken by one agency with the aim of 
improving school discipline have had the corollary effect of adding to levels of youth 
offending -  a new cost and one that must be bom by other agencies. Functional 
fragmentation also generates a degree of policy duplication and contradiction which 
can in turn lead to the wasting of scarce resources, gaps in service provision or 
problems in the sequencing of services (6 et al 2002: 37). The pursuit of efficiency 
within one functionally-defined and -oriented unit of government can therefore lead to 
blinkered policy-making and wider inefficiencies in the system as a whole.
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Functional fragmentation is most debilitating, however, where problems "resist ... 
solutions that are readily available through the action of one agency' (6 et al 2002: 34). 
Successfully tackling rising levels of childhood obesity, for example, requires the input 
of a multiplicity of agencies. These include health care, of course, but also social 
services, education and lifelong learning and even those agencies with responsibility 
for regulating media advertising and contracting out school catering. Single agencies 
are not only ill-equipped to tackle such a 'wicked' problem alone, but may also be 
disinclined to act collaboratively where doing so poses a real or imagined risk to their 
capacity to carry out a prescribed function. Many studies have identified a tendency 
within bureaucracies generally for agencies to protect their resources and guard their 
policy-making 'turf': those seeking collaborative solutions to cross-cutting problems 
are often reminded to 'keep off the grass' (see Downs 1967; Heclo & Wildavsky 1974).
It was a deepening frustration with this entrenched departmental attitude that led 
to the first calls to join-up government in the UK in the late 1990s. However, it took 
some time for those calls to develop into a cogent case for reform and still longer for 
the JUG doctrine to achieve any standing among policy-making elites. The problems 
associated with functional fragmentation were widely acknowledged and the basic 
goal of bringing greater coordination to the business of government certainly struck a 
chord, but JUG was nonetheless a concept that for many seemed nebulous, 
intellectually-lightweight and transient.
2.2.2 'Horizontally and vertically co-ordinated thinking and action'
JUG continues to defy easy definition. In the early practitioner literature, it was used to 
capture an emerging attitude to public service reform and was 'a term of art" rather 
than 'a precise technical or scientific concept' (Pollitt 2003: 34). Even in the more 
sophisticated academic literature that followed, writers struggled to pin down a 
straightforward meaning (Huxham and Vangen 2000; James 2001; Kavanagh and 
Richards 2001; Newman 2001; Newman and Nutley 2001). The definition put forward 
by Pollitt (2003: 35), which is careful to acknowledge its own limitations and 
deficiencies, is perhaps the most useful available in the literature and worth
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perfectly possible for this to be pursued independently of inter-departmental 
coordination), the phrase JUG is used here as short hand for what the doctrine's most 
zealous promoters and strictest devotees might see as an ideal state: a joined-up policy 
universe (Fig. 2.4).10
Perhaps the most effective way to build on Pollitt's preliminary definition of JUG is 
to detail some of the specific institutional arrangements and practices the doctrine 
prescribes and to discuss these in the light of some New Labour reforms. Pollitt (2003:
44) suggests a number of ways in which policy-makers might effectively join-up their 
activities, based on his review of the practitioner and academic literatures. These 
examples of 'best practice' include:
• Shifting to an outcome-and-effectiveness-focused mode of policy-making, where 
different organisations can be united in the pursuit of commonly-defined, shared 
outcome targets (Cabinet Office 2000a; DETR 2000, executive summary).
• The organisation of ministries around client groups
• Firmly lodging the strategic leadership of the 'joined-up7 initiative with one or 
more senior politicians (Cabinet Office 2000a).
• Creating a co-ordination device/steering group (Cabinet Office 2000a).
• Creating 'joint teams' at operational level.
• Organising 'one-stop' or 'one-window7 delivery at street level.
• Developing funding mechanisms in which 'pots' of money can only be 'unlocked' 
when all the key stake-holders agree (Cabinet Office 2000a).
• Pooling parts of budgets and their administration.
• Ensuring that the 'rules of the game' for collaboration are clearly-defined (Van 
Bueren et al 2001).
• Organising effective systems for the consultation of stake-holders, rather than the 
'too little, too late, too few7 mode of consultation which the civil service [in the UK 
context] is sometimes accused of (Van Bueren et al 2001; Cabinet office 2000a, 
annex 6).
• Exchanging key staff between the different organisations involved (DETR 2000: 
para. 3.113).
• Involving outside experts at the earliest possible opportunity (Cabinet office 2000a: 
paras 7.7-7.11).11
A number of the reforms carried out by New Labour in the name of JUG have 
involved one or more of these examples of best practice. Geoff Mulgan (2005: 182-4) 
has carried out a review of these reforms (admittedly from the perspective of a former 
Director of both Tony Blair's Strategy Unit and the pro-JUG think tank, Demos), and it 
worth rehearsing two of the main examples in order to better illustrate the kinds of 
activity practitioners have designed as attempts at JUG.
38
Devolution and public policy: a joined-up governance approacn
Firstly, the Blair government created a small number of well-resourced and high 
profile policy units that operated independently of any particular department. The 
Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) and the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU), later 
known as the Strategy Unit (SU), were able to 'analyse problems and propose 
solutions free from departmental interests' (Mulgan 2005: 182). These in turn set up a 
number of dedicated delivery units, among them the Rough Sleepers Unit and the 
Children and Young People's Unit, which were charged with directly tackling the 
issues affecting their eponymous client groups through the strategic mobilisation of 
resources and expertise held by various government agencies. The SEU, PIU and 
proliferation of subordinate units, each with their own cross-cutting problem to tackle, 
were a kind of institutional scaffold erected around the existing departmental 
structure.
Secondly, the Sure Start programme was set up by the government in 1999 as a 
means of tackling a specific cross-cutting issue by pooling budgets and encouraging 
cross-departmental leadership. Sure Start brought together the contributions of 
agencies with responsibility for early education, childcare, health and family support 
in order to deliver 'the best start in life for every child', with a particular emphasis on 
those in disadvantaged areas. Although the programme was based in the Department 
for Education and Employment, responsibility for overseeing the programme and 
delivering on its objectives rested with Yvette Cooper, who at the time was a Minister 
in the Department of Health (Mulgan 2005:182). Moreover, Sure Start was funded out 
of a pooled budget which was managed by a designated team.
The key point to make is that the examples of best practice identified by Pollitt and 
the New Labour innovations detailed above all require, to a greater or lesser degree, 
that two or more policy actors agree to pool what might be termed their 'policy- and 
decision-making sovereignty'. If, for example, important personnel are exchanged 
between agencies, or parts of budgets are combined or transferred, the agencies 
involved must come to terms with the prospect of some control over those resources 
being held in common with another agency or agencies: they must be prepared, then, 
to dismantle some of the barriers demarking their turf and expose their institutional 
interests to some degree of risk. Crucially, the challenge facing those hoping to join-up
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government is how to sustain the kinds of inter-personal and inter-organisational 
relations necessary for this pooling of policy- and decision-making sovereignty to take 
place.
2.2.3 Building and sustaining inter-organisational relations: a question of trust
To 'believe in someone', without adding or even conceiving what it is that one believes 
about him, is to employ a very subtle and profound idiom. It expresses the feeling that 
there exists between our idea of a being and the being itself a definite connection and 
unity, a certain consistency in our conception of it, an assurance and lack of resistance 
in the surrender of the Ego to this conception...
Simmel (1990:179)
Trust has been the subject of increasing sociological interest in the last two decades, 
with writers turning their attention to such questions as: what is trust; how and why 
do we trust; and how can trust be sustained (Zucker 1986; Sako 1992; Misztal 1996; 
Seligman 1997; Sztompka 1999; Lane & Bachmann 2000). There is broad agreement in 
this literature that trust is a key explanatory variable in social interaction, but one that 
has not been clearly conceptualised or effectively utilised by scholars. Trust has been 
described as one of social science's greatest enigmas: it is the oil in the machine of 
society, but is intangible and even immeasurable. As Martin Hollis (1998: 1) observes, 
trust is something that seems to work better in practice than in theory. It may be useful, 
therefore, to posit a basic definition of trust before discussing its particular relevance 
and analytical utility for a study of policy-making generally and JUG in particular.
Put simply, the existence of trust gives the 'trustor' -  who may be an individual, 
group or organisation -  a degree of confidence that the 'trustee' will behave in line 
with their expectations. Changes in levels of trust will be reflected in changes in the 
degree of confidence the trustor has in the trustee and, indeed, in the kinds of 
expectations he or she holds. 6 et al (2002: 119-120) distil four main 'reasons' to trust 
from the sociological literature:
1. We might trust on the basis of past experience of dealing with the person or 
organisations during which they have proven to be capable and reliable.
2. We might trust on the basis that the person or organisation has a reputation. We 
might ourselves rely on that reputation as a guide to the person or organisation's 
likely behaviour, or we may rely on that person or organisation acting in such a 
way as to protect its reputation.
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3. We might trust on the basis of shared characteristics or shared identity. We might 
decide, for example, that a person is trustworthy because we share the same 
nationality or local roots, or simply the same sex.
4. We might trust on the basis of generic institutional factors like the availability of legal 
redress in the event of default.
Some scholars have applied the sociological concept of trust to governance and the 
policy process (Eshuis & Van Woerkum 2003; Van Vliet & Stein 2004; Marks & 
Zadoroznyj 2005). Within this emerging literature, Jasper Eshuis and Cees Van 
Woerkum's (2003) distinction between 'individual', 'organisational' and 'institutional' 
trust is of particular interest. Individual trust, they argue, is founded on a continuity of 
face-to-face contacts and the 'orality' -  the body language, eye-contact and verbal 
exchanges - they contain (Bahre & Smets, 1999). Such contacts enable policy actors to 
develop close relationships based on mutual intellectual respect, or a shared 
understanding of policy issues. They help cultivate empathy. Stereotyped ideas of 
certain categories of actors -  the 'voluntary sector', say - can also be overcome in a 
face-to-face context (although one must not ignore the possibility that prejudices can 
also be reinforced). The point is that relationships based on high frequency, high 
quality contact often become 'overlaid with social content that carries strong 
expectations of ... abstention from opportunism' (Granovetter 1985: 490, quoted in 
Eshuis & Van Woerkum 2003: 381). High levels of individual trust within a given 
policy space can create a series of relationships within which actors 'will expose 
themselves [to risk] more easily, are more receptive to other's [sic] ideas, accept more 
interdependence, and have less need to impose control on others' (Klein Woolthuis et 
al 2002: 5, quoted in Eshuis and Van Woerkum 2003: 382). Trust, then, can oil the 
wheels of cooperation within a policy process and the more trust there is, the greater 
the chance that actors will agree to pool policy- and decision-making sovereignty. The 
prime conditions for JUG are therefore those where mutually trusting relationships 
can be formed between key policy actors.
'Organisational trust' shares many features with individual trust and can in some 
ways be conceptualised as trust between groups of individuals. As Eshuis and Van 
Woerkum (2003: 383) put it:
41
Devolution and public policy: a joined-up governance approach
Trust in organizations has to do with agency too. Organizations produce trust because 
of their agency or ability to perform. The ability to perform sprouts from the fact that 
organizations as a collectivity bundle and direct the agency of the individuals in the 
organization. The trust in the ability to perform is similar to the trust in competencies 
of individuals.
But this type of trust is also a function of the way in which the processes organisations 
develop are seen as effective, or reliable. In this sense, organisations can also be the 
subject of institutional trust. This third variant is of particular interest because it flows 
from, in large part, many of the characteristics that actors operating in the new context 
of devolved government are unlikely to be able to demonstrate: longevity, continuity, 
proven track record. Institutional trust, one may expect, will be a feature of more 
established policy contexts where there has been a sufficient passage of time for shared 
experience to reinforce inter-organisational relationships.
Having established the importance of trust for successful JUG, it is necessary to be 
able to distinguish between different levels of trust in order to be able to identify more 
and less onerous forms of joining-up. 6 et al (2002: 20) again offer a useful classification:
1. The minimal or merely prudential level of trust is where we trust that a person's 
statement of intent -  a promise, threat or other indication of intention - can be 
believed.
2. We may trust a person to carry out a contract we have with them.
3. We may trust the person or organisation to exercise goodwill. That is, we trust that 
person or organisation to protect our interests.
It is also important to recognise trust in both its predictive and normative senses. As 
Hollis (1998:10-14) explains, if one trusts that someone will, for example, arrive for an 
appointment on time, one may do so for two separate but linked reasons. First, one 
may expect that person to be on time because they have shown themselves through 
their previous conduct to be punctual. Their trustworthiness is therefore based on past 
experience and is predictive. Second, one may expect the person to be on time because 
punctuality is what courtesy demands. Their trustworthiness is therefore based on a 
commonly held set of behavioural expectations and is normative.
These senses of trust are, of course, mutually reinforcing. A normative commitment 
to punctuality can only exist if it has been reinforced over time by a majority being 
reliably punctual. Proponents of JUG make a similar argument. In one of the first 
codifications of JUG, the PIU put it in the following terms:
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The answer is not to try to remove the boundaries, but to make sure they remain 
flexible and permeable. That may require a fundamental change ... switching from a 
culture of tribal competitiveness to one of partnership. That change of mind-set is 
difficult to achieve in an organisation that is not used to looking beyond its own 
narrow interests. It means looking for shared agendas, and may sometimes mean doing 
things that do not seem to be in the immediate interests of the organisation, but which 
adds value indirectly by adding to the value of the partnership. That change of mindset 
is vital to successful cross-cutting working.
Cabinet Office (2000a)
For what might be described a 'pure7 form of JUG to be achieved, then, policy actors 
must act in ways that reflect the existence of a 'culture of collaboration'. That is to say, 
there must be a normative commitment to JUG among all stakeholders if the most 
beneficial effects of it are to be felt.
2.2.4 A new name for an old idea? Joined-up government in historical perspective
The idea must be rejected that there was once a simpler age, when policies could be 
enacted that would require a single agency to carry them out, acting alone ...
6 (2004:104)
The discussion so far has proceeded on the basis that JUG is a distinctive and path- 
breaking concept with the potential to redefine government, or at least reconfigure the 
ways in which it operates. However, much of the academic debate on JUG has been 
concerned with whether it is in fact a new idea at all (Kavanagh and Richards 2001; 
Clark 2002; Flinders 2002; Hood 2005). There is no doubt that the phrase itself is novel 
(even if claims to its authorship are disputed), but whether JUG describes a genuine 
departure in public administration remains something of a moot point.
What is beyond doubt is that governments have always been preoccupied to some 
extent with the need to coordinate their business. As Christopher Hood (2005: 19) 
notes, the language of public administration has traditionally made reference to a 
doctrine of 'coordination' which, at the most general level, holds that 'all or many 
parts of executive government should interconnect, complement one another, and pool 
related information'. Specific attempts at coordinating government activities are 
detectable since at least the beginning of the twentieth century, beginning with 
military operations and disaster management (Hood 2005: 20). During the Second 
World War, for example, reference was made to the need to undertake military
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operations 'in which two or more of the fighting services cooperate in order to strike 
the enemy with the maximum of effect at a chosen place and at a chosen time' 
(Sanders 1943: 7, quoted in Hood 2005: 20). In the post-war era, the need for greater 
administrative coordination moved steadily up the political and public administration 
agendas and there were increasingly sophisticated examples of UK governments 
putting forward policy coordination as a potential solution to the problems associated 
with departmentalism. These are covered in some detail in the literature, but it is 
worth discussing one particular example which clearly demonstrates that 'overcoming 
the pathology of departmentalism' has not been the exclusive concern of the New 
Labour decade.
The Conservative government formed by Edward Heath in June 1970 carried out a 
substantial programme of institutional redesign aimed at tackling creeping 
departmentalism. The 1970 White Paper, The Reorganisation of Central Government 
(Cmd 4506, 1970), contained a series of restructuring measures that merged a number 
of smaller departments into larger ones. This meant that there were fewer Cabinet 
ministers and, in theory at least, fewer competing tribal voices around the Cabinet 
table. For Kavanagh and Richards (2001: 4), these measures were taken in the hope 
that they would 'assist the Cabinet to develop a broader, strategic, overview of the 
government's programme and militate against the outbreak of 'departmentalism". 
Heath's structural reorganisation of departments, then, was undertaken very much in 
the spirit, if not the name, of JUG.
Heath's most innovative commitment to policy co-ordination came in the form of 
his Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) (see also Flinders 2002; Plowden et al 1988). 
The CPRS was a clear articulation both of Heath's appreciation of the problems 
associated with departmentalism and his understanding that coordinating 
mechanisms and processes offered potential solutions. The CPRS sought to challenge 
the entrenched departmental mindset of Whitehall in a number of ways. In particular, 
it produced a series of influential reports on carefully chosen policy issues -  among 
them the motor industry, race relations and energy conservation - that cut-across 
departmental boundaries (Kavanagh & Richards 2001: 5). These, then, were among the 
first acknowledged 'wicked' problems. Crucially, it was the CPRS's 'freedom from
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day-to-day pressures and vested departmental interests [that] enabled it to engage in 
more wide-ranging analyses than might otherwise have been possible' (Greenwood & 
Wilson 1984: 50, quoted in Kavanagh & Richards 2001: 5). In its 1975 report, A  Joint 
Approach to Social Policy, the CPRS framed its analysis in ways that would be familiar 
to any of the New Labour 'joiner-uppers'.
Given the clear parallels between the Heath government's interest in policy 
coordination and New Labour's aspiration to achieve JUG, it is understandable that 
scholars such as Pollitt (2003: 36) have concluded that JUG 'only seems new' and is in 
fact only 'the latest manifestation of one of the oldest preoccupations in the field of 
politics and public administration/ However, to dismiss JUG as merely a high profile 
rebranding (sexing-up?) of an old administrative doctrine may be hasty.
2.2.5 What is distinctive about joined-up government?
Although it is quite reasonable to locate JUG within a cyclical pattern of interest in 
policy coordination, it has three broad features that may add up to a certain degree of 
distinctiveness. Firstly, most scholars have characterised departmentalism as an 
escalating problem. Kavanagh and Richards (2001: 3) make the point:
The problem has been exacerbated, post-Haldane, by governments year on year taking 
on more responsibilities and becoming locked into more dependency relationships. The 
creation of new departments, as well as the growth of legislation, regulation, 
programmes and networks, prompt reactions elsewhere in the system that may be 
unforeseen or run counter to a policy's original intended outcomes.
Against this background, attempts at policy coordination by the Heath government 
and others appear as marginal efforts to shake Whitehall from the grip of 
departmentalism. In contrast, JUG arguably represents a more ambitious and 
thorough-going attempt at policy coordination. Even if it is not a qualitatively new 
solution to the problem of departmentalism it might be accurate to describe JUG as a 
significant ratcheting-up of drat solution. The examples of best practice and examples 
of New Labour reforms listed above represent a more diverse range of institutional 
arrangements and practices than any previous attempts at coordination have proposed, 
and the requirement that collaborative relationships with institutions in civil society 
should form part of a joined-up policy process is arguably an extra dimension. This is
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certainly the view of Andrew Podger (2007; see also Lindquist 2000) for whom the 
different structural conditions in a more complex world have created an inescapable 
imperative to coordinate the business of policy- and decision-making better:
The greater interest in connectivity and horizontal government in recent years should 
not be seen as just a fad -  it has many recognised long-term drivers, across many policy 
areas, on a worldwide basis. These include the increasing demands of citizens; the 
complexity of modem social problems; the pressure on public budgets; the impact of 
new information and communications technologies, giving both the increased technical 
capacity to connect and a related increase in expectations that we will use that capacity; 
and active experimentation by governments in new ways to meet these challenges and 
deliver services.
Secondly, JUG has achieved unprecedented longevity as a prominent political and 
administrative goal. It is certainly true that the phrase itself has now fallen from 
fashion. Andrew Davies, the Welsh Assembly Government Minister for Finance and 
Public Service Delivery, now consciously avoids what he calls 'an ugly phrase' and 
instead talks about 'policy integration' as a key aim of his government (Interview 10). 
Similarly, usage of the term in the popular media has fallen off considerably since 
reaching a peak in 2000 (Fig. 2.5).
Fig.2.2 Incidence of the phrase ’joined-up government’ in The
Times, 1997-2007
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However, Page (2005) and others observe that JUG has now passed into the general 
canon of Civil Service administrative doctrines. It may no longer be a 'Big Thing', he 
argues, but it is certainly still thought of as a 'Good Thing'. Aiming for partnership 
and developing collaboration have become default settings for policy-makers
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operating at all levels of UK government and JUG has become synonymous with 
'good government'. In this sense, policy coordination has never before enjoyed such a 
prolonged period of interest and action.
Thirdly - and potentially most significantly - proponents of JUG emphasise a 
normative dimension to the doctrine. That is to say, the achievement of JUG involves 
more than restructuring departments and developing overarching institutions to bring 
a strategic overview to the business of government. The ultimate aim of JUG expressed 
clearly in the practitioner literature is the achievement of both structural and cultural 
change. Ministers and senior civil servants, for example, were encouraged in the early 
practitioner literature to provide strong leadership in tackling cross-cutting issues and 
to act as 'champions' of JUG, whose example would help 'create a culture conducive to 
cross-cutting working' (Cabinet Office 2000a: 7). Perhaps the defining feature of JUG, 
then, is that its proponents emphasise the need to cultivate new attitudes and ways of 
working as a way of catalysing and reinforcing institutional and process change so 
that reforms carried out in the name of JUG are sustainable in the longer term.
If policy actors could be found to be entering into trust relationships with others 
based on trust in its normative sense, then, the distinctiveness of JUG as an 
administrative doctrine could be reinforced by empirical data. This is because the 
existence of such relationships would indicate cultural change. This key research 
question is taken up in chapter 8.
I
| 2.2.6 Assessing 'joined-up-ness'
Detecting, measuring and assessing JUG has proven as much of a challenge for 
scholars and practitioners as defining it. Pollitt (2003: 43-46), however, identifies two 
broad methods of assessment that might be employed. The first examines policy 
outcomes and asks whether a given JUG initiative has produced more co-ordinated 
public policy, or whether outcomes 'reflect continued contradictions, duplications and 
fragmentations' in policy formulation and delivery. Such a method is attractive 
because it assesses the impact of JUG initiatives on the social problems they are 
designed to address. However, significant resources are required to assess outcomes 
effectively and it is not yet clear whether there are sufficiently mature outcomes to
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assess in Scotland and Wales. Particularly when the focus of initiatives is on the most 
intractable social problems, the success or failure of JUG must be measured in decades 
rather than years. The second method of assessment Pollitt outlines, however, is more 
manageable because of its focus on policy processes and outputs. This method involves 
comparing the policy processes and outputs of a given policy initiative with 
prescribed examples of "best practice'. By considering how many of these joined-up 
institutional arrangements and practices have been followed, it becomes possible to at 
least estimate the degree of 'joined-up-ness' within a given policy space. Such an 
approach incorporates a great deal of 'practitioner wisdom and experience' and, most 
importantly, requires neither tangible policy outcomes nor the availability of 
significant resources to be applied to a JUG initiative (Pollitt 2003: 45). As Pollitt (2003:
45) emphasises, it is a method that can be used 'long before results or outcomes-based 
evaluations are even possible'.
A clear weakness of the best practice approach, however, is that the literature gives 
little indication of the relative importance of the various institutional arrangements
j  and practices. Being able to measure the degree of joined-up-ness -  rather than merely 
estimate it - requires that the examples of best practice are arranged into a hierarchy of 
some sort. The best available variable for creating such a hierarchy and allowing 
important distinctions to be made between examples of best practice is the level of 
trust required. Table 2.2 shows how such a hierarchy might be arranged, with some of 
the examples of best practice suggested by Pollitt (2003: 44) matched to the 
corresponding level of predictive trust required as put forward by 6 et al (2002: 20). At 
the bottom of the hierarchy, where no trust is required, are measures that seek to join- 
up government merely through the more effective dissemination of information. A 
minimal level of trust is required for consulting stakeholders or involving outside
y
j experts where there is no question of handing over the policy agenda to those actors.
|
A funding mechanism that requires evidence of and commitment to collaboration in 
order to 'unlock' some dedicated resource requires policy actors to demonstrate 
'contractual trust, while pooling budgets, or handing control of the policy agenda to 
one or more stakeholder, requires that there is the highest level of trust between actors, 
the 'goodwill' level in 6 et al's classification.
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This Hierarchy of joined-up thinking and action (HJTA) (Table 2.3) combines two 
sets of good ideas to form an innovative framework for effective descriptive evaluation 
of policy processes and outputs. The framework makes it possible for policy-making 
across policy areas, jurisdiction and levels of government to be compared. The HJTA is 
developed further in chapter 3 as part of a "JUG approach'.
Table 2.2 Hierarchy o f joined-up thinking and action
Level of trust 
required
Type of institutional arrangement or practice
Goodwill • Pooling budgets
• Exchanging key people
• Creating 'joint teams' at operational level •
• Handing over the policy agenda to institutions in civil society
• Making the legislature a driver of policy
Contract • Developing funding mechanisms in which 'pots' of money can 
only be 'unlocked' when all the key stake-holders agree
Minimal • Organising effective systems for the consultation of stake-holders
• Consulting outside experts
• Focusing the business of participation in policy delivery and 
implementation -  application, monitoring, evaluation -  on 
collaboration and partnership
Informational • Ensuring the 'rules of the game' for collaboration are clearly- 
defined
• Framing problems as 'cross-cutting problems'
2.2.7 Obstacles to JUG at the centre: tracing accountability and tracking resources
The departmental system that has dominated policy-making in the UK for over a 
century draws a great deal of its legitimacy and longevity from its ability to deliver at 
least a veneer of democratic and managerial accountability and provide acceptable 
mechanisms for effective resource management. As is mentioned above, Haldane 
endorsed the convention that Ministers are responsible for their departments and the 
administration of their prescribed functions before Parliament, and the departmental
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system makes it clear where political and managerial responsibility lies. It is also 
relatively straightforward to track and manage the throughput of resources in a 
departmental system as staff, money and assets are hermetically sealed within vertical 
'tubes' (Mulgan 2005:183).
The purpose of JUG, of course, is to overcome some of the inherent weaknesses of 
the departmental system. In terms of accountability and resource management, 
however, many of these weaknesses can be interpreted as strengths. Breaking down 
the barriers between departments and allowing resources to permeate departmental 
demarcations may very well allow government to respond more effectively to cross­
cutting issues, but it can also result in a blurring of the lines of accountability and an 
obscuring of the throughput of resources. Involving non-governmental actors in the 
formulation and delivery of joined-up solutions would almost certainly exacerbate 
these problems.
Within a large scale policy-making context such as Whitehall, the importance of a 
departmental modus operandi for tracing accountability and tracking resource 
management is magnified. Put simply, the greater the number of agencies that require 
joining-up, the greater the risk that doing so will adversely affect accountability and 
resource management. This has been one of the key obstacles to achieving JUG at the 
UK Centre. 6 and others (6 et al 2002; Parston & Timmins 1998; United States General 
Accounting Office 1992) have identified a range of additional obstacles to JUG, 
including: intra-departmental incentive structures and career paths that are not 
conducive to collaborative working; issues of employment law; and the fact that the 
geographic boundaries for agencies expected to collaborate or coordinate their 
activities are very often not co-terminous.
2.3 JUG and interest-based theory: an empirical challenge to the network paradigm?
The call to join-up government is not a call to reinvent government. Rather, as Vernon 
Bogdanor (2005a: 17) explains, it is 'a means of modifying a form of government which 
remains organised predominantly in the departmental mode'. The institutional 
arrangements and practices detailed above are grafted on to a functionally fragmented
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system in order to offset some of its worst features: a subtle redesign of the 
architecture of government rather than a complete rebuild.
However, if JUG prescribes a subtle modification to the architecture of government, 
it demands a fundamental change in the mode and pattern of behaviour among those 
acting within that system. As has been noted, the network literature explains the 
policy process in terms of interests and resources; actors have confidence that they can 
predict the behaviour of other actors within networks and rely on them to protect their 
interests based on the mechanism of resource dependency. However, a genuinely 
joined-up policy universe, should such a thing exist in empirical fact, is held together 
by a different gravity: by high levels of inter-personal and inter-organisational trust. 
The existence of such a universe, in which a full array of stake-holding actors pool 
policy- and decision-making sovereignty and develop co-ordinated and collaborative 
policies and forms of implementation, would therefore represent an empirical 
challenge to the network paradigm.
If Rhodes' policy community is seen as the expression and logical end point of a 
free market in power and influence, then genuinely joined-up policy processes -  
themselves taking the form of networks of course -  are best compared to a planned 
economy, in which power and influence is distributed according to a set of guiding 
principles; that is, the principles contained in the doctrine of JUG. This requires actors 
to act in ways that they would not in a free market context; it asks them to desist from 
exploiting their own resources and to instead act in ways that benefit broader 
partnerships. The network literature therefore provides a valuable tool kit for 
identifying an absence or failure of JUG. Where actors within a network exclude other 
actors or seek to restrict membership on the grounds of the resources actors bring to 
the table, they are participating in the very antithesis of JUG. In each of the ideal types 
of policy network put forward by Rhodes and discussed above, for example, 
distinctions are drawn as much by who is not involved in the policy-making process 
as by who is. The inclusiveness of policy-making is based squarely on a 'need to know' 
basis, not on a normative commitment to inclusion as a principle of good governance. 
Moreover, the way actors behave is determined by their own interests and not by what 
is necessary to develop and implement the best possible policy outputs or outcomes.
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Policy networks are therefore a conceptual tool that can be used to describe or explain 
a policy process in which actors collaborate and coordinate their activities, but only 
where doing so serves their narrow institutional interests.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter began by explaining that, while JUG is a prominent goal of government 
and a key strand of the public policy literature, it remains a concept and mode of 
policy- and decision-making that is difficult to define, describe and evaluate. 
Moreover, it is unclear whether JUG is in fact a new idea at all. In an attempt to bring 
I some clarity to the concept and harness its potential as a perspective on the policy- and 
decision-making process, a clear definition was posited, along with the basis of a 
framework for conducting descriptive evaluation of policy processes and outputs from 
a JUG perspective. The HJTA brought together two good ideas from the JUG literature: 
first, the examples of best practice identified by Pollitt (2005) in the practitioner 
literature as the basis of a best practice approach to the evaluation of joined-up 
thinking and action; and, second, the nature and extent of the trust required to operate 
or operationalise them effectively. The HJTA is further developed as a framework for 
descriptive analysis in chapter 3.
The chapter then considered the implications of JUG for the way policy- and 
decision-making is currently described, explained and conceptualised. After 
identifying the policy network and interest group literatures as together forming the 
paradigmatic organising perspective in the British public policy literature, it was 
argued that the network approach was founded on the core explanatory mechanism of 
resource dependency and could therefore be described as an essentially interests- 
based account of the policy process. It was suggested that, should a genuinely "joined- 
up policy universe" be detected in empirical fact, it may represent an empirical 
challenge to the network paradigm.
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Notes to Chapter 2
1 The terminology of the policy network literature is at best inconsistent and at worst 
confused. It is necessary, therefore, to make clear how the term 'policy network' is 
used in this study. Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider (1991: 29) use the term 
generically -  to refer to any cluster of policy actors, no matter what peculiar or 
distinctive features that network exhibits - and it is this usage that is adopted here. A 
policy network, then, is described simply by 'its actors, their linkages and its boundary. 
It includes a ... set of mainly public and private corporate actors [and] the linkages 
between actors serve as channels for communication and for the exchange of 
information and expertise.'
2 Jordan, however, does see a degree of 'flexibility in the system' and the possibility of 
different 'sets of participants' moving in and out of the policy community over time. In 
this respect, his policy community is more loosely integrated than that of Heclo and 
Wildavsky and, indeed, Rhodes (Jordan 1981:117, quoted in Smith 1992: 28). The early 
American literature on govemment-group relations identified structures with the 
same broad characteristics as policy communities, known as 'Iron Triangles'. It is clear 
that this kind of policy-making structure was recognised before the late 1970s, even if 
it was labelled differently (see e.g. Griffith 1939; Freeman 1955).
3 The term was first introduced by Heclo (1978).
4 Indeed, the typologies writers like Rhodes have posited contain only ideal-types. No 
network exists with exactly the characteristics of, say, an 'issue network'. Marsh 
acknowledges that what Rhodes puts forward is more a continuum, on which a given 
network can be positioned closer to one pole or the other.
5 Examples of issue networks are more difficult to identify in the empirical literature. 
The most often cited is the consumer affairs policy network, though an in-depth case 
study is missing.
6 Although in this classification producers are restricted to 'economic interests' and, 
more specifically, to 'industrial organisations', there is no obvious reason why not-for- 
profit, voluntary organisations that deliver services or provide expertise on which the 
centre depends for the effective implementation of policy can not be included. Rhodes 
is silent on this point.
7 A further example of the network concept being used to explain policy outcomes is 
Toke and Marsh (2003).
8 David Marsh suggests that what this debate boils down to is in fact a fundamental 
epistemological disagreement between the two sides: a disagreement, that is, over the 
primacy one should attach to structure and agency (1998: 10-14; see also Marsh & 
Furlong 2002; Marsh et al 2001)
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Applied research methods
This chapter outlines the applied research methods used to generate primary data 
and assimilate secondary material in order to test the study's central thesis. It also 
elaborates on the HJTA as a framework for organising and facilitating its analysis 
and the basis, therefore, of a 'JUG approach'. The chapter also introduces and 
provides some basic background to the case studies in each of the devolved 
institutions and explains why they were chosen as suitable tests of joined-up 
governance (JUG).
The first section of the chapter introduces education and lifelong learning policy 
as the study's principal area of focus in Scotland in Wales and special education 
needs (SEN) and adult and community learning (ACL) policy as the areas chosen for 
close examination. This is followed by a more detailed discussion of the case study 
method, including the extent to which it might be possible to generalise research 
findings. The research design is then outlined, which combines document collection 
and analysis with a series of semi-structured interviews with key policy actors. The 
value of interview data in uncovering the nature of policy-making is examined and 
the method of identifying potential interviewees is explained.
The second section elaborates on the HJTA as a framework for effective 
descriptive evaluation of policy-making in each of the cases before considering a set 
of seven key variables which may influence the number and quality of trust
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largely technocratic teachings of JUG may take second place to the realities of 
electoral or party politics.
1.1.1 Generalising in case study research: beyond 'the science of the singular7?
The case study is not a specific technique but rather a method of organising data for 
the purpose of analysing the life of a social unit (Franklin and Osborne 1971: 184). 
The unit could be a person, a family, an organisation, an institution, a network. A 
number of research methods may be marshalled by the case study researcher to 
produce an in-depth study of the case or cases of interest. Case study research can 
have many purposes and be designed and executed in many ways. Catherine Hakim 
(2000: 61) has described the 'extended range' of case study designs:
[there are] case studies combining exploratory work, description and the testing out 
of hunches, hypotheses and ideas in varying combinations.
For this reason, there is 'very little consensus as to the exact methodological status of 
the case study as a type of [social] research' (Verschuren 2003: 122). For many case 
studies, an intensive investigation of a single case is the only concern of the 
researcher. Many are descriptive or evaluative studies. It is where 'the science of the 
singular' (Simons 1980) moves beyond the confines of its particular case and enters 
the domain of generalisation that problems often arise.
Case studies that generalise from results have been fiercely criticised. How, it is 
quite reasonably asked, can a study of a single school (e.g. Woods 1979; Ball 1981; 
Burgess 1983), no matter how in-depth or rigorous, be representative of the schooling 
system at large? Generalisation from the results of such studies, like levels of 
bullying or the effect of free school breakfasts, will always be open to the charge that 
those results have the potential to be 'idiosyncratic' (Bryman 1992: 89). This is 
because isolated cases always have an 'unknown degree of specificity7 (Gillham 2000: 
6). Precisely because the 'the real business of case study is particularisation', the 
findings such studies produce are a 'poor basis for generalisation' (Stake 1995: 8). 
This is a not only a concern for critics but also for case study researchers themselves. 
As Alan Bryman (1992: 88) notes, many exponents of the method 'display unease
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about the extent to which their findings are capable of generalisation beyond their 
particular case'.
Although these criticisms are mostly valid, there are certain conditions in which 
some generalisation might be considered appropriate. In order to explain this, it will 
be necessary to make a distinction between different kinds of case study research 
and, just as importantly, between different forms of generalisation. The problem of 
potentially idiosyncratic results can be addressed by extending case study research to 
a number of different cases. Cynthia Cockbum (1991), for example, investigated 
resistance to sex equality in organisations through a series of case studies of different 
kinds of organisation: a trade union, a civil service department, a retail company and 
a local government organisation. By producing a comparative suite of case studies, 
Cockbum's findings were given important comparative context. Similarly, Jerome 
Skolnick (1966) carried out a case study of police officers in 'Westville, USA', and 
also spent a period embedded in a police force in another US city. The second case 
enabled him to put his findings from Westville in comparative context and allowed 
many of that force's idiosyncrasies to be identified and explained. The 'degree of 
specificity' of each case was made clearer through comparison.
This is what Robert Yin (1994: 30) has called 'comparative case method' and 
though it has been utilised in many fields of social enquiry, it has been most 
enthusiastically embraced by political scientists (see Lijphart 1975). The three case 
studies of individual schools mentioned above, like all studies of single cases where 
generalisations outside of that case are made, would benefit from being extended to 
another case or cases. However, while it is true that a multiple-case method protects 
research from some of the criticisms that narrower studies are open to, it is not 
enough, on its own, to validate generalisation. The form of generalisation that is made 
is equally important.
Yin (1994: 30-34) makes the distinction between 'statistical' and 'analytic' 
generalisation. The former is an attempt to apply to data collected in case studies the 
same generalisations one would apply to data about a sample (Bassey 1999: 30-32). 
This is exactly what is advocated by Louis Cohen, Lawrence Manion and Kevin 
Morrison (2003:185) in their source book on research methods:
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1.1 Research design
Finding answers to the research questions outlined in chapter 1 requires a research 
design that offers insight into the unseen workings of the policy process; the off-the- 
record conversations which take place in informal settings. Although there is a raft of 
relevant and iUuminating documents in the pubic domain that offer some way of 
providing this insight, the most satisfactory method is to combine document 
collection and analysis with in-depth, face-to-face interviews with key members of 
the policy process. At the centre of the research design, therefore, was a series of 
interviews with individuals identified as key actors within the education and lifelong 
learning policy networks in Scotland and Wales.
Potential interviewees were initially identified following a period of desk research 
during which the education and lifelong learning policy networks in Scotland and 
Wales were mapped. This was done with reference to all available documentary 
evidence, including: minutes of plenary debates; minutes and reports from the 
relevant committees and departments; party manifestos and other policy proposals; 
reports on the activities of the relevant QUANGOs; documents prepared by 
interested groups; and broad policy strategies. The interviewees identified at this 
stage were divided into the following groups: ministers, deputy ministers and their 
spokespeople; other elected representatives with a particular interest or expertise in 
the field of education and lifelong learning; senior officials within the Scottish 
Executive and Welsh Assembly Governments, with a focus on those in the variously 
configured education and lifelong learning departments; the directors or other senior 
representatives of relevant pressure groups, representative and third sector 
organisations; and senior officials working in Scottish or Welsh Assembly 
Government—sponsored programmes in local government settings.
Mapping the policy networks in Scotland and Wales provided a useful starting 
point, but further informants were identified using chain referral sampling, or 
'snowballing'. This type of respondent-driven sampling carries with it certain, well- 
known dangers of informant agenda-setting and bias, and it was important to remain 
mindful of these issues in the field. However, care was taken to ensure that initial 
informants occupied a range of distinct positions in the policy networks in Scotland
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and Wales, and by using these multiple entry points it was possible to limit as far as 
possible the problems of bias experienced in some sociological studies that have used 
the same sampling technique (see Biemacki and Wald 1981). The potential for this 
kind of bias was further off-set by the fact that, on a number of occasions, the same 
individual was referred by more than one informant.
The interviews themselves were all semi-structured and, where possible, only 
nominally time-limited. As Charlotte Davies (1999: 98) has noted, the emphasis in 
this kind of qualitative interviewing is on obtaining 'a  variety of interpretations' 
rather than seeking consistencies in responses in order to generate statistical 
generalisations. Put differently, face-to-face interviews allow a certain degree of 
insight into official documents, rehearsed plenary performances and carefully 
prepared media briefings, and the assurance of confidentiality led, in some cases, to 
quite candid conversations. This is not to say all interviews were entirely frank, but 
much was divulged 'off the record' that put a great deal of data generated through 
document collection and analysis into some kind of context.1 Precisely because the 
interviews were a search for unique or inaccessible viewpoints, no attempt was made 
to obtain any representative sample of policy-makers and practitioners.
Aside from these specific data collection techniques, a key aspect of the research 
design -  and arguably its most innovative feature - was the framework developed for 
the effective evaluation of policy processes and outputs from a JUG perspective. The 
following section elaborates on the HJTA introduced in chapter 2 and outlines a set 
of seven 'moderating variables' that may be used alongside the HJTA to explain -  or, 
at least, account for -  any variation in the nature and extent of joined-up thinking 
and action it may help detect.
1.2 A framework for descriptive evaluation and assessment of 'joined-up-ness'
The discussion in chapter 2 put forward the HJTA as a basic framework for the 
effective descriptive evaluation of policy processes and outputs from a JUG 
perspective. The HJTA brings together two of the most useful ideas in the JUG 
literature -  Christopher Pollitt's best practice examples assembled from the 
practitioner literature and Perri 6 et al's typology of trust relationships -  to form the
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basis of what might be described as a 'JUG approach'. The HJTA makes it possible -  
arguably for the first time -  to conduct systematic, comparative analysis of JUG 
between policy areas, across jurisdictions and over time (Table 3.1). This is clearly a 
useful approach for exploring the research questions set out in chapter 1.
Table 3.1 Hierarchy o f joined-up thinking and action
Level of trust Type of institutional arrangement or practice
Goodwill • Pooling budgets
• Exchanging key people
• Creating 'joint teams' at operational level
• Handing over the policy agenda to institutions in civil society
• Making the legislature a driver of policy
Contract • Developing funding mechanisms in which 'pots' of money can 
only be 'unlocked' when all the key stake-holders agree
Prudential • Organising effective systems for the consultation of stake-holders
• Consulting outside experts
• Focusing the business of participation in policy delivery and 
implementation -  application, monitoring, evaluation -  on 
collaboration and partnership
Informational • Ensuring the 'rules of the game' for collaboration are clearly- 
defined
• Framing problems as 'cross-cutting problems'
However, the HJTA is only a part of an effective JUG approach. Its utility is restricted 
to some extent by the fact that it only measures trust in its predictive sense. As such, 
it is a framework which can only b used to measure JUG where it has already been 
ascertained that a 'culture of collaboration' has not emerged. The HJTA is also 
restricted t a degree by the fact that, while it may uncover variation in the nature and 
extent of joined-up thinking and action between policy contexts, it is not equipped in 
the form in which it appears in Table 3. to explain that variation. These two 
limitations are addressed in the following section which outlines two further 
components of a JUG approach.
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1.2.1 Normative trust and detecting the 'normalisation' of collaboration
The HJTA is effectively a framework for the descriptive evaluation of trust in its 
predictive sense; that is to say, the framework is concerned with trust relationships 
where policy actors' confidence in the behaviour of one another is based on their 
knowledge of some known, actor-specific characteristic: a reputation, a past 
experience of dealing with an individual or organisation, the personalities of those 
involved in face-to-face negotiation. This knowledge helps actors predict behaviour. 
However, an analysis of policy processes and outputs should also examine the 
evidence of trust in its normative sense (see chapter 2: 42-43). Actors may trust 
another actor or actors when they are less familiar with any actor-specific 
characteristics. In these circumstances, such an actor may feel confident that the 
behaviour of the other actor or actors will be conditioned by a normative 
commitment to JUG: the 'rules of the game' that govern behaviour within a given 
policy-making context are sufficiently legitimised, embedded and normalised as the 
expected mode of behaviour and interaction that collaboration is a 'default setting'.2
This is a qualitatively different kind of trust and an important one for the 
descriptive evaluation of JUG. Normative trust must exist if JUG is to become a 
universal mode of policy- and decision-making; if a cultural change is to take place. 
However, it is closely bound up with predictive trust too as the normalisation of 
behaviour flows from that kind of behaviour being demonstrated consistently within 
a given context. Therefore, if policy actors routinely act in a way that 'abstains from 
opportunism' within a given policy milieu, that behavioural heritage may form the 
basis of normative trust in the future and act as the starting point for a 'culture of 
collaboration'.
1.2.2 Measuring variation in the nature of joined-up thinking and action
It is unlikely that the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and action will be 
consistent across policy areas, jurisdictions, levels of government and over time. An 
effective JUG approach to examining policy processes and outputs must therefore 
incorporate a framework for understanding and accounting for variation where it is 
detected. This section indentifies a set of seven 'moderating variables' that can be
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used alongside the HJTA. This has two principal potential benefits: first, recognising 
the variables and incorporating them into a JUG approach give it additional 
complexity and sophistication and help make it into a more responsive and flexible 
tool; and, second, explaining variation can help identify the degree of specificity 
within each case, the absence of which can make generalisation of the research 
findings problematic. Ultimately, this could take the study of JUG towards a 
predictive model where the nature and extent of JUG can be forecast according to 
specific conditions within the policy context.3
These variables can be summarised as follows:
1. The existing level of policy-making capacity within the specific policy area in 
question. Where governments are disinclined to pool policy- and decision­
making sovereignty, they may still be forced into trust relationships: what might 
be termed 'forced marriages'. This may be a particular feature of new 
jurisdictions where it is not likely that there will be a robust tradition and settled 
pattern of policy-making in that particular context. This is, of course, a variable 
that might be expected to become less of a factor over time, but it is not necessary 
time-dependant.
2. The political sensitivity of the specific policy area in question. Government 
departments and other traditionally-powerful actors are more likely to retreat to 
departmental control of policy processes and outcomes when a policy issue is 
exposed to unusual public scrutiny and/or has direct electoral or party political 
implications. This variable will fluctuate over time as the political sensitivity of 
an policy area is as fickle and unpredictable as politics itself.
3. The degree of existing consensus within the specific policy area in question. This 
will condition the behaviour of all policy-actors, not merely that of the well- 
resourced. Even a well-intentioned government liberated from preoccupation 
with its own institutional interests may struggle to cultivate effective trust 
relationships under such conditions. This variable is undoubtedly subject to 
change over time, but in general consensus takes longer to build then erode.
4. The level of legislative competence of the political institution. This is of 
particular relevance for a comparative study of jurisdictions with political 
institutions with different levels of legislative competence as is the case in 
Scotland and Wales. The opportunity to develop statutory safeguards can 
reinforce trust relationships. Although the degree of legislative competence of the 
competent political institution may be increased, and Wales is already emerging 
as a case in point4, this is likely to be over an extended period.
5. The overall level of resources available to government. As JUG is closely linked 
to efficiency and, therefore, to 'efficiency savings', it is to be expected that a less 
generous settlement for the Scottish Parliament or National Assembly for Wales 
would potentially lead to a more enthusiastic approach to JUG.
6. The scale of the policy-making context. This is particularly relevant for the
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individual-type trust relationships identified by Jasper Eshuis and Cees Van 
Woerkum (2003) and discussed in some detail in chapter 2 (40-43). Smaller scale 
can provide opportunities for higher quality and higher frequency face-to-face 
contact between key policy actors than is possible in larger bureaucratic settings 
like Westminster-Whitehall.5 Unlike most of the variables discussed here, scale is 
almost never subject to change over time. Indeed, in the devolved context, scale is 
more accurately described as a 'feature' than a 'variable'.
7. The age of the competent political institution. This variable is particularly 
important for Eshuis and Van Woerkum's (2003) institutional-type trust 
relationships because these develop between actors over time. They are 
relationships that require a period of incubation.6 The passage of time has 
obvious implications for this time-defined variable.
The utility of this set of variables is shown in the analysis in chapter 6, where 
variation in the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and action between the SEN 
and ACL policy areas in Scotland and Wales is explained.
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Notes to chapter 3
1 The interviews also proved useful as a source of unpublished documentary 
material. Although this was usually shared on the understanding that it would 
remain confidential, it did inform the analysis in chapters 5 and 6 by adding further 
context to documents in the public domain.
2 It may seem logical to include 'normative' trust in the HJTA as an additional, higher 
tier. After all, policy actors entering into such relationships are, by definition, doing 
so in spite of their own, narrow institutional interests. However, normative trust does 
not attach itself so usefully to particular examples of best practice in JUG as the 
predictive variant. An actor may, for example, agree to pool budgets with another 
out of either predictive or normative trust. The variable is the degree of actor-specific 
knowledge a participants in the relationship bases its decision on, not the nature of 
the activity itself. For those reasons, analysis which examines evidence for an 
emerging 'culture of collaboration' must take place alongside -  but separated from -  
that undertaken using the HJTA.
3 The possibility of developing such a model is discussed further in chapter 6 (152- 
153).
4 The National Assembly has recently been given permission to apply to the 
Westminster parliament for Legislative Competency Orders (LCOs) and SEN policy 
was one of the first areas that were identified for application.
5 However, there is no guarantee that smaller scale will necessarily build greater 
trust. High quality, high frequency contact with an individual may equally lead to an 
erosion of respect and cause actors to become more disinclined to collaborate than 
had they known each other less well.
6 As with scale, however, it does not follow that this variable will have an even 
influence. Indeed, it seems at least equally possible that time may serve to 
institutionalise negative relationships.
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Evidential base: special educational needs and 
adult community learning policy in Scotland and 
Wales, 1999-2007
As a central responsibility of the devolved institutions, education and lifelong 
learning achieved considerable prominence in the policy agendas advanced in 
Scotland and Wales between 1999 and 2007. As a route out of poverty and 
disadvantage, as an engine of social mobility and community cohesion, and as a hard 
currency in the emerging 'knowledge economy', learning was put forward by 
Scottish and Welsh policy-makers during that period as the solution to some of the 
two nations' most intractable social and economic problems.
The Welsh Assembly Government confirmed its commitment to education and 
lifelong learning in 2001, by recasting Wales as a 'Learning Country' (NAW 2001). In 
the first flagship strategy document published following devolution, Jane Davidson, 
then Minister for Education and Lifelong Learning, declared that a new focus on 
education and training in Wales would 'liberate talent7, 'extend opportunity', 
'empower communities' and 'help create wealth' (NAW 2001). A Learning Country, 
Davidson continued, would embrace and harness technological change in order to 
meet the increasing challenges posed by competition from Europe and beyond, 
whilst simultaneously empowering the disadvantaged to improve their own life 
chances (NAW 2001). The Scottish Executive1 developed a similar equation for
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success. Instead of issuing one foundational document in the image of Wales' 
Learning Country, the Executive demonstrated its commitment to learning through a 
series of strategies in a range of areas within the broad field of education and lifelong 
learning. In the area of adult basic skills, for example, Alan Wilson, then Deputy 
Minister for Enterprise and Lifelong Learning, was explicit that adult literacy and 
numeracy was a key area for promoting social justice, for delivering economic 
development - even for improving health. As such, learning was given considerable 
prominence -  almost primacy - in the Executive's wider policy agenda in Scotland 
(Scottish Executive 2006:1-5).
In short, devolution in both nations was accompanied by a highly ambitious focus 
on education and lifelong learning which had a clear dual purpose: learning, in 
rhetoric at least, promised to deliver both economic development and social justice 
for the devolved nations.
This chapter charts the development of education and lifelong learning policy in 
Scotland and Wales from the first devolved elections, in May 1999, to the most recent, 
in May 2007. Within the broad field of education and lifelong learning, the chapter 
focuses on two more narrowly-defined areas: special educational needs (SEN) and 
adult community learning (ACL). These areas are of particular interest for two main 
reasons: first, there has been considerable policy-making activity in SEN and ACL in 
both jurisdictions since 1999, meaning that there is a relatively well-developed 
evidential base to inform detailed comparative analysis; and, second, policy-making 
in the two areas has taken place in the context of different levels of consensus and 
competition among key policy actors, meaning that the study's broader research 
questions around policy processes and outputs can be tested in different ways (see 
Chapter 1: 12-13). To this end, particular attention is paid to policy developments 
which have salience for questions around joined-up governance (JUG). In the area of 
SEN, the chapter focuses on Working Together, a multi-agency strategy developed to 
deliver better speech and language therapy (SLT) services for children and young 
people in Wales, and the Coordinated Support Plan (CSP), a statutory measure 
designed to coordinate the contributions of an array of agencies with an interest in 
educational provision for children with additional support needs in Scotland. In the
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area of ACL, the chapter focuses on Community Consortia for Education and 
Training (CCETs), an institutional framework designed to encourage and facilitate 
partnership working among the statutory, private and third sectors at a sub-regional 
level in Wales, and Individual Learner Accounts (ILAs), a funding mechanism 
designed to broker ACL to those with the greatest need to develop their basic skills 
in Scotland.
In the final section, the chapter locates these developments within the wider 
policy contexts in Scotland and Wales between 1999 and 2007 and explores some of 
the complex linkages that developed during that period between education and 
lifelong learning and a number of other broad policy goals.
4.1 Special educational needs
The statutory framework for SEN in England and Wales is outlined in the Education 
Acts 1993 and 1996, and in the Special Educational Needs and Disability Act 2001. 
Under the terms of this scheme, a child has SEN if he or she has a Teaming 
difficulty7 which calls for 'special educational provision7 (Education Act 1996: s312.1). 
A child has a 'learning difficulty7 if he or she has:
a significantly greater difficulty in learning than the majority of children of his or her 
age, or a disability which either prevents or hinders him or her from making use of 
educational facilities of a kind generally provided for children of his or her age in 
schools within the area of the Local Education Authority (LEA).
Education Act (1996: s312.2)
The term therefore covers a broad spectrum of cognitive, physical and social 
obstacles to learning and may include: formally diagnosed neurological or 
developmental conditions, such as dyslexia, speech and language difficulties, ADHD 
and autism; physical disabilities, such as visual and aural impairment and a range of 
motor disorders; and less specific, unnamed difficulties, which may be linked to 
family circumstances or to a lack of appropriate learning opportunities. 'Special 
educational provision7 refers to:
provision which is additional to, or otherwise different from, the educational 
provision made generally for children of [the same] age in schools maintained by the 
same LEA.
Education Act (1996: s312.4)
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Such provision may range from simple curriculum differentiation, through to 
intensive, one-to-one support by specially-trained Learning Support Assistants 
(LSAs) or, for children with the most acute needs, regular consultations with 
specialist therapists. It has been estimated that one in four children in mainstream 
schooling in England and Wales will require special educational provision of some 
description during the time they spend in compulsory education (ELLC Jun 16 2004). 
In 2002, 3.4% of the mainstream school population in Wales had statutory 
recognition of their SEN, and in 2003-04 the budget for SEN in Wales was £224m 
(NAW 2003c).
The Education Act 1993 placed a duty on the Secretary of State for Education to 
issue a Code of Practice for SEN provision in England and Wales and established the 
power to revise it from time to time (Education Act 1993: sl56.1). The first Code of 
Practice came into effect in 1994 (DfE 1994) and the most recent was issued in 2002 
(DfES 2002). Central to the Code of Practice was the Individual Education Plan (IEP), 
a document unique to each child with SEN and aimed at reviewing the efficacy of 
any special educational provision he or she receives. The IEP was also the primary 
instrument for monitoring the progress of children with SEN in English and Welsh 
mainstream schools. The Code of Practice also set down guidance and procedures 
for the early identification of SEN. There is clear evidence that early (and 
appropriate) intervention is an effective means of addressing many learning 
difficulties, and the Code of Practice placed particular emphasis on the role of 
external specialists (e.g. speech and language therapists or educational psychologists) 
in picking up the early signs of difficulty and advising schools on preventing the 
development of more significant needs (DfES 2002). The increasing use of such 
specialists, however, created a number of related problems. Particular specialisms 
complained they were under-resourced and unable to meet demand. There were 
also severe problems coordinating services: for example, NHS Trusts were the 
primary providers of SLT services in England and Wales, but it was LEAs that had 
responsibility for ensuring provision of such services to children with SEN. This led 
to tension across agencies and confusion for parents seeking appropriate levels of 
support for their children (SALTAG 2003). The issue of early identification of SEN
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j
I and, in particular, the role of specialist external services in that identification, 
continues to be one of the key policy issues in the contemporary SEN debate.
The Education Act 1996 also made provision for the statutory assessment of
t
| children who fall (or probably fall) within the Act's definition of Teaming 
difficulty'.2 If, following assessment, a child is considered to have sufficiently acute 
needs, the responsible LEA is obliged under the Act to make and maintain a 
Statement of those needs, resulting in a statutory entitlement to special educational
i
provision (Education Act 1996: s323-330). This statutory assessment or
'Statementing' process has become a hugely controversial policy issue in England 
and Wales. Children who have acknowledged or suspected SEN, but who are not 
assessed as requiring a Statement under the terms of the 1996 Act, have no statutory 
entitlement to special educational provision of any kind. There has also been a great 
deal of variation in the number of Statemented children in comparable LEAs across 
England and Wales since the statutory assessment process was first introduced 
(Estyn 2004: 5; ELLC May 26 2005), and a general decline in the overall number of 
new Statements granted across England and Wales in the decade to 2000 (BCCED 
2000). This led to suggestions that resource management, rather than educational 
need, was taking priority within some LEAs and even Baroness Wamock, author of 
the report that first recommended a standardised form of national statutory 
assessment, Special Educational Needs (CEHC 1978), has acknowledged some of the 
inequities the process can create (Wamock 2005). Statementing has also become a 
time-consuming process, with a minimum six month wait between initial assessment 
and the issue of a Statement, and consequently a proportion of children with SEN 
inevitably fail to gain the provision they need at a sufficiently early stage in their 
development. As such, the two issues at the centre of the SEN policy debate in 
England and Wales -  early identification and statutory assessment -  are closely 
interwoven.
The 1996 Act also created a Special Educational Needs Tribunal to deal with 
disputes arising from the statutory assessment process in England and Wales 
(Education Act 1996: s325-326). The SEN and Disability Act 2001 renamed it the
I(
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Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal (SENDIST) and extended its 
jurisdiction markedly (SEN and Disability Act 2001: s.17).
SEN provision in Scotland, like the majority of its education system, is subject to a 
different legislative scheme to that which operates in England and Wales, and has 
developed some distinctive definitions of and approaches to SEN and associated 
provision. Provision for children with SEN was until recently made through a 
framework based around the Education Act (Scotland) 1980. In a clear echo of the 
England and Wales legislation, Section 1 (5) (d) of the Act defines children's SEN as, 
'needs caused by a learning difficulty which he has which calls for provision for 
special educational needs to be made for him'. 'Learning difficulty' is defined in the 
same Section as:
(i) he has significantly greater difficulty in learning than the majority of children or, 
as the case may be, young persons of his age; or
(ii) he suffers from a disability which either prevents or hinders him from
making use of educational facilities of a kind generally provided for children or, as 
the case may be, young persons of his age in schools under the management of the 
education authority for the area to which he belongs ...; or
iii) he is under the age of five years and is, or would be if provision for special 
educational needs were not made for him, likely to fall within subparagraph (i) or (ii) 
above when over that age
Children enter the statutory process where they have ’pronounced, specific or 
complex special educational needs, which are such as require continuing review’. In 
order to formalise the review process, each child identified as having SEN is given a 
Record of Needs to encourage agencies to come together to plan and review a child's 
needs. The Record of Needs is broadly comparable with the Statementing process in 
England and Wales, although it focuses on an assessment of the child's strengths and 
weaknesses, rather than the provision that should be put in place to allow the child 
to progress.
The format of a Record of Needs is specified in the Education (Record of Needs) 
(Scotland) Regulations 1982. Under the terms of these regulations, a Record must 
contain: a summary of the child's impairments; a statement of the special educational 
needs arising from these impairments; measures proposed by the relevant education 
authority to meet those needs; and, where appropriate, the nomination of the school
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to be attended. The Record may also include the views of the child and/or parents 
and a summary of reviews of the Record. Education authorities are required to keep 
the Record under review and guidance recommends that this be on an annual basis. 
About 2% of children in compulsory education had such a Record in 2005, but many 
more received additional provision.
The suitability of the Record of Needs, like that of the Statementing process in 
England and Wales, has been an important policy issue in Scotland for some years 
and was one of the most debated policy issues between 1999 and 2007. Unlike in 
Wales, however, the Scottish Parliament had the powers to introduce legislation to 
radically change the system.
4.1.1 The development of SEN policy in Wales, 1999-2007
Responsibility for education and training in Wales, including SEN provision, has 
rested with the National Assembly since devolution. A separate SEN Code of 
Practice for Wales was issued in 2002 and this ensured the IEP remains at the heart 
of the guidance and procedures set down for SEN provision in Welsh mainstream 
schools (NAW 2002a). The Assembly government also established a Special 
Educational Needs Tribunal for Wales (SENTW) in 2003, which operated with 
effectively the same jurisdiction as SENDIST, which became its English equivalent.3 
It is clear that publication of a Code of Practice, the inclusion in the Code of the IEP 
as its central focus, and the creation of a separate SEN Tribunal for Wales all 
represent clear continuities with pre-devolution SEN policy in Wales.
There were, however, been some important policy departures. The Assembly 
government set out its priorities for SEN in The Learning Country. Briefly, it made 
commitments to:
• adopt a strategic approach to reduce the fragmentation of [external] services;
• establish the precise extent to which the demand for speech and other therapies is 
exceeding supply; and
• require LEAs and LHBs to work together on matters of provision much more 
consistently than they do at present.
NAW (2001, original emphasis)
In order to add some detail to what were somewhat vague commitments to improve 
and coordinate speech and language therapy (SLT) services, Jane Davidson and Jane
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Hutt, then the Assembly Ministers for Education and Lifelong Learning and Health 
and Social Services respectively, together established a Speech and Language 
Therapy Action Group (SALTAG) in 2002. The group's membership was drawn 
from representatives of all the key stakeholder groups, including LEAs and LHBs, 
NHS Trusts, and specialist SEN and SLT organisations (SALTAG 2003, Appendix I). 
The group undertook a review of SLT services in Wales based on a wide-ranging but 
informal consultation process, and published its report, Working Together, in late 2003 
(SALTAG 2003). The report identified a number of failings in the provision of SLT 
services in Wales, among them: 'unmanageable caseload sizes and poor professional 
morale'; a Tack of co-ordinated working arrangements between health and 
education'; and 'insufficient resources generally' (SALTAG 2003: 31-33). The group 
made two key recommendations. The first of these was that the Assembly 
government should establish schemes in which SLT services are made available on a 
regional basis, so that the contributions of different providers can be coordinated 
and a seamless rather than fragmented service can be offered to parents and their 
children (SALTAG 2003: 26). The Assembly government responded by setting up a 
number of regional schemes in which:
all parties bring resources to the table and agree priorities in relation to how these 
resources can be used most effectively within a given region ... bringing together in 
an integrated way teams of speech and language therapists, specialist teachers, SLT 
assistants and LSAs to share their skills, knowledge and training ... conduct joint 
assessments and provide intervention to meet individual needs including in-situ 
support in schools.
Jane Davidson, Afasic Cymru Conference Oct 15 2004 (Afasic 2004)
These schemes did not become operational until April 2005 and so the extent to 
which they were successful in their aim of coordinating SLT services in the initial 
trial regions is as yet unknown.4 Nonetheless, such schemes represent a novel 
approach to tackling the problem of integrating services. SALTAG's second key 
recommendation was that:
a funding mechanism should be developed that supports and facilitates a co­
ordinated approach to the commissioning of services to children and young people 
with [speech, language and cognition difficulties (SLCD)].
SALTAG (2003: vii)
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The response of the Assembly government was to encourage LEAs and LHBs to 
apply for its Flexibilities Special Grant (FSG). Totalling £4.85m in 2002-03, the FSG 
had the 'policy intention' of achieving 'greater joint working between the NHS and 
local government' by providing an option for joint-budgeting for collaborative 
projects (NAW 2002b).
In June 2003, the Assembly's Education and Lifelong Learning Committee5 (the 
ELL Committee) decided to carry out a comprehensive review of SEN policy in 
Wales (ELLC Jun 18 2003). The review focused on the two key policy issues 
identified above: in phase 1, the ELL Committee examined early identification and 
intervention, including the provision of specialist external services such as SLT; and, 
in phase 2, it focused on the statutory assessment procedure.6 Phase 1 was completed 
in November 2004 at which time the ELL Committee made a number of 
recommendations to the Minister for Education and Lifelong Learning (ELLC 2004a: 
paras. 4.1-2.28). Briefly, it recommended that the Assembly government should:
• issue guidance to LHBs and LEAs encouraging ... joint commissioning of 
services and pooled budget arrangements [and the extended use of] the FSG, to 
fund collaborative SEN projects;
• give particular attention to the need for all newly qualified teachers to have a 
better understanding of SEN; particularly in techniques for early identification;
• commission an audit of provision of SEN services for children and young people 
with SEN, whose first language is neither English nor Welsh;
• provide funding for an advocacy service, independent of LEAs, to reinforce its 
independent nature and ability to offer totally impartial advice; and
• increase funding for the training and recruitment of specialist staff [e.g. speech 
and language therapists].
All of these recommendations were accepted by the Minister, who then outlined 
detailed plans (including some funding details) to put them into practice (WAG 
2005a; see also NAW 2005c). In some cases, these plans represented extensions or 
adaptations of existing policies, most notably with respect to the extended use of the 
FSG. But in many respects the recommendations of the ELL Committee led to a 
degree of policy innovation. For example, a number of 'coordinators' were 
appointed to work with health and education service providers in overseeing joint 
commissioning arrangements for the provision of specialist external services at the 
local level (WAG 2005a).
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4.1.2 The development of SEN policy in Scotland, 1999-2007
Like its counterpart in Wales, the Education, Culture and Sport Committee (ECS 
Committee) of the Scottish Parliament (along with its various other incarnations) 
made SEN provision a key priority in the years immediately following devolution. 
The ECS Committee began a review of SEN policy in Scotland with a formal written 
evidence session in early 2000 and published a report, based in large part on that
|
I consultation, as well as on extra oral evidence taken in Committee, in 2001 (ECSCi
! 2001). The recommendations of the ECS Committee were strikingly similar to those
of the ELL Committee in Wales, noted above. Perhaps of most analytical relevance 
for this study was the clear commitment on the part of the ECS Committee to putting 
in place joint funding and delivery arrangements between agencies working in the 
spheres of education, health and social services in Scotland. For example, the ECS 
Committee recommended that:
The Scottish Executive should consider establishing an inclusive education resource
centre which would co-ordinate resources, information and training for staff, parents
and young people with special needs, and undertake research.
(ECSC 2001)
In 2002, Cathy Jamieson, then Minister for Education and Young People, 
announced proposals for radical changes to assessing and providing for children 
with SEN in Scotland, including important statutory arrangements to improve the 
coordination of services. The main features of the proposals can be summarised as 
follows:
• Plans to replace the Record of Needs with a strengthened and more streamlined 
staged intervention process, where a new, flexible Coordinated Support Plan will 
be put in place for children with the most complex needs
• Improved staged intervention processes using school-based support to provide 
for all children with additional support needs, including those with behavioural
| difficulties, children for whom English is an additional language, refugees and
| asylum seekers and Gypsy/Traveller children. External agencies, such as
education authorities, social workers and health professionals will continue to 
support children, parents and schools whenever necessary
• Local authorities to provide more information for parents of children with 
additional support needs, and to have mediation services in place which will aim 
to resolve any disputes at an early stage
• Extended rights of appeal for parents and children to allow them to challenge the 
level of provision proposed. And a less bureaucratic appeals system, with an
I
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independent, expert Tribunal being set up to make the appeals process less 
daunting and quicker for parents and young people
Although officially a response to the Executive's own consultation paper, Assessing 
our Children's Educational Needs - the Way Forward? (Scottish Executive 2001a), the 
proposals echoed many of the recommendations made by the ECS Committee.
The Scottish Executive subsequently announced outline proposals for change in 
► February 2002 and the process culminated in the Education (Additional Support for
Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004. This major piece of legislation replaced SEN with a 
much wider recognition of all Additional Support Needs (ASN)7 and replaced the 
Record of Needs with a new statutory instrument of assessment and recording, the 
highly innovative Coordinated Support Plan (CSP). The definition of ASN was 
always intended to be much wider than that of SEN (Scottish Executive 2002). The 
Act removed the requirement that a child should be experiencing a Teaming 
difficulty' and instead referred to the 'additional support' that should be available 
where the child requires such support to benefit from the education to be provided 
'for whatever reason' (si (1), emphasis added). Additional support must now be 
provided if a child requires such support as a result of a range of new variables, 
including if he or she is 'gifted or talented'. As the new instrument of statutory 
assessment and recording, the CSP details the ASN of a child and the full range of 
services required to adequately provide the additional support necessary where the 
provision of that support requires action on the part of two or more agencies. 
Crucially, the CSP places a statutory duty on the agencies named in the Plan to 
implement the plan effectively and provide a record of implementation. The CSP is 
! subject to periodic review within certain time parameters.
4.1.3 The SEN policy context in Scotland and Wales: a climate of consensus
For many years, the most debated SEN policy issue in the UK was whether to include 
children with SEN in mainstream schooling, or else to segregate those children in 
special schools or other segregated settings. This debate seemed to have been settled 
on the side of inclusion by the early 1980s, but is slowly remerging in the English 
context. Since the UK general election of May 2005, the Conservative Party has
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sought to make an issue of the closure of a number of special schools in England and 
its Leader, David Cameron (2005), has been unequivocal in his opposition to the 
policy of inclusion across the board. "Labour's idea of compassion', Cameron argues, 
'is to put every child, no matter what ability or disability in the same class and the 
same school and say, somehow, that is equal rights, that is inclusion. Well I say it is 
heartless, it is gutless, it is wrong and we've got to get rid of it'. There has also been a 
steady increase in the proportion of children being schooled in segregated settings in 
England since 2002 (CSIE 2005).
In Scotland and Wales, however, the hegemonic position of inclusion remains 
unchallenged and inclusion-versus-segregation is yet to re-emerge as a major issue 
within the Scottish and Welsh SEN policy debates. Indeed, in Scotland, the right for 
a child with SEN of any kind to be admitted to a mainstream school remains 
enshrined in statute in the form of the Education (Scotland) Act 1981. This has some 
important implications for a study of policy-making that takes particular interest in 
JUG. It was posited in Chapter 2 that the ideal conditions for effective JUG are those 
where high levels of inter-personal and inter-organisational trust can be established 
and maintained and this may be more likely to happen in a policy area where the 
debates that polarised opinion in the past have now been settled and a climate of 
something close to consensus has been created. In the following section, it will be 
clear how this kind of policy-making context does not exist in many other policy 
areas, not least in this study's other chosen key case study.
4.2 Adult community learning
In the 21st Century, our natural resource is our people -  and their potential is both 
untapped and vast. Skills will unlock that potential. The prize for our country will be 
enormous -  higher productivity, the creation of wealth and social justice. The 
alternative? Without increased skills, we would condemn ourselves to a lingering 
decline in competitiveness, diminishing economic growth and a bleaker future for 
all.
Lord Leitch (2006:1)
Every additional year of learning by adults brings measurable social gain in terms of 
the way people live their lives and function within society. People with more 
education tend to be more law abiding and to enjoy better standards of health. These 
are all benefits for society as a whole ... leisure education is a good investment for 
those with a lower level of education in terms of social gain and is worthwhile even 
if they do not progress to further learning.
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Sir Adrian Webb (2007: 55)
In communities across the UK, coal-mining, steel-working and ship-building, along 
with many other kinds of heavy industry, have all but disappeared. Although a 
significant manufacturing rump remains, the service sector has grown beyond all 
recognition in the last two decades or so, with the UK now specialising in such areas 
as financial services, biotechnology and telecommunications. This reweighting of the 
UK economy has placed new demands on its workforce and a good standard of 
literacy and numeracy - and at least a basic competence in information and 
communication technology (ICT) - have become minimum requirements for 
employability (Future Skills Wales 2003). Even comparatively low order occupations, 
such ‘as front line jobs in customer service call centres, demand far more 
sophisticated communication skills than were required to work the factory 
production lines of the 1960s and 1970s.
As the needs of the economy have changed, so the definition of what constitutes 
'basic' skills has been revisited. As the Scottish Executive (2001b: 7) put it: '[literacy] 
and numeracy are skills whose sufficiency may only be judged within a specific 
social, cultural, economic or political context' and it is fair to say that that context has 
changed markedly. In this respect, the results of a survey commissioned by the 
Scottish Executive in 2000 (MORI 2000, quoted in Scottish Executive 2001b: 8) are 
instructive. The results of the survey make clear employers' changing attitudes to the 
sufficiency of the basic skills of their employees: nearly a third of employers 
responding to the survey reported that increasing demands had been made on 
employees' literacy and numeracy skills over the previous five years; nearly a third 
expected increasing demands to be made on employees' literacy and numeracy skills 
over the following five years; and a fifth believed poor or moderate literacy and 
numeracy skills had been and would continue to be a barrier to productivity in their 
business.
It is in this light that employers' organisations across the UK have been warning 
for some time that a significant minority of adults, ranging from school leavers to 
experienced individuals currently in work, lack the literacy, numeracy and ICT skills 
necessary to meet what has become a new minimum standard, and with potentially
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debilitating consequences for the competitiveness of UK business (e.g. CBI 2006). 
Phrases such as "skills deficit' and 'literacy gap' have entered the lexicon of business 
leaders and their representatives and a certain amount of pressure has been put on 
governments to 'up skill' the general working population as a consequence.
Policy-makers at the UK level have certainly heeded these warnings. The UK 
government commissioned a large scale, independent review of the UK's long term 
skills needs in 2004. The Leitch Review of Skills was tasked with identifying the 
'optimal skills ... to maximise economic growth, productivity and social justice, set 
out the balance of responsibility for achieving that skills profile and consider the 
policy framework required to support it.' The final report of the Review, Prosperity 
for all in the global economy - world class skills, published in December 2006, explained 
the urgent need for the UK to raise achievements at all levels of skills and 
recommended that it commit to becoming a world leader in skills by 2020, 
benchmarked against the upper quartile of the OECD. This means 'doubling 
attainment at most levels of skill' and involves the responsibility for achieving these 
ambitions being 'shared between Government, employers and individuals.' (Leitch 
2006: 3).
However, Leitch is only the most recent example of the major influence the 'skills 
agenda' has had on the nature and trajectory of education and lifelong learning 
policy at the UK level in recent years: the creation of literacy and numeracy 'hours' 
was an attempt to improve basic skills in schools; the development of National 
Vocational Qualifications (NVQs) was an effort to endow vocational qualifications 
with the same prestige as more traditional, academic qualifications; and there was 
significant investment in subsidising training opportunities for those in employment, 
with a focus on formal accreditation for work-learned skills. Crucially, there was also 
recognition among policy-makers that those individuals with the lowest skills are 
often those least likely to engage with formal or traditional educational opportunities 
or be in employment and able to access work-based learning. In this light, ACL, 
traditionally the preserve of the casual or 'leisure' learner, opened up as an 
additional front in the battle to improve the nation's skills.
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ACL, as Sir Adrian Webb (2007: 55-58) has remarked, is notoriously difficult to 
define or categorise. It can take the form of informal, non-accredited courses for 
those with little experience of traditional education, but can also closely mirror 
formal educational settings with linear routes towards recognised qualifications. It 
can be a means of engaging with adults who 'have to be informally coaxed into 
rebuilding a relationship with the world of learning' (Webb 2007: 58), but can also be 
an opportunity for already well-qualified individuals to pursue their interests and 
continue learning throughout their lifetimes. Courses might range from accountancy 
to fork lift truck driving, nail care to conversational Spanish (ILA Scotland 2009). 
There are therefore many ideas of what ACL is, what it can achieve, what form it 
should take and what kind of journey adult learners should be taken on. Building up 
the skills of the hardest to reach and lowest skilled to fuel a changing economy is 
merely one of many competing policy aims.
It should come as no surprise, then, that some providers and advocates of adult 
learning are generally unimpressed by suggestions that the focus of ACL should be 
narrowed onto basic skills. There is strong support among well-resourced 
organisations, such as the FE colleges, the Scottish Adult Learners' Partnership and 
the National Institute of Adult Continuing Education (NIACE), for the principle 
often described as Teaming for learning's sake' or, alternatively, 'leisure learning', to 
be maintained and, indeed, extended. There is also some concern that some of the 
'softer' benefits associated with adult learning -  creating more responsible, engaged 
and fulfilled citizens, for example - would be stripped away in any rush to develop 
courses focussed exclusively on those 'harder' skills which appear to have a more 
immediate or tangible economic pay off.
How best to develop ACL policy in ways that balance these competing (though 
not necessarily incompatible) aims was the key policy issue in the ACL field in 
Scotland and Wales between 1999 and 2007 and there were a number of innovative 
responses.
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demands of business. Arthur Morgan et al (2004: 228) have described the problem:
The very different orientation of [education providers] and employers meant that it 
was difficult to bring the various stakeholders together to produce a reform that 
would have a direct impact...
Even prior to devolution, then, it was clear to all with an interest in ACL that many 
of the grave social and economic problems afflicting Wales could not be solved by 
policy actors usually defined by either an education or economic development 
orientation acting in isolation.
Concerted work to overcome this problem began in 1998, when the Welsh Office 
set up an Education and Training Action Group (ETAG) to review the provision of 
education and training in Wales in anticipation of the inaugural Assembly elections. 
The Group began a major process of consultation and published its 
recommendations the following year (ETAG 1999). The subsequent Education and 
Training Action Plan (ETAP) recommended a significant restructuring of post-16 
education and training in Wales designed to rationalise a complex structure in which 
various roles were played by Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs), the Further 
Education Funding Councils (FEFCs) and Local Education Authorities (LEAs). The 
fledgling Assembly accepted ETAG's proposals and several stages of reform led to a 
new national body, Education and Learning Wales (ELWa), assuming responsibility 
for post-16 provision from April 2001.9 At the national level, ELWa comprised the 
National Council for Education and Training for Wales (NCETW), and the Higher 
Education Funding Council for Wales (HEFCW). Beneath this were four regional 
ELWa committees, covering North, Mid, South-East and South-West Wales, and at a 
sub-regional level a series of Community Consortia for Education and Training 
(CCETs) were established (Phelps et al 2006).
The architects of this new structure in Wales were acutely aware of the cross­
cutting issues at the heart of the policy debate and their reforms took great care to 
bring together the disparate interests from government, educational institutions and 
the voluntary and private sectors in ways that they hoped would encourage greater 
collaboration and partnership. ELWa's Operational Plan, for example, drew 
attention to the role business interests would play in the new regime: "[we] place the
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utmost importance on our relationships with businesses' ELWa insisted, 'from one to 
one contact through to engagement with local, regional and national business 
organisations' (ELWa 2001: 35). In short, the new education and training structure 
was charged with an onerous task: it was hoped it could help bring effective 
coordination to a notoriously fragmented and contested policy milieu.
This commitment to achieving greater joined-up-ness, particularly in the case of 
ACL, can be seen most clearly in the structure and remit of the highly innovative 
CCETs, as well as in the rhetoric surrounding them.
4.2.1.1 Community Consortia for Education and Training: a 'strategic compact'
CCETs formed an important part of the new post-16 structure in Wales 
recommended by ETAG and, while not statutory bodies, the Consortia enjoyed some 
considerable autonomy in developing sub-regional strategies for developing and 
delivering education and training. ETAG (1999) clearly had the broad aims of JUG in 
mind when it advised that the CCETs would 'develop the kind of partnership and 
collaborative approach to the provision of learning that really can and will create 
benefits for learners', and many individual CCETs took this up as a kind of mission 
statement (e.g. BCBC 2006). In launching the CCETs, Jane Davidson, then Minister 
for Education and Lifelong Learning, heralded the principle of the consortium as 
providing an opportunity to develop a truly 'integrated education and training 
system' through a full range of interests 'who have agreed to collaborate at the local 
level to deliver education and training in their areas ... working together in 
committed partnership'.
The Assembly government set down a number of functions for the CCETs which 
were wide-ranging but focussed in large part on the need to build partnerships and 
collaborative relationships. These included:
• identifying opportunities for improved provision, including new patterns of 
collaboration;
• ensuring the work of education and training meets the needs of employers and 
others at every stage;
• securing delivery to agreed conditions of accountability, propriety and regularity;
• ensuring that Welsh medium post-16 provision meets defined needs;
• ensuring that collaboration with Higher Education institutions is sustained and 
enhanced;
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• working in close collaboration with the National Council to develop teaching and
learning through Information and Communication Technology;
• working with Careers Wales;
• capitalising on Wales' developing profile in Europe; and
• producing an annual Partnership Plan.
In all, twenty-one CCETs were formed with boundaries roughly coterminous with 
the Welsh unitary authorities.
CCETs are not only an example of attempts to join-up ACL policy processes. There 
are also some examples where CCETs themselves developed innovative, joined-up 
ACL policy outputs. One such example is the Learning Brokers project, which was in 
operation in one local authority area of South Wales between 2002 and 2006. 
Learning Brokers was developed by the Bridgend CCET, working in partnership 
with the Bridgend Association of Voluntary Organisations (BAVO). The CCET 
commissioned the People and Work Unit to conduct research and make 
recommendations on a suitable way of linking individuals to skills and training 
opportunities in the Bridgend local authority area, with a particular focus on 
disadvantaged areas. As Bridgend County Borough Council (BCBC 2008: 1) 
acknowledged in its submission to Excellence Wales (the Welsh Local Government 
Association's (WLGA) body which recognises and shares good practice), Learning 
Brokers successfully explored 'ways to avoid unnecessary duplication of provision' 
and demonstrated 'the clear benefits of having a centralised ... team who can assess 
local need and be a bridge between learners and providers to meet that same need/ 
The Assembly government reaffirmed its commitment to tackling low levels of 
basic literacy and numeracy - and to the CCETs as a key mechanism for achieving 
this at a sub-regional level - in its basic skills strategy document Words Talk, Numbers 
Count (WAG 2005c). The strategy was developed in order to raise awareness, 
develop new ideas and strengthen capacity to tackle basic skills deficits in Wales. 
Among four core aims contained within the strategy was a commitment to diminish 
significantly the number of adults with poor basic skills (WAG 2005c: 4). More 
specifically, the Assembly Government made a commitment to:
• Help people with low basic skills to identify their needs and to tackle them
• Make sure that effective learning provision is in place and that learners receive 
sufficient support over both participation and completion.
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Although the CCETs were assessed at this stage as having achieved some notable 
successes, the Assembly government was not entirely satisfied with the way that 
adult basic skills had been incorporated into their Action Plans and promised 
to 'encourage' CCETs to 'develop a more coordinated approach to planning and 
delivery' (WAG 2005c:17).
This hinted at what was to become the ultimate failure of the CCETs. Hopes that 
CCETs would provide the conditions under which a collaborative ethos could be 
established and sustained at a sub-regional level were largely dashed. One ELWa 
representative told Nick Phelps and his colleagues (2006: 569) during an interview 
undertaken as part of a research project into business representation in Wales, that 
far from contributing to a collaborative ethos among the full range of stakeholders, 
the CCETs had merely succeeding in exposing stakeholders' divergent positions:
I think generally speaking if you look at the fact that... there is competition between 
training suppliers and schools and colleges for post-16 people. The squabbles that go 
on if [CCET members] are in a meeting together is not really conducive to a bloke 
giving up his time from running his business to be constructive about the various 
needs in the area. And I think until we sort this out we are not actually going to get 
business people involved. I would honestly say that at CCET level ... the business 
influence in what CCETs are doing is now next to nothing
This view is further reinforced by the interview data. All of the CCET members 
interviewed commented on a certain degree of disharmony between business and 
educational interests within individual Consortia (Interviews 7 & 5). The former 
Director of a leading adult learners' representative organisation, for example, was in 
no doubt about the absence of a collaborative ethos in evidence in CCETs generally. 
"The biggest players in CCETs' he argued, 'were FE colleges and they'd come and 
say, 'well, we're doing this anyway, I don't care about you ... thank you, goodnight, 
we're off' ...' (Interview 7). This appears in stark contrast to ELWa's own assessment 
of the progress made by CCETs in meeting their objectives in terms of collaboration. 
'The key added value provided by CCETs thus far' ELWa stated in 2003, 'is ... the 
change in culture that they are helping to stimulate amongst learning stakeholders; 
there are increasing signs that learning providers and related organisations are 
developing a greater willingness to collaborate (ELWa 2003)
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Although there certainly were examples of CCETs largely fulfilling expectations 
in terms of partnership and collaboration, in general the CCETs failed to engage and 
involve the appropriate range of interests, or at least the range of interests their 
architects originally intended. Employers and representatives from business 
organisations such as the Chambers of Commerce, CBI, IoD, and FSB were very 
much in the minority on CCETs. Individual employers (admittedly with a number of 
clear exceptions, particularly with regard to the highly pro-active Chairman of the 
Bridgend CCET) found it difficult to justify the time commitment. Business 
representation on the CCETs amounted to 12% of all members in 2003, with only 5 
individual members being drawn from business representative organisations 
(ELWA 2003). Moreover, members of CCETs from all of the sectors from which 
interviews were conducted reported that the Consortia quickly became process- 
rather than outcomes-oriented, leading to frustration and no little sense of 
disillusionment (Interview 5).
The Assembly government ended formal requirements for CCETs in 2007. The 
Minister reported that new partnership organisations were needed to find a better 
balance between the supply and demand side of education and training and 
indicated that new structures would reflect recommendations made by Leitch and 
seek to "strengthen the employer voice in the delivery of skills [through] a 
rationalisation of existing bodies to better represent employer views" (ELLC 21 Mar 
2007). The problems surrounding education and training in Wales therefore remain 
cross-cutting and the Assembly government continues to pursue joined-up solutions.
The most recent policy development in ACL in Wales suggests what form these 
future solutions may take. Skills, of course, is a devolved issue, and Lord Leitch in 
his review of skills in England could only express his hope that the Celtic nations 
would follow the Anglo Saxon lead (2006: 18). Partly in response to Leitch, but also 
because of Wales' stubbornly low skills levels, the Assembly government 
commissioned Sir Adrian Webb to undertake a review of the mission and purpose of 
the FE sector in Wales in December 2006 (Webb 2006). Jane Davidson, then Minister 
for Education, Lifelong Learning and Skills, agreed that the review would need to be 
"holistic in its approach", incorporating an appraisal not just of FE institutions, but an
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analysis of the wider roles of the sector too. This included: analysis of developments 
in 14-19 education; responsiveness to the skills needs of employers and the economy; 
adult learning; social justice and community engagement; interface with higher 
education provision; and the needs of, and responsiveness to, post 14 learners in 
Wales. The final report of the Webb Review was published in December 2007, 
meaning that any policy outputs following on from the recommendations of the 
Review are outside the time frame of this study. However, the process through 
which the review was commissioned, its terms of reference set out and its 
recommendations arrived at does form part of the analysis in the chapters that 
follow.
4.2.2 The development of ACL policy in Scotland, 1999-2007
We are fully committed to supporting a coordinated community learning policy as a 
means of engaging with young people, of promoting social inclusion, of developing 
individuals and communities ....
Cathy Jamieson
Minister for Education and Young People (2001)
Improving levels of literacy and numeracy is [a] vital step in helping people to 
participate in and contribute to our economy ...
Wendy Alexander
Minister for Transport, Enterprise and Lifelong Learning (2001)
The picture of a comparatively low-skilled adult population that was so clear to 
those with an interest in ACL in Wales was similarly stark to their counterparts in 
Scotland. In considering the scale and nature of the problem, the Scottish Executive's 
strategy paper, Adult Literacy and Numeracy in Scotland (2001b), noted that, though the 
majority of the population was satisfied with their skills for the uses they 
encountered: up to 800,000 adults appeared to have very low skills; 500,000 assessed 
their own skills as poor or moderate; and many unemployed people did not know if 
they had the literacy and numeracy skills for their choice of job. The strategy also 
drew attention to that fact that a high proportion of those with low levels of literacy 
and numeracy were to be found among people who live in Scotland's most 
disadvantaged areas, among workers in low skilled jobs, among people on low 
incomes, and among people with health problems and disabilities. As such, policy­
makers were quick to make the same links as their counterparts in Wales between
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poverty and disadvantage and low skills -  and to identify strengthened and 
refocused community-based adult learning as a potential solution.
A potentially hugely significant development in the first Parliament was the way 
in which the Scottish Executive chose to configure its various departments. In 
particular, there was a decision to unite in one ministerial portfolio responsibility not 
only for enterprise (encompassing business and economic development), but also 
lifelong learning. This may be indicative of awareness within the nascent Executive 
of the need to coordinate skills and economic development policy as a direct 
response to the emerging skills agenda. If correct, this observation would be a direct 
example of the Executive taking steps to '[structure] the machinery of government 
around a small number of broad policy goals' (Leicester and Mackay 1998: 3; see 
chapter 1: 4) in the way many supporters of devolution in Scotland had imagined 
they would and hoped they might. However, it was suggested by some informants 
during the course of the research that the decision to combine these functions in one 
department was at least partially the result of political expediency. It was suggested 
that, following her (unsuccessful) bid for the Labour leadership in Scotland, Wendy 
Alexander was given a choice of policy areas to come under her Deputy Minister 
portfolio. This alternative interpretation would explain the way the departments 
were configured using the dynamics of intra-party politics rather than an emerging 
bureaucratic attitude to JUG. Indeed, there was a third string to Alexander's 
Ministerial bow at that time, Transport, and this may hint at a not altogether 
coherent plan to join-up interrelated policy areas using the departmental structure.10
Aside from these developments in the departmental structure of government, 
there were a number of innovative policy responses to the problem of poor basic 
skills in Scotland, particularly among those outside of the orthodox arenas of formal 
educational settings and the workplace. One of the most significant was the 
development, demise and subsequent renaissance of the Individual Learner Account 
scheme.
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4.2.2.1 ILA Scotland: brokering learning for adults outside the workplace
A key problem identified by policy-makers in Scotland, as in Wales, was the 
difficulty practitioners experienced in linking learners and their specific, individual 
needs to the complex web of available learning opportunities delivered in different 
settings and in different ways. There were a number of perceived barriers to learner 
engagement: some individuals had been disenfranchised by mainstream education 
and found it difficult to engage in formal learning activity; others were not aware of 
opportunities or unclear about how to access learning; others did not have the 
necessary resources to attend courses (Slowey 2004). The Individual Learner 
Account (ILA) scheme, in all of its incarnations, offered Scottish learners significant 
cash contributions to the cost of learning as a way of incentivising and facilitating 
adult learning.
Scotland's original Learner Account scheme was closed following the demise of a 
similar scheme in England in November 2001. Both schemes had suffered under 
(largely unfounded) allegations of fraud and from a failure to reach the under­
skilled individuals the programmes were designed to assist. Three years later, in 
January 2004, Scottish officials announced the creation of a new scheme, known as 
ILA Scotland, which offered adult learners over the age of eighteen and earning 
£15,000 or less the opportunity to get up to £200 towards the cost of courses at 
community learning venues and FE colleges. To protect against past problems of 
fraud, the scheme used the Student Awards Agency of Scotland and the Scottish 
University for Industry as safeguards.11
ILA Scotland had a small number of very clear aims that can be summarised as 
follows:
• Widen participation in adult learning
• Introduce new, non-traditional learners to learning
• Prioritise needs of certain learner groups
• Target funding more effectively, focussing on low income earners
There were therefore two mechanisms at work which may be of some significance in 
terms of JUG. ILA Scotland identified on the ground "brokerage7 between the public 
and a public service as a key to joining up the two. It also used a funding mechanism:
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there was a significant commitment of resources to the scheme. Crucially, any 
learning provider that wants to offer a course as part of the scheme (and the funding 
made available to support learners is clearly an incentive for providers to want to 
engage with it) must meet quality standards and cover areas of learning that are 
approved by ILA Scotland. This gives the architects of the scheme and its 
administrators some control over the kinds of learning individuals from deprived, 
low-skilled backgrounds receive.
Leitch was very enthusiastic about ILAs and saw the Scottish example as one for 
the rest of the UK to follow. In particular, Leitch enthused about the way ILA 
Scotland engaged successfully with lower level, lower income learners and this, he 
said, is a key lesson to learn in England, where he wanted Learner Accounts to carry 
the entire adult learning traffic outside a work context by 2010. It is also important to 
note that, despite not representing a policy innovation initially (ILAs were 
introduced simultaneously across jurisdictions) their renaissance in Scotland and 
subsequent focus on lower level skills has shown some considerable innovation. As 
Leitch explains:
6.34 The recent Education and Skills Select Committee report on further education 
endorsed the reintroduction of Learner Accounts and noted that problems marring 
the previous Individual Learning Account scheme were administrative rather than 
fundamental. The Review supports this conclusion, recognising that learning 
accounts present real benefits for people, increasing ownership and choice, as well as 
providing a powerful incentive to the supply-side to drive up quality.
6.35 The [scheme] in Scotland [has] successfully shown that accounts can be 
expanded to learners at lower learning levels and the Review wants to ensure that 
all learners, particularly those most likely to be disengaged from learning, can access 
the benefits that accounts deliver.
4.2.3 The ACL policy context in Scotland and Wales: a climate of non-consensus
Unlike in the case of SEN, ACL policy-making takes place in a context where the 
major policy debates have yet to be settled and the actors in the process have 
competing claims not only over the nature of provision, but also over its purpose. In 
the case of SEN, potential fault lines still exist in the divisions between actors with a 
principal focus on education, social services or health, whereas in ACL, the fault 
lines between education and business are clear. It is wrong to characterise the
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situation as one in which those who see ACL as having a social justice function and 
those who see it as having an economic development function are in different camps 
-  that is a false dichotomy - but these two aims do place competing pressures on 
policy-makers and resources.
For this reason, ACL is a quite different test of JUG than SEN. In a climate of non­
consensus, building and maintaining the necessary inter-personal and inter- 
organisational trust to promote a collaborative ethos and effective joined-up thinking 
and action must be more difficult to achieve. In some respects, ACL is a 'harder' test 
of JUG than SEN and an area which may require participants in the policy process to 
demonstrate a deeper commitment to coordination.
4.3 The wider policy context
All of the policy developments described in this chapter can not be discussed in 
isolation from other important developments that have shaped and continue to 
shape the nature and trajectory of policy-making across policy sectors in Scotland 
and Wales. As was noted in chapter 1, the Making the Connections (WAG 2004) 
agenda had three very clearly articulated and complementary aims in Wales. The 
first was to place 'citizens at the centre', so that services would be more responsive to 
users' needs and people and communities would be involved in designing the way 
services are delivered. The second was to deliver 'better public engagement', so that 
every person would have the opportunity to contribute to and connect with the 
hardest to reach. The third aim was to allow 'the Welsh public service to work 
together', so that more and better coordination between providers could deliver 
more efficient and effective services.
It was in this context that education and lifelong learning policy in Wales 
developed following the Learning Country. Interviewees used the term 'proofing' to 
describe how policy proposals were held up to the light of Making the Connections 
before being put in place (Interview 1 & 2). The Assembly government published an 
action plan to operationalise Making the Connection in 2005. Delivering the Connections: 
from Vision to Action (WAG 2005b) gave the agenda a second injection of publicity
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and ensured that the need for greater coordination in public services remained in the 
consciousness of actors involved in policy formulation and delivery in Wales.
A second key policy development that impacted greatly on the development of 
some aspects of education and lifelong learning policy in Wales -  particularly skills- 
related, for-work training - has been Communities First, the Assembly government's 
flagship programme for improving the living conditions and life chances of people 
living in the most deprived communities in Wales. Communities First is a long term 
programme that acknowledges the central role community involvement must play in 
delivering real and sustainable change and aims to:
• get local people involved in improving their areas and their own prospects;
• bring in funding and support from a range of sources to make things happen;
• make sure improvements last;
• encourage flexibility, risk-taking and new ways of dealing with problems;
• involve everyone working together to identify and do something about their 
community's problems.
Crucially, work undertaken as part of the programme is informed by the (recently 
revised) Communities First Vision Framework (WAG 2007). The Framework is 
organised around six key themes:
• Child Poverty;
• Community Safety;
• Health and Well Being;
• Education, Skills and Training;
• Environment; and
• Jobs, Business and Income Generation.
Communities First therefore has a focus on bringing education and training 
opportunities to the hardest to reach in the most deprived communities and, 
uniquely, is tasked with "programme bending" existing mainstream services into 
those communities. So, for example, Communities First had a great deal of input into 
the CCETs and even hosted the Learning Brokers programme in Bridgend. Although 
the successor to Learning Brokers, Bridges into Work, is outside the time frame of 
this study, it is noteworthy that Communities First in six local authority areas in 
Wales has taken the step of match-funding the new project, providing further 
evidence of how education and lifelong learning is moving toward something like a 
symbiotic relationship with other WAG-sponsored bodies. Communities First is
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expressly tasked with facilitating or brokering access to education and lifelong 
learning opportunities and is a part of a number of the main learning strategy 
documents (e.g. WAG 2005c).
It is instructive that education and lifelong practitioners working with learners on 
the ground view their own work within this wider policy context. The Learning 
Brokers project was, in its own words, a reaction to the fact that partnership and 
collaborative working were 'high on the policy agenda' and was conscious that it 
was being designed in the context of the expectations laid down in the Making the 
Connections agenda. This may be evidence of a culture or ethos emerging in which 
policy-makers and practitioners locate their own work within an overall agenda.
In Scotland, a similar agenda to Making the Connections was put in place some 
years earlier. As Richard Parry and Audrey McDougal (2005) describe, the Scottish 
Executive embarked on what it called a 'cultural change' programme in late 2002, 
which was designed to ensure that the Executive could deliver the targets contained 
in the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition's policy programme A partnership for a 
better Scotland: partnership agreement (Scottish executive 2003). The change agenda 
was based around four core concepts: leadership; outward focus including working 
with stakeholders; delivering outcomes; and developing corporate processes and 
procedures. The successes of Changing to Deliver have been evaluated on two 
occasions: by the Scottish Permanent Secretary, John Elvidge, in a review conducted 
for the Finance Committee of the Scottish Parliament, and later by the Office of the 
Chief Researcher in autumn 2004 (OCR 2004). The findings of Elvidge's review are 
summarised by Parry and McDougal (2005: 3) and reproduced in Box 4.1.
The overall conclusion of the evaluation study undertaken by the Office of the 
Chief Researcher was that significant improvement could be demonstrated in the 
areas of policy-making and outward focus. It was acknowledged that 
communicating the corporate vision and gaining staff support for change has been 
successful, although this had yet to be demonstrated through concrete actions and 
work was required to fully engage ministers. Finally, the evaluation noted that 
changes in corporate processes had achieved little improvement, and a greater
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alignment is needed between corporate processes and the business needs of the 
Executive.
Box 4.1 Achievements of Changing to Deliver
• Leadership -  based on responses to a recent staff survey, the Executive scored 
highly compared to other UK departments and public bodies.
• Outcomes -  outcome measures are primarily based on meeting the partnership 
agreement targets; however another measure of success of this programme is the 
degree of professionalisation of the executive's staff. The number of staff holding 
appropriate professional qualifications is increasing both in support services and 
mainstream policy roles.
• Outward focus -  a 2004 survey of stakeholder opinion about the Executive, 
involving 824 respondents indicated that over 70% of stakeholders were satisfied 
with their dealings with the Executive and two thirds of stakeholders considered 
that the Executive's approach to joint working has improved since devolution.
• Corporate processes -  improvements in the finance, IT and HR systems have also 
been achieved.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that both SEN and ACL policy in Scotland and Wales have 
experienced some important developments since 1999. SEN has been the subject of at 
least two major reviews and a range of policy innovations have been proposed and 
put into practice. ACL has been high on the policy agenda of both governments and 
the need to up skill members of deprived communities has been a particular focus in 
both jurisdictions. This has resulted in eye-catching policy innovations, like ILA 
Scotland and the Communities First aim of "programme bending', which have 
attracted international attention.
It is clear from the discussion above that policy-makers were not reticent about 
making claims for joined-up thinking and action in their areas of interest or 
responsibility. The degree of rhetorical engagement with the doctrine of JUG was 
considerable. But to what extent is this rhetoric matched by the reality of policy­
making? Among the claims to new ways of working, just how joined-up was policy­
making in these areas during the period of study? The following chapter addresses 
this question through a descriptive evaluation of policy processes and outputs from 
a JUG perceptive.
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Notes to chapter 4
1 Following the election of Alex Salmond's Scottish National Party, in May 2007, the 
Scottish Executive has been known as the Scottish Government. In order to prevent 
confusion, this study only uses the term Scottish Executive as it was used 
consistently throughout the period of the first two Parliaments.
2 This provision also forms part of some previous legislation, but it is the 1996 Act 
that is currently in force in England and Wales.
3 A detailed account of the role and progress of this body is included in its annual 
report (SENTW 2005).
4 Indeed, any assessment of the efficacy of a JUG initiative in terms of its outcomes is 
beyond the scope of this study (see Chapter 2: 47-49).
5 The ELL Committee's broad remit was based on the portfolio of the Minister for 
Education and Lifelong Learning and included schools, further education, higher 
education, skills development, the youth service and the careers service.
6 The areas of focus identified by the ELL Committee were more wide-ranging and 
clearly-defined than the priorities set out by the Assembly government in The 
Learning Country.
7 This means that, post-2004, it is inaccurate to talk of the development of special 
educational needs policy in Scotland. However, it is confusing to change the 
terminology to additional support needs and a consistent terminology has been 
maintained for that reason.
8 The national standards framework for literacy and numeracy defines skills at Entry 
level (divided into three sub-levels), Level 1 and Level 2 or above. Levels 1 and 2 are 
broadly comparable to GCSE English and Mathematics. General descriptions of each 
level within the National Standards are given below.
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Table 4.2 National standards framework for literacy and numeracy
Level Level Literacy (reading) Numeracy
Entry level 1 Understands short texts 
with repeated language 
patterns on familiar topics
Can obtain information 
from common signs and 
symbols
Understands information 
given by numbers and 
symbols in simple 
graphical, numerical and 
written material
Entry level 2 Understands short 
straightforward texts on 
familiar topics
Can obtain information 
from short documents, 
familiar sources and signs 
and symbols
Understands information 
given by numbers, symbols, 
simple diagrams and charts 
graphical, numerical and 
written material
Entry level 3 Understands short 
straightforward texts on 
familiar topics accurately 
and independently
Can obtain information 
from everyday sources
Understands information 
given by numbers, symbols, 
diagrams and charts used 
for different purposes and 
in different ways in 
graphical, numerical and 
written material
Level 1 Understands short 
straightforward texts of 
varying length on a variety 
of topics accurately and 
independently
Can obtain information 
from different sources
Understands 
straightforward 
mathematical information 
used for different purposes 
and can independently 
select relevant information 
from given graphical, 
numerical and written 
material
Level 2 or 
above
Understands a range of 
texts of varying complexity 
accurately and 
independently
Can obtain information of 
varying length and detail 
from different sources
Understands mathematical 
information used for 
different purposes and can 
independently select and 
compare relevant 
information from a variety 
of graphical, numerical and 
written material
9 These reforms are discussed in some detail by Phelps et al (2006).
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10 There is a potentially key difference here with Wales. The Assembly government 
chose to combine lifelong learning with education, rather than enterprise. Later on, 
this was reinforced by the addition of skills. In Wales, any link between enterprise, 
lifelong learning and skills was made in the way different departments and ministers 
interrelated, rather than in the way they were structured.
11 A version of the ILA Scotland was established in Wales in July 2003. ILA Wales is a 
smaller scheme with narrower criteria for qualification (learners must be in receipt of 
certain benefits or have qualifications below NQF Level 2) and a smaller amount 
available to support learners, up to a maximum of £200.
98
5
Analysis: measuring 'joined-up-ness' in policy 
processes and outputs
Between 1999 and 2007, the rhetoric surrounding education and lifelong learning 
policy in Scotland and Wales was pervaded by the language of joined-up 
government (JUG). No problem, it seemed, was so intractable that it could not be 
overcome by a more 'collaborative ethos' or by better 'partnership working'. 
Stakeholders with apparently divergent views on how policy should be developed 
came together in 'strategic compacts' (NAW 2001: 49), while government 
departments and agencies whose first instinct was to defend their narrow 
institutional interests developed new, 'whole-of-govemment' mindsets. But to what 
extent did these claims to joined-up thinking and action reflect a real commitment to 
a new mode of policy- and decision-making in the two nations? Were government 
and other traditionally-powerful policy actors really prepared to pool policy- and 
decision-making sovereignty purely in the name of greater coordination?
This chapter measures the 'joined-up-ness' of special educational needs (SEN) and 
adult community learning (ACL) policy processes and outputs in Scotland and 
Wales between 1999 and 2007. To this end, it employs the Hierarchy of joined-up 
thinking and action (HJTA), developed in chapter 3, as a framework for the 
descriptive evaluation of the key policy processes and outputs detailed in chapter 4. 
The analysis is organised according to the different tiers of the HJTA and further 
divided by policy area and jurisdiction.
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The key finding is that trust relationships were successfully cultivated between 
policy actors in both policy areas in both jurisdictions during the period of study. 
Issues were routinely framed in terms of the spheres of interest they cut across and 
there were concerted and consistent efforts to involve the full array of stakeholding 
groups in finding joined-up solutions. This was particularly true in Wales, where 
devolution delivered a step change in the frequency and quality of consultation 
experienced by less well-resourced policy actors, some of whom were able to shape 
the nature and trajectory of policy-making in their particular area of interest. While 
the level of trust demonstrated in the majority of policy processes and outputs was 
restricted to the lower 'informational' or 'prudential' tiers of the HJTA, there was 
some evidence of 'contractual' trust relationships, most commonly associated with 
funding mechanisms designed to encourage joint working at the policy 
implementation and delivery level. As might be expected, there were fewer 
examples of policy processes or outputs which demonstrated the existence of the 
more onerous 'goodwill' trust. However, it is highly significant that those examples 
that were identified were found almost exclusively within the SEN policy area. As 
such, SEN is cautiously described as being 'more joined-up' than ACL in both 
Scotland and Wales during the period in question.1 Despite this, however, it is 
shown that there was virtually no evidence of 'normative' trust operating to 
moderate behaviour in any of the case studies and it is concluded that a genuinely 
joined-up 'culture of collaboration' had not emerged.
5.1 The HJTA as a framework for descriptive evaluation
The HJTA was introduced in chapter 2 and further developed in chapter 3 as a 
framework for effective descriptive evaluation of policy processes and outputs from 
a JUG perspective. The HJTA arranges the processes and outputs that the academic 
and practitioner literatures identify as examples of best practice in JUG (e.g. Pollitt 
2005) according to the level of trust between policy actors that must be demonstrated 
for each process or output to operate (or be operationalised) effectively (e.g. 6 et al
2002) (Table 5.1).
The key factor in evaluating the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and
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action within a given policy area or jurisdiction is the preparedness of well- 
resourced (and therefore influential) policy actors to pool policy- and decision­
making sovereignty with other actors, some of whom may be less well-resourced 
(see chapter 2: 40-45). This level of preparedness is itself determined by the extent to 
which well-resourced actors can trust other actors to hold influence over the nature 
and trajectory of policy-making: well-resourced actors must want to involve a full 
array of stakeholders in the interests of formulating and delivering better policy, 
rather than need their involvement in order to protect or further their own 
institutionally-defined policy aims. Chapter 3 explained that the degree of risk an 
actor feels when contemplating a potential trust relationship me be influenced by a 
further set of moderating variables, namely: the existing level of policy-making 
capacity; the political sensitivity of the policy area or issue; the degree of existing 
consensus within the policy area; the level of legislative competence of the political 
institution; the overall resources available to government within the jurisdiction; the 
scale of the policy-making context; and the age of the competent political institution 
(see chapter 3: 63-65). Depending on how each of these variables plays out within a 
given policy area (or, as the case may be, a given policy issue), the number and level 
of trust relationships that form and, concomitantly, the degree of joined-up-ness that 
exists, may vary considerably. In short, there can be more or less conducive 
conditions for effective JUG.
When used in conjunction with this set of moderating variables, the HJTA allows 
policy processes and outputs in a given policy area to be evaluated and the degree of 
joined-up-ness measured. The following section uses the HJTA to measure the 
degree of joined-up-ness in SEN and ACL policy processes and outputs in Scotland 
and Wales. The analysis is organised according to the different levels of trust that 
make up the HJTA and further divided by jurisdiction and policy area. The section 
begins by identifying examples of best practice in JUG at the HJTA's lowest, 
'informational' tier.
Table 5.1 Hierarchy o f joined-up thinking and action
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Level of trust Type of policy process or output
Goodwill • Pooling budgets
• Exchanging key people
• Creating 'joint teams' at operational level
• Handing over the policy agenda to institutions in civil society
• Making the legislature a driver of policy
Contract • Developing funding mechanisms in which 'pots' of money can 
only be 'unlocked' when all the key stake-holders agree
Prudential • Organising effective systems for the consultation of stake­
holders
• Consulting outside experts
• Focusing the business of participation in policy delivery and 
implementation -  application, monitoring, evaluation -  on 
collaboration and partnership
Informational • Ensuring the 'rules of the game' for collaboration are clearly- 
defined
• Framing problems as 'cross-cutting problems'
5.2 Applying the HJTA to policy processes and outputs in Scotland and Wales
5.2.1 Policy processes and outputs at the informational tier of the HJTA
This section presents evidence of policy processes and outputs that require no trust 
between policy actors but do require the effective dissemination of information and a 
certain degree of "buy in' to the core principles of JUG.
Wales
The key policy issues in the area of SEN in Wales were consistently framed as cross­
cutting problems during the period of study. This was equally true at ministerial, 
official and stakeholder levels. Keith Ingham, then the Head of Children's Health 
and Social Services at the Assembly government, was quite clear that the specific 
policy issue of Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD), for example, required a clearly- 
articulated, collaborative response:
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I think there's more of that than there used to be ... especially as the Assembly has 
taken on greater powers -  we're not just following Whitehall edict, we're not just 
churning out what came out of central government, we are developing our own 
guidance. You can't do that without working with others across the Assembly and if 
you do it the wrong way and it goes out you'll be criticised. You know that people 
will say, 'well, you're telling us we should work together and you're evidencing that 
you're not'. So, there's a degree of self-interest, there's a degree of understanding that 
you can't achieve your ends not doing it but beyond that it's good policy, it's the way 
that you have to do things. Fundamentally we want to improve the lives of children 
and young people -  at least I hope that7s what we're all about -  and that's the way 
we've got to work.
(Interview 12)
The Speech and Language Therapy Action Group's (SALTAG) main criticism of 
speech and language therapy (SLT) provision, for example, was that there was an 
absence of effective joint working between education and health, resulting in a 
fragmented, poorly-sequenced and, at times, incomplete SLT service (SALTAG
2003). The policy issue, then, was not that SLT services needed to be improved, or 
even invested in, but rather that the education, health and, to a lesser extent, social 
services agencies involved in policy-making and implementation should better 
coordinate their activities so that a more joined-up service could be developed. 
Indeed, the majority of policy-making activity in this field took place within what 
could be described as a 'collaboration agenda' in which all of the policy actors with 
an interest in SEN policy wanted to be involved -  and, what is more, wanted to be 
seen to be involved - in collaborative working. Collaboration was seen as A Good 
Thing or, as one interviewee suggested mischievously, 'the true path of the 
righteous' (Interview 7). Even Ministers were conspicuous devotees. The Ministers 
for Education and Lifelong Learning and Health and Social Services respectively 
wasted no opportunity to jointly announce policy innovations or appear together at 
events where cross-cutting issues, like SLT and ASD, were being discussed (see 
chapter 4: 73-74).
The majority of stakeholders interviewed as part of the research were very clear 
that SEN was now being identified effectively as a cross-cutting policy area, but also 
that this had not been the case prior to devolution. Stakeholders reported a major 
change in the attitude of key policy- and decision-makers in Wales towards the 
growing ranks of non-governmental actors in civil society and particularly to those
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in the third sector. Rather than being seen as members of a 'Cinderella sector', 
interviewees reported that voluntary organisations were increasingly recognised as a 
vital source of expertise and service provision that must form part of any strategy to 
tackle the cross-cutting issues surrounding SEN (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4, 6). The 
Assembly government was consistent in its enthusiasm for involving the third sector 
in the heart of the policy- and decision-making process (Interview 13) and backed 
this up with wide and deep consultation on a number of policy proposals.
Indeed, the language of partnership and collaboration provided the vocabulary of 
everyday interaction in the SEN policy sector in Wales. The Making the Connections 
agenda successfully penetrated the consciousness of both government and non­
governmental policy actors and acted as a key reference point to moderate behaviour 
(see chapter 4: 92). All of the interviewees with an interest in SEN policy brought 
Making the Connections into interview discussions without prompting and it was 
clear that its aims had struck a chord. Interviewees also reported a new readiness on 
the part of Tong in the tooth' civil servants to broaden the scope of engagement 
(Interview 1) and one civil servant identified the same change in attitude among 
some of his colleagues.2 At what must still be seen as an essentially rhetorical level, 
then, even some of the 'dinosaurs' -  those faithful guardians of the departmental 
structure - appeared to have come around at least to the idea of JUG.
On a more practical level, the Assembly government took the opportunity 
afforded by this clear enthusiasm for JUG to build collaboration in to the business of 
policy implementation and delivery. The process of applying for funding to provide 
a particular service or deliver a particular project aimed at tackling problems 
associated with SEN - as well as the monitoring and evaluation frameworks which 
examined the work of the applicant following the allocation of funding - placed the 
requirement to provide clear evidence of collaborative working high on the list of 
assessment criteria.3
ACL policy processes and outputs in Wales shared many features with those in 
the SEN policy area a this informational level. The key policy issues (particularly 
tackling low skills levels in disadvantaged communities) were consistently framed as 
cross-cutting problems in need of joined-up solutions during the period of study and
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the Making the Connections agenda was similarly successful in setting the tone among 
stakeholders and government actors alike. Although outside the strict timeframe of 
this study, a 2008 consultation document demonstrates clearly how Making the 
Connections has set the tone in the ACL policy area. A whole section of the document 
is dedicated to 'building links across Policy Agendas' and the document makes 
explicit reference to Making the Connections throughout:
Adult community learning policy reflects the aim of M aking the Connections, which 
is to ensure that public services work in a more joined-up way to deliver effective 
services for citizens ... adult community learning can and should have strong links 
to a wide range of other Welsh Assembly Government strategies and initiatives .. 
it [also] has a key role to play in contributing to policy priorities such as social 
inclusion and health and well being ...
(WAG 2008: 31)
The same document goes beyond mere rhetoric, however, with its 'Policy Gateway 
Summary' (Table 5.2). This shows not only an awareness of the cross-cutting nature 
of ACL, but also a desire -  at least at this informational level -  to develop a 
systematic way of improving coordination.4
There is no doubt that greater collaboration was seen by all involved in ACL 
policy as A Good Thing. Andrew Davies, the Assembly Minister for Finance and 
Public Service Delivery, certainly framed the problem of low skills levels in Wales' 
deprived communities in those terms:
There has been a very conscious recognition of the need to integrate policy in this 
area ... If we take one of our high level policy objectives -  which is tackling economic 
inactivity, particularly in our inner cities and the former coal-mining areas of the 
South Wales valleys -  research has shown time after time that issues such as long 
term unemployment, economic inactivity -  however you want to describe it -  are 
closely associated with a number of characteristics: with poor health, restricted life 
chances, lower life expectancy - educational qualification levels are worse.
And clearly one of the main reasons for this is what is known as the long no (or very 
low) skills 'tail'. Many of those in disadvantaged communities have very low or very 
few skills. So the issue of skills is at the heart of a number of social and economic 
problems and from that flows the idea that we have to work more cooperatively, 
departments have to work more cooperatively ...
(Interview 10)
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Table 5.2 Adult community learning policy gateway summary5
One Wales Overall Contribution Explanation
Commitment U N P F G
1. A Healthy 
Future
X Thought to have a potential contribution, with 
scope for stronger steer with regard to the 
health benefits of learning and links with the 
Assembly Government7s Health agenda.
2. A
prosperous
society
X Considered to have a potential contribution ... 
there is scope to build more explicit links with 
Communities [First]
3. Living 
communities
X A potential contribution, with consideration 
needing to be given to communities of interest 
and under-represented groups ...
4. Learning 
for life
X Considered to make a good contribution, with 
links to wider Government strategies, such as 
health and well being, economic inactivity and 
inclusion
5. A Fair and 
just society
X ... The policy should reflect to inclusion 
agenda. It represents an opportunity to 
develop potential inter-departmental links and 
to progress the Making the Connections 
Agenda. Opportunities to develop and 
strengthen the learner voice should be 
explored...
6. A
sustainable
environment
X A neutral contribution n. There is a link to 
sustainability issues through procurement and 
commissioning for the adult community 
learning curriculum.
7. A rich and
diverse
culture
X A fair contribution. There is a need for a joined- 
up approach with CyMAL's Gateway to 
Learning programme.
Key: U: Undermining; N -  Neutral; P -  Potential; F -  Fair; G - Good
Communities First is one of the attempts to regenerate valleys communities that 
Mr Davies described as being 'overtly, consciously joined-up' in approach (Interview 
10). However, the notion of 'programme bending', which was central to the 
Assembly government’s flagship programme for improving the living conditions 
and life chances of people living in the most deprived communities in Wales, proved 
to be little more than an eye-catching use of aspirational language -  a phrase people 
used, but not a model that could demonstrate consistent and widespread action. The 
architects of the Communities First programme imagined that programme bending 
would be the natural effect of the greater capacity and higher profile disadvantaged
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communities would enjoy as a result of substantial investment in the innovative 
Communities First partnership structure at a local level (WAG 2002, 2007). This, 
however, was naive. There was little resource allocated to facilitating programme 
bending beyond the appointment of Communities First officers to support 
partnerships. For this reason, programme bending was generally unsuccessful and 
overly dependent on the network-building skills of individuals, most of whom were 
not operating at a sufficiently senior level to carry much influence. As one 
Communities First officer told the Wales Audit Office during its 2009 review of the 
Communities First programme, there was no resource 'carrot7 or statutory 'stick' for 
agencies to agree to work together and 'bend' programmes into deprived areas in 
order to tackle a range of problems, including low skills levels:
[programme] bending can only work if the main service providers are prepared to 
work in a real partnership. There is little evidence in our ward to support this 
premise. Where small successes have occurred this has been down to the good 
relationships between officers below director level. Until the main players buy into 
the concept of [programme bending] this is unlikely to change ...
Unnamed Communities First Officer (WAO 2009: 65)
This concept of 'buy in' is undoubtedly important, but only partially explains the 
failure of this policy. The WAO (2009) was highly critical of the Assembly 
Government in its review of Communities First for failing to ensure that its own 
departments -  as well as the agencies it sponsors -  were sufficiently responsive to 
the skills and other needs of deprived communities and put this down to a general 
failure to communicate the concept and requirements of programme bending 
effectively. However, it is argued below that the absence of any additional or 
redeployed resource -  the 'carrot' described above -  was at least equally responsible 
for the failure of programme bending. Effective communication between actors was 
not enough on its own to pull off such an ambitious form of JUG. This has since been 
realised by the Assembly government and the discussion below of the new 
Communities First Outcomes Fund demonstrates a new approach.
Finally, although the Community Consortia for Education and Training (CCETs) 
are characterised later in this chapter as having failed to develop trust relationships 
between disparate policy actors, the mere fact that they were designed, introduced
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and operated for some time (no matter how dysfunctional this was) demonstrates at 
least a commitment on the part of the CCETs' architects to finding innovative 
institutional arrangements to tackle cross-cutting issues and, just as important, a 
certain degree of 'buy-in' from stakeholders who took the time to attend. Those 
isolated examples of joined-up policy outputs emanating from the CCET structure 
which include Learning Brokers (see chapter 4: 93-94) showed the potential this 
structure had for providing a site for innovative collaborative working.
Scotland
As in Wales, the key policy issues in the area of SEN were consistently framed as 
cross-cutting problems in need of joined-up solutions during the period of study in 
Scotland. A leading SLT organisation, for example, defined its role in these terms:
Although we are parent-led we believe that, in order to improve [SLT] services for 
children, we need to actually work with those services and I think one of the 
hallmarks of our work is that we try to work collaboratively between parents and 
professionals but also across the professional areas. In order to achieve this, we have 
developed a training programme that is open to teachers and to therapists.
(Interview 14)
Perhaps more importantly, government actors shared this way of framing policy 
problems. In re-assessing the Record of Needs, for example, the Scottish Executive 
saw the need for a 'better multi-disciplinary approach' to assessment and recording 
as a means of 'avoiding unnecessary duplication' in the system (Scottish Executive 
2001a) and, as one interviewee commented diplomatically, prevent agencies 'using 
their initiative to avoid responsibility' (Interview 22). Moreover, the Coordinated 
Support Plan (CSP), which replaced the Record of Needs, was heralded by 
government and non-governmental actors alike as an opportunity to 'promote more 
effective joined-up planning and provision of services between education 
authorities, schools, social workers and health professionals' (Unison Scotland 2003) 
and 'foster co-ordination across the range of services (multi-disciplinary and multi­
agency)' leading to a more co-ordinated set of services (Scottish Executive 2004). 
This was another clear example of policy issues being expressed in ways that 
acknowledged and sought to address 'wicked' problems. Euan Robson, the Deputy 
Minister who took the legislation through the Scottish Parliament, certainly saw the
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CSP in these terms:
SEN was, of course, merely one sub set of what was a much broader problem of a 
lack of coordination. Now, the answer that we came up with in terms of the 
[Additional Support for Learning] legislation was the Coordinated Support Plan.
There was that clear understanding that there needed to be better cooperation 
between agencies. Now ... there was a complete misunderstanding among some 
people in the Parliament who thought that the Coordinated Support Plan was 
somehow a replacement for the Record of Needs -  it was nothing of the sort; it was a 
wholly different concept ... two or more agencies had to be involved ... it was a way 
of bringing together the agencies to address barriers to learning for individuals 
which came from a variety of causes, not all of which were located within the 
education department.
(Interview 22)
In a clear parallel with Making the Connections, the Changing to Deliver agenda 
successfully penetrated the consciousness of both governmental and non­
governmental actors and acted as a reference point to moderate behaviour in much 
the same way. Despite this, though, Changing to Deliver was not cited as frequently or 
with the same enthusiasm by Scottish interviewees. While it is possible that the 
greater experience of public policy in Scotland may have contributed to a more 
sceptical outlook and cooled enthusiasm for the real difference such an initiative 
might achieve, the fact that Changing to Deliver predates Making the Connections by 
three years may be a more likely cause of its marginally lower currency.6
The full range of stakeholders interviewed was broadly content with the 
frequency and quality of consultation on SEN policy issues, but interviewees 
indicated that devolution had not had the same impact on this as it had in Wales. 
This response is quite likely to have been informed by the existence in Scotland of a 
relatively healthy pressure group sector prior to devolution with a number of 
indigenous Scottish groups having a sound track record of working closely with 
government for many years. Even so, Richard Parry and Audrey McDougal (2005) 
cite a 2004 survey of Scottish stakeholder opinion which indicates a broad feeling 
that the Executive's approach to joint working had improved since devolution and 
this is generally supported by the interview data.
The key policy issues in the area of ACL in Scotland (particularly adult literacy 
and numeracy) were consistently framed as cross-cutting problems in need of 
joined-up solutions during the period of study. As was noted in chapter 4, adult
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literacy and numeracy provided the principal focus for policy-making activity 
during the period in question and there was no doubt as to the cross-cutting nature 
of the problem.
Once again, the language of partnership and collaboration was the vocabulary of 
everyday interaction. The Changing to Deliver agenda successfully penetrated the 
consciousness of both governmental and non-governmental actors and acted as a 
reference point to moderate behaviour and there can be no doubt that JUG was 
universally regarded as A Good Thing. In many ways, the ILA Scotland scheme is 
the best example of JUG being attempted principally through effective 
communication and dissemination of information. The ILA scheme identified the 
need for central brokerage of learning, particularly for individuals with low skills 
from disadvantaged communities and used a funding mechanism to ensure learning 
providers developed courses to address the needs of this particular client group. 
Although learning providers were clearly motivated by this funding dimension, it is 
also clear that they have signed up intellectually to the ILA project.
5.2.2 Policy processes and outputs at the prudential tier of the HJTA
This section presents evidence of examples of best practice that demonstrated a 
minimal or 'prudential' level of trust between policy actors; that is, a level of trust 
where a person's (or organisation's) statement of intent -  a promise, threat or other 
indication of intention -  must be believed for the institutional arrangement or 
process to be effective.
Wales
There was a frenzy of consultation in the SEN policy area in Wales during the period 
of study. However, access to the policy process was not only extended by the 
Assembly Government. The Education and Lifelong Learning Committee (ELL 
Committee) of the National Assembly undertook widespread and detailed 
consultation with stakeholders as part of its review of SEN policy in Wales (see 
chapter 4: 75). The quality of consultation ranged from an opportunity for groups 
and individuals to make written comments on formal consultation documents, 
through more restricted opportunities to give oral evidence at Committee, to far
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more exclusive opportunities for direct meetings with ministers and committee 
members on both a formal and informal basis. Some groups had informal access to 
ministers which, on balance, can be taken as forming the basis of a number of 
important goodwill trust relationships discussed below. The ELLC Committee 
undoubtedly deferred to the expertise of certain groups that gave evidence and this 
can be taken as an indication of (at least) a prudential level of trust between actors.
Any organisation wishing to become involved in, for example, policy delivery 
would encounter at every stage a range of requirements to ensure that they did not 
act in isolation from potential partners. These stages included meeting various 
criteria during the application process; demonstrating that commitment through the 
variously-configured monitoring frameworks during the course of the project; and 
being evaluated against those criteria during the evaluation phase.
In the ACL policy area in Wales, there was also wide-ranging consultation with 
stakeholders and outside experts on a number of important policy innovations, 
including the Webb Commission, the CCET structure, the Communities First 
Partnership structure and the Communities First Outcomes Fund. In general, this 
consultation was restricted to formal settings and did not develop into the kinds of 
close, goodwill trust-based relationships identified below in the SEN policy areas. 
One interviewee did claim informal access to key decision-makers and this claim 
which was confirmed by at least one senior member of the Assembly government. 
However, there is no evidence that this relationship resulted in any additional 
influence on the nature and extent of policy-making.
Scotland
The Scottish case studies revealed similar findings to Wales at this prudential level. 
There was frequent consultation with stakeholders and outside experts during the 
period of study in the SEN policy area. SEN legislation followed on from exhaustive 
consultation by the Scottish Executive while the SEN policy review undertaken by 
the Scottish Parliament's Education, Culture and Sport Committee (ECS Committee) 
was similarly thorough in the way it canvassed opinion and amassed evidence
An agency wishing to become involved in, for example, a project to deliver SLT
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services would encounter at every stage of the process a range of requirements to 
ensure that they did not act in isolation from potential partners. These stages 
include: meeting various criteria during the application process; demonstrating that 
commitment through the variously-configured monitoring frameworks during the 
course of the project; and being evaluated against those criteria during the 
evaluation phase.
The ACL policy process was similarly characterised by wide-ranging consultation 
with stakeholders. The consultation for the ILA Scotland policy innovation, both in 
its original and 'relaunched' formats, demonstrated that stakeholders located 
differently in the broadly conceived ACL network -  learning providers, business 
interests, community development interests -  were involved to some extent in the 
shaping of policy.
5.2.3 Policy processes and outputs at the contractual tier of the HJTA
This section presents evidence of those examples of best practice that demonstrate 
the existence of a contractual level of trust between policy actors. That is, a level of 
trust where a person's (or organisation's) statement of intent -  a promise, threat or 
other indication of intention -  is supported by some kind of independent mechanism 
that offers legal or financial recourse in the event of a breach.
Wales
The main examples of policy processes and outputs at this contractual tier of the 
HJTA in all of the case studies are funding mechanisms. Put simply, all of the funds 
which aimed to improve and cultivate collaboration used the carrot of additional (or 
in most cases, redeployed) resources to encourage stakeholders (some of which may 
have divergent views on the direction in which policy should travel) to combine 
their own resources and work together to tackle particular policy issues. In the SEN 
policy area, where there was no specific funding mechanism introduced, actors 
seeking to address problems linked to SEN were able to access the Flexibilities 
Special Grant (FSG) and Cymorth funding.7
The role of this funding mechanism for developing contractual trust relationships 
is shown more clearly in Wales in the ACL field. As part of the Communities First
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programme, a new funding regime to support more effective 'programme bending' 
has been announced for 2009-12. Although the Communities First Outcomes Fund is 
outside the time frame of this study, it provides useful comment on the performance 
of Communities First to date and its programme bending aspiration in particular. 
This is because the introduction of the fund has now been deemed necessary in order 
to encourage real programme bending. This demonstrates that the Assembly 
government now understands the limitations of attempts at JUG based purely on 
good intentions. Its hitherto naive lack of understanding of what it takes to 
encourage genuine joint working has recently been criticised implicitly by the WAO 
(2009).
The Outcomes Fund demonstrates a new understanding on the part of WAG that 
budget-pooling among policy actors needs to be facilitated by a reliable contractual 
arrangement. The Family Employment Initiative (FEI) in a number of South Wales 
local authority areas demonstrates the power of this kind of mechanism to bring 
together a range of groups -  voluntary (the British Trust of Conservation 
Volunteers), non-statutory (registered social landlords), local government (a number 
of local authority economic development units) and devolved (WAG) - to tackle the 
problem of under-skilling through genuine collaborative work including the 
provision of ACL, local infrastructure improvement and employment initiatives. 
Interestingly, the change in focus to the Outcomes Fund, with its own focus directly 
on making the most of Assembly government money and delivering measurable 
outcomes in exchange for funding, coincides with a new, less generous settlement 
for WAG (see chapter 6:142).
The Communities First Outcomes Fund, like all of the funding mechanisms 
described in this section, requires those seeking to access the fund to trust other 
actors to deliver shared goals. It requires agencies to conceptualise problems outside 
of their immediate sphere of interest and to build strong relationships with actors 
who they would not class as natural bedfellows.
Scotland
The Coordinated Support Plan (CSP) is an interesting example of a policy outcome
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which requires contractual trust between actors, but which is not a funding 
mechanism. The CSP is a statutory tool which requires agencies involved in the 
provision of services to any child or young person with identified Additional 
Support Needs (ASN) to work within a statutory framework (see chapter 4:77).
The ILA Scotland funding arrangements encouraged education providers to focus 
their provision and, just as importantly, their outreach work and marketing 
strategies associated with that provision, on those with the lowest skills in the most 
disadvantaged circumstances. Crucially, it required actors with traditionally 
divergent ideas about what ACL means and how it should develop to work together. 
In order to attract learners who would be subsidised by ILA Scotland funding, 
community development interests, business interests and learning providers had to 
come together to plan and design innovative courses. They also needed to engage 
more effectively with deprived communities. This was achieved by allocating 
resources in a way that encouraged policy actors to moderate their behaviour and 
consider the needs of a particular client group. It is important to note, however, that 
this did not involve any goodwill trust relationships. The education budget was not 
pooled with any economic development money, for example, but was simply 
deployed in such a way that encouraged policy actors, in this case the learning 
providers, to develop their provision and marketing in ways that better met the 
skills needs of the most deprived individuals. As such, it was a successful example of 
joined-up thinking and action in policy implementation.
5.2.4 Policy processes and outputs at the goodwill tier of the HJTA
This section presents evidence of those examples of best practice that demonstrate 
the existence of a goodwill level of trust between policy actors and therefore occupy 
the highest (and most onerous) tier of the HJTA. That is, a level of trust where one 
expects a person or organisation to act in such a way that protects one's interests 
without there being the possibility of any contractual or statutory recourse. This, 
then, is the purest definition of trust and exposes policy actors to the greatest risk.
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Wales
The first example of goodwill trust is the budget pooling which took place between 
departments in the Assembly government in order to take forward the ASD strategy 
in Wales.8 As Keith Ingham, then the Head of Children's Health and Social Services 
at the Assembly Government, noted:
We recognised we had to cover all the bases in developing [ASD] policy -  you can't 
go ahead and not do that and it's certainly been a helpful process to have that 
involvement. We've also been able to pool funding [within the Assembly 
government health, education and social services departments] and, again, it's a 
combination of understanding and goodwill and coming together and seeing that 
you can get a benefit out of pooling some resource whether that's people or it's 
money.
(Interview 12)
There are many further examples of goodwill trust relationships where actors have 
pooled policy- and decision-making sovereignty in different ways, especially 
through the extent and quality of consultation with stake-holding groups. The 
creation of SALT AG and the positive reaction to its recommendations is a case in 
point (see chapter 4: 73-74). SALTAG identified major deficiencies in the provision of 
SLT in Wales and the Assembly government responded to its recommendations by, 
in effect, adopting them. The organisations represented on SALTAG therefore 
exerted a great deal of influence on the shape of SLT provision in Wales and the 
major policy developments in SLT since devolution can confidently be described as 
the product of a highly collaborative process.
This finding is reinforced by the interview data. The director of a SLT 
organisation recognised the highly influential role her organisation and others 
similarly placed had played in the development of SLT policy in Wales through 
SALTAG. Claire Moyle, the Director of Afasic Cymru, reported that the Assembly 
government routinely sought and acted upon her organisation's advice as an 
independent organisation, describing devolution as a 'revolution' for voluntary 
groups in Wales. In particular, she described the possibilities that exist to meet with 
senior officials and ministers, often informally, and on a regular basis. Furthermore, 
she was clear that her counterparts in England enjoy few of the same opportunities
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to build relationships with and influence key decision-makers in the same way 
(Interview 1)
There is also evidence that face-to-face contact had helped relationships between 
officials and stake-holding groups develop, sometimes from a basis of 
misconception. The Director of a SEN advocacy organisation described how officials 
had often initially expressed surprise that her organisation employed professionals 
rather than volunteers, demonstrating an alarming and fundamental 
misunderstanding of an important sector. However, Denise Inger, the Director of 
SNAP Cymru, went on to explain that face-to-face meetings had helped the 
organisation represent itself as competent and professional and it is now held in very 
high regard (Interview 2). This claim was confirmed by officials (Interview 13), 
politicians (Interview 9) and a former Deputy Minister (Interview 9). Crucially, it 
was the opportunity for face-to-face contact that earned the organisation the trust of 
decision-makers.
Stakeholders in the field of autism reported close involvement in the development 
of the draft All Wales strategy for ASD. The Chief Executive and another senior 
representative of a leading Welsh-based autism charity claimed to have written the 
strategy with a senior official after being personally approached by the minister 
(Interviews 3 & 4) and this was confirmed in interviews with officials in the 
education, health and social Services departments department (Interviews 12 & 13). 
Indeed, the great majority of stake-holding groups in the SEN policy area in Wales 
reported satisfaction with the quality and frequency of consultation and some 
claimed close working relationships with ministers and senior officials (e.g. 
Interviews 1, 2, 3,4 & 6).9
If the Working Together initiative and work of SALTAG is an example of goodwill 
trust between policy actors delivering a genuinely joined-up policy process, then the 
regional SLT projects they recommended -  and which were subsequently set up by 
the Assembly government -  are an example of the same high level of trust between 
policy actors delivering a genuinely joined-up policy output.10 The regional projects 
for SLT provision involved creating agencies with responsibility for funding and 
delivering health, education and social services, creating joint teams and pooling, or
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at least carefully coordinating, valued resources. The Assembly government's 
regional schemes for SLT seem to typify a desire on its part to coordinate the 
commissioning and delivery of services so as to achieve the most efficient use of 
resources and the most integrated provision of services. Indeed, this quite specific 
policy aim has been expressed clearly by the Assembly government:
The highest level of collaboration between the NHS and LEAs would be achieved if 
NHS Trusts and LEAs provided services in an integrated way, allowing different 
professionals to work under one management structure ... Since NHS Trusts ... are 
not coterminous with LEAs, this integrated service could best be organised in some 
parts of Wales at a geographical level
For effective integrated working the providers need to have resolved that there are 
clear management structures, professional accountability, clear performance 
management of the service and a joint location of the service and proper 
administrative support.
Jane Davidson (ELLC Sep 22 2004)
However, although the available documents and minutes associated with SALTAG's 
work do not give any indication of disagreement or intransigence within the group 
itself, the interview data shows how difficult it was for members of the group 
representing the health and education sectors to agree on a way forward. As one 
prominent member explained:
Historically, education and speech and language therapy have been completely 
removed from each other ... now, even, in Swansea, if children need a speech and 
language appointment they have to have an afternoon off school and go to a clinic 
and if they don't go to the appointment they are removed from the list. This was 
commonly understood as a problem by all of the members of SALTAG. When we got 
everyone together, though, it was a nightmare ... you just could not get health and 
education to agree to anything ... even the term special educational needs, there was 
no consistency on what that meant. I was sitting in between people to stop them 
arguing. However, we did get, eventually, some decisions and everybody agreed on 
collaboration, joint working, going into schools - a big change in working for 
therapists and health professionals. We shared an idea of what needed to done, just 
needed to be locked in a room 'til we came up with something we could all sign up 
to.
(Interview 1)
A further key example of a goodwill trust relationship is that which developed 
between the ELL Committee of the National Assembly and the Assembly 
government. This relationship was in part made possible by the specific role
117
Devolution and public policy: a joined-up governance approach
envisaged for the National Assembly's committees:
Are [the Assembly Subject] Committees going to be simply there to probe and 
scrutinise and find weak points in the armoury of the Minister? Or can you still have 
Subject Committees which will be scrutinising and being very hostile at times, but at 
other times sharing the role of developing policy suitable for Wales? I believe that the 
Assembly Subject Committees have to [perform] this dual function of scrutiny and 
policy-making.
Rhodri Morgan (2000)11
Although assessments of the relative 'strength' and 'weakness' of parliamentary 
committees are criticised for being impressionistic and lacking in analytical criteria 
(Arter 2002: 93), there can be no question that some legislatures possess 'stronger' 
committees than others. In the Westminster Parliament, the committees perform a 
largely scrutinising role and are arguably only a 'minor adjunct' to the main 
chamber (Sir David Steel, PCSP 2001). By contrast, the majority of continental 
legislatures are described by David Arter (2002: 96) as 'committee-based', with some, 
like the German Bundesrat12, undertaking core activities in committee and holding 
general plenary sessions only once a month (Hague and Harrop 2004: 252). 
Furthermore, in certain Scandinavian legislatures, such as the Swedish Riksdag and 
Finnish Eduskunta, committees enjoy the power to initiate legislation and policy of 
their own (Sjolin 1993). In Arter's terms (2002: 99), such legislatures are 'committee- 
driven'.
The architects of the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly were each clear 
in their preference for 'strong', Scandinavian-style committees (Rawlings 1998: 462- 
468; see also CSG 1999; NAAG 1998; Jones and Osmond 2001; Bulmer et al 2002; 
Arter 2002; Arter et al 2005). Indeed, the minimal role given to committees at 
Westminster served the Scottish Consultative Steering Group (CSG) as a 'negative 
template' (Mitchell 2000: 616). In the Welsh context, the National Assembly Advisory 
Group (NAAG) envisaged a dual role for the Subject Committees, combining a 
significant function in 'reviewing the effectiveness of policies' with one focussed on 
'developing new policies' (NAAG 1998: paras. 5.7 and 5.8). There was thus a clear 
expectation that the legislature would be closely involved in the process of policy 
formulation.
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In the area of SEN policy, the Assembly's ELL Committee undoubtedly met this 
expectation. In chapter 4 the committee was shown to be a key player in the SEN 
policy process, acting pro-actively when taking the decision to undertake its review of 
SEN policy, and acting effectively in that its recommendations were accepted by the 
Minister and subsequently translated into real policy change. There are a number of 
features of the ELL Committee and its membership that may help explain this 
considerable strength and influence. Rod Hague and Martin Harrop (2004: 252) 
argue that the key to the influence of committees lies in, firstly, the existence of a 
non-partisan, Consensual culture and, secondly, the presence of considerable subject- 
specific expertise among the committee's membership. It is arguable that in its 
review of SEN policy in Wales, the ELL Committee demonstrated both these 
attributes.
At no point during deliberations did party loyalties distract ELL Committee 
members from the review's terms of reference. Moreover, most members were 
moved to remark in plenary on the consensual nature of the ELL Committee's work 
and David Melding, the chair of the National Assembly's Health and Social Services 
Committee, was keen to emphasise the close working relationships he encountered 
in his dealings with members (e.g. NAW 2004). The relatively small size of the ELL 
Committee (all of the Assembly's Subject Committees had only nine members at this 
stage) and the stability of its membership over the course of the review are likely to 
have contributed to a clear sense of 'Committee identification'.13 The ELL Committee 
was also able to draw on a great deal of relevant experience: Jeff Cuthbert is the 
former principal of an Adult Education Centre, has worked for the Welsh Joint 
Education Committee (WJEC) and been a school governor; Christine Chapman has 
been employed as a secondary school teacher, youth worker and careers advisor; 
Denise Idris Jones is a former secondary school teacher, as is Owen John Thomas; 
and Irene James continues to work as a teacher of children with SEN. The ELL 
Committee also benefited from the availability of sufficient resources for it to 
appoint a panel of experts in the form of the SENRG. Its members' great wealth of 
personal expertise was thus complemented by genuinely authoritative and 
comprehensive advice.
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It is also worth noting that the ELL Committee was operating within what can 
cautiously be described as a policy-making 'tradition'. Its two previous incarnations 
in the Assembly -  the Pre-16 Education, Schools and Early Learning Committee and 
the Post-16 Education and Training Committee - were similarly pro-active and 
effective in their approaches to policy-making. David Egan and Roy James (2001a: 
45) have noted that the Pre-16 Committee was making 'good progress in its chosen 
policy development areas' and that the Post-16 Committee was 'driving the 
[education] policy agenda' in Wales (2000b: 63) before both became casualties of the 
formation of coalition government in October 2000. The work of the Post-16 
Committee is particularly pertinent. A conscious decision was made early in its 
lifetime that it should 'spend a large proportion of its time developing policy on 
specific identifiable issues' (Post-16 Committee 2000a). In reviewing the work of the 
Education and Training Action Group (ETAG), for example, a number of key 
amendments and additions were made which were subsequently adopted as part of 
primary legislation introduced into the House of Lords (Egan & James 2001b: 71).14 
Further reviews were undertaken of arts and culture policy and higher education 
policy in Wales, both of which resulted in significant changes to policy in those 
areas.15 The Post-16 Committee also managed to remain largely independent of the 
Assembly government throughout its short lifetime, with its chair, the experienced 
former Westminster MP Cynog Dafis, instrumental in resisting persistent attempts 
by the Labour administration to 'make [the Committee] into a rubber stamp' (Egan 
& James 2001b: 71-72).16
The key role of the ELL Committee in placing SEN on the policy agenda, shaping 
the framework within which policy developments were discussed and arriving at 
clear and strong recommendations that were acted upon by the Assembly 
government are all evidence of some considerable level of trust between the ELL 
Committee and the Assembly government. The ELL Committee fulfilled the role of a 
kind of 'steering actor' within the policy process, bring together all of the relevant 
actors. This was certainly the role the ELL Committee saw itself playing:
Because we are a very small nation we were able to bring in the widest possible 
range of views, performing a 'conductor' role helping to bring about a consensus not 
only in the committee itself but in the whole of Wales
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(Interview 9)
More importantly, though, the Assembly government did not attempt to control the 
work of the ELL Committee, or shape the findings of its review. This relationship of 
trust was confirmed by both the Chair of the ELL Committee (Interview 9) and the 
senior civil servant within the Assembly government who had closest contact with 
the ELL Committee during the period of the review (Interview 13).
The evidence for the existence of this kind of goodwill trust relationships in the 
ACL policy area in Wales is far thinner. The Community Consortia for Education 
and Training (CCETs), the Assembly government's institutional framework 
designed to encourage and facilitate partnership working among the statutory, 
private and third sectors at a sub-regional level in Wales, are an interesting example 
of a policy process arrangement where success was contingent on the existence of 
goodwill trust between actors. Unlike some of the funds described as examples of 
contractual trust relationships, CCETs were not supported by any additional 
funding that could have helped deliver this high trust requirement. There are limited 
examples of CCETs bringing together disparate interests but, on the whole, there 
were a well-meaning framework which was defeated precisely because of a lack of 
goodwill and no mechanism to help build it.
Taking a broader view of ACL in Wales, there was a complete absence of any 
effective or coherent budget or other resource pooling. This is entirely consistent 
with the conclusions of the Webb Review, which found:
... much disjointed working within WAG and even within DCELLS. Not only is a 
coherent approach to funding lacking, but people in the field are working in silos 
defined by those funding streams rather than working strategically and sharing best 
practice.
(Webb 2006: 58)
Scotland
In the negotiations that led to the development of the CSP, an agreement was made 
for some budget pooling to take place between the education and health 
departments of the Scottish Parliament. The amount of funding involved remains 
unclear, but a senior civil servant in the Scottish Executive described it as 
'considerable' (Interview 18). Euan Robson, the Deputy Minister for Education and
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Young People who took the legislation containing the CSP through the Scottish 
Parliament, said that the decision to transfer some of the education budget to health 
was taken as a way of securing the necessary commitments from health agencies 
with regard to service delivery (Interview 22). Therefore, for the CSP to find its way 
from a policy proposal to a piece of legislation it required the inter-departmental 
pooling of resources. This budget pooling suggests not only a sound appreciation of 
the cross-cutting nature of the policy problem but also - and more importantly - 
provides evidence that the actors involved had sufficient trust in each other to pool 
policy- and decision-making sovereignty. Given the purpose of the CSP, its central 
position within a major legislative development and the goodwill level of trust 
involved in the negotiations involved in securing it, the CSP must be assessed as an 
example of JUG in action.
This point is further reinforced by the interview data. Senior education officials in 
Scotland reported that they have been able to cultivate close working relationships 
with their counterparts in health and social services in relation to SEN (and other 
cross-cutting issues such as child protection) since devolution and this has led to 
what one interviewee called a Shared understanding' of SEN (Interview 18). 
Similarly, the Deputy Minister reported 'very strong inter-ministerial relationships' 
between the education and health ministerial teams and said these had been highly 
significant in the successful negotiation over the nature of the CSP and, of course, the 
question of funding (Interview 22). In all cases, interviewees remarked that it was 
the high frequency of high quality, 'face-to-face' meetings they enjoyed with 
counterparts in other agencies that formed the basis of these important trust 
relationships and that this was in part explained by the relatively small number of 
senior officials involved and their close physical proximity to each other (Interviews 
15, 18 & 22). Policy-making in Scotland was on more than one occasion described as 
a 'small world' in which the key protagonists regularly meet on a formal and, 
crucially, an informal basis (Interview 14,15,17 & 18).
The role of the ECS Committee of the Scottish Parliament in agenda setting and 
driving forward substantive policy change in the SEN area was similar to that 
achieved by the ELL Committee in Wales discussed above. The influence of a
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committee of the Scottish Parliament should not come as a particular surprise. Paul 
Caimey's (2006; with Shephard 2005) work on the 'outputs' of the committees of the 
Scottish Parliament has shown that the committees are 'at the heart of the 'new 
politics' in Scotland'. Caimey's analysis is restricted to examining the role of the 
Parliament as having a reactive influence on Scottish Executive policy and 
legislation, either through scrutiny arrangements or amendments, but the picture of 
resourceful committees with a track record of 'taking on' ministers and the Executive 
certainly supports the finding that, at least in the SEN policy area, the ECS 
Committee acted as a proactive policy-maker. As a senior civil servant working in 
SEN policy-making at the time noted, the Scottish Parliament -  the legislature itself - 
saw devolution as an opportunity for it to assist directly in the development of a 
specifically Scottish policy response to the cross-cutting problems associated with 
SEN:
Up until devolution, we mimicked legislation in the area of special educational needs 
... the opportunities for getting legislative change was relatively limited. But when 
we got devolution the opportunities were there. And one of the first things the new 
Parliament did was set up an enquiry into special educational needs with a view to 
making significant legislative changes.
(Interview 18)
There is, however, less agreement between ECS Committee members and the 
Scottish Executive about the role the relevant Committee played than exists in Wales. 
Key decision-makers within the Scottish Executive would not accept that the ECS 
Committee had set the agenda and instead argued that it was the extensive 
consultation process presided over by the Scottish Executive that generated these 
key policy ideas (Interview 18 & 22).
No examples of goodwill trust were detected in the ACL policy area in Scotland. 
Although ILA Scotland can be described as an example of a joined-up policy output 
-  learning providers demonstrated contractual trust very clearly and resources were 
trained on a cross-cutting problem as a result - there is no evidence that the process 
involved any pooling of policy and decision-making sovereignty.17
This analysis has shown that, while there is some evidence of joined-up thinking 
and action in all of the case studies chosen, the highest levels of trust (and,
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concomitantly, the most effective examples of joined-up thinking and action) were 
restricted to the SEN policy processes in Scotland and Wales. The Summary in Table
5.3 shows that, at the highest tier of the HJTA, the policy processes and outputs 
identified during the research are heavily weighted towards the SEN policy areas in 
Scotland and Wales. SEN policy in both nations benefited from a number of 
examples of best practice in JUG from the highest tier of the HJA. These included: 
budget and resource pooling; close working relationships with legislatures; the 
involvement of stakeholders directly in the process of drafting policy; and the 
effective creation of one-stop or joint teams at the policy implementation stage. In 
contrast, the key JUG initiatives in the ACL policy area, while demonstrating a clear 
aspiration to join-up policy- and decision-making, were undermined by a lack of 
goodwill trust and by naive expectations that collaborative working would 'emerge'. 
Indeed, in so far as a JUG approach makes it possible to rank policy areas in terms of 
their relative joined-up-ness (and there is no attempt to quantify joined-up-ness here), 
well-resourced policy actors were clearly more willing to pool policy- and decision­
making sovereignty in the SEN policy area than in the ACL policy area. As a 
consequence, SEN policy-making in both jurisdictions is described as having been 
'more joined-up' than ACL policy-making. But does this variation between policy 
areas mean that policy-making in one area took place within a 'cultural of 
collaboration' that was less well-developed or simply absent in the other?
5.3 A culture of collaboration? Did actors demonstrate trust in its normative sense?
Although there is considerable evidence of policy processes and outputs that 
demonstrated the highest levels of predictive trust, there is virtually no practical 
evidence that the JUG doctrine acted as the anvil on which the rules of the game for 
interaction were forged in any of the case studies. Interviewees generally framed 
their discussion of trust and trust relationships in terms of their confidence in 
predicting the behaviour of other policy actors based on some knowledge specific to 
that actor: the actor's general reputation, some experience of having worked with 
that actor, or a personal relationship with an individual within an organisation. 
There was no a presumption or, indeed, expectation, that other policy actors would
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'abstain from opportunism' (Granovetter 1985) out of a commitment to the doctrine 
of JUG and it is quite clear that the pooling- of policy- and decision-making 
sovereignty that did take place was not the result of JUG having been legitimised 
and embedded to the extent that the pooling of policy- and decision-making 
sovereignty had become a normalised and therefore expected mode of behaviour. 
There was not a sufficiently well-developed culture around JUG to give participants 
in the policy-making process confidence that all actors -  regardless of how well they 
were known to each other, or what their resources might be -  would act according to 
an overarching set of rules.
This is clearly an important finding with implications for the question of whether 
JUG can be seen as a distinctive response to the need to bring greater coordination to 
the business of policy- and decision-making. Chapter 2 argued that the rhetoric 
surrounding JUG emphasised cultural as well as structural change and the finding 
that no new culture has emerged clearly diminishes the doctrine as a departure in 
public administration. However, there is still a great deal of evidence of greater 
collaborative practice done in the name of JUG and this means that the doctrine has 
had a real impact on how policy actors behave.
5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that, while there is some evidence of joined-up thinking and 
action in all of the case studies chosen, the highest levels of trust (and, 
concomitantly, the most effective examples of joined-up thinking and action) were 
restricted to the SEN policy processes in Scotland and Wales. The Summary in Table
5.3 shows that, at the highest tier of the HJTA, the policy processes and outputs 
identified during the research are heavily weighted towards the SEN policy areas in 
Scotland and Wales. SEN policy in both nations benefited from a number of 
examples of best practice in JUG from the highest tier of the HJA. These included: 
budget and resource pooling; close working relationships with legislatures; the 
involvement of stakeholders directly in the process of drafting policy; and the 
effective creation of joint teams at the policy implementation stage. In contrast, the 
key JUG initiatives in the ACL policy area, while demonstrating a clear aspiration to
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join-up policy- and decision-making, were undermined by a lack of goodwill trust, 
naive expectations that collaborative working would 'emerge' and an unwillingness 
to commit new or redeploy existing resources to encourage collaboration.
Indeed, in so far as the framework makes it possible to rank policy areas in terms 
of their relative joined-up-ness, well-resourced policy actors were clearly more 
willing to pool policy- and decision-making sovereignty in the SEN policy area than 
in the ACL policy area. As a consequence, it is argued that SEN policy-making in 
both jurisdictions was 'more joined-up' than ACL policy-making.
There is clearly variation in the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and 
action across case studies, but why should this be the case? Are the policy actors 
involved in ACL less enthusiastic about -  or more resistant too -  the principles and 
modus operandi of JUG than their SEN counterparts? Are there some features of ACL 
policy that cause policy actors to adopt a different, more circumspect mode of 
behaviour? At the most senior ministerial and civil service levels, some of the same 
individuals were involved in both of the respective processes: why should these 
individuals' behaviour vary in this way?
This key question of variation in the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and 
action -  between policy areas, but also across jurisdictions and even levels of 
government -  is addressed in the following chapter.
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Notes to chapter 5
1 Although there was considerable variation between policy areas, there was only 
minimal variation across jurisdictions. This was restricted to differences in the level 
of legislative competence and policy-making capacity between Scotland, with its 
greater history of self determination, and Wales.
2 Understandably, the interviewee wished this particular contribution to remain 
anonymous.
3 However, it is instructive that neither the Assembly government nor the Scottish 
Executive has taken the opportunity presented by widespread enthusiasm for the 
broad aims of JUG to undertake any kind of JUG-based evaluation of policy-making 
in their jurisdictions. Interviewees agreed that such an evaluation would be useful to 
inform future activity and it was mooted that there could be some kind of JUG 'test' 
that proposals should meet before being acted upon (Interview 13). However, there 
was universal agreement that confidence in JUG as a mode of policy- and decision­
making (and in the track record of the Assembly government and Scottish Executive 
in joining-up their activities in the last decade) was not yet strong enough for such an 
evaluation to become a reality.
4 The inclusion of 2008 data is justified by the fact that the Assembly government 
undertook this analysis using its 'Policy Integration Tool' (PIT). The same PIT was 
used in a number of other policy areas during the period of study and therefore 
represents a standard approach by the Assembly government.
5 This table is reproduction of the one produced by the Assembly government (2008: 
32)
6 This is speculation. No interviewee made either link explicitly.
7 This raises the broader question of 'match funding', which has become a ubiquitous 
requirement for organisations wishing to apply for funding in a range of policy areas 
in both nations. While this development may well be motivated by a desire to tackle
I cross-cutting issues it is, of course, also motivated by a desire on the part of funding 
bodies (which include, but are not restricted to governments and government 
agencies) to maximise the impact of their own resource and get 'more bang for their 
buck'.
8 The degree of goodwill trust demonstrated in the ASD work is made more 
remarkable when one considers the close policy relationships between the Assembly 
government and a small number of actors in civil society that are identified below.
9 The explanatory utility of scale is discussed in chapter 6.
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10 Whether the outcome of this policy innovation has successfully addressed the cross­
cutting problem is, however, a moot point. There remain significant gaps in 
coordinated service provision and the future of the projects is uncertain.
11 A speech delivered to the Institute of Welsh Affairs (IWA), November 13th 2000 
(Morgan 2000).
12 This is Germany's upper chamber.
13 As such, the Committee is similar to Lowenberg and Patterson's characterisation of 
a 'corporate committee' (1979, quoted in Arter 2002: 101; see also Mattson 1996: 137- 
140), in which 'decision-making processes are highly autonomous [because] 
members have a strong sense of identification with the committee and satisfaction 
with its performance.'
14 ETAG was set up by the Welsh Office in 1997 and charged with the task of re­
organising the whole of non-university post-16 education in Wales (see ETAG 1999). 
The Post-16 Committee's most notable contributions to the resulting Education and 
Training Action Plan for Wales (ETAP) were the creation of the National Council for 
Education and Training in Wales and the national careers service, Careers Wales 
(ELLC 2003). For more detail on ETAG and ETAP, see chapter 4: 83-84.
15 Parts of both reviews were undertaken by the ELL Committee after the Post-16 
Committee was wound-up in 2000.
16 Both the Pre- and Post-16 Committees showed no sign of splitting along party lines 
during their lifetimes and the latter was the first in the National Assembly to appoint 
a special advisor of any description when the filmmaker, Ceri Sherlock, took on that 
role for its review of arts and culture policy (Post-16 Committee 2000b: para. 1.2). This 
can be taken as further evidence that the ELL Committee's role in formulating SEN 
policy had a foundation in previous committee work in the area of education.
17 The contractual level of trust demonstrated by participants in policy processes and 
outputs associated with the ILA Scotland policy means that it is without doubt an 
example of joined-up thinking and action. However, goodwill trust creates 
qualitatively different kinds of JUG and it is arguable that budget pooling between, 
for example, education and economic development or enterprise in Scotland, could 
have developed an ILA policy that was far better equipped to tackle the problem of 
low skills in deprived communities.
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Analysis: explaining variation in the nature and 
extent of joined-up thinking and action
The analysis in chapter 5 identified a marked variation in the nature and extent of 
joined-up thinking and action between the special educational needs (SEN) and 
adult and community learning (ACL) policy areas in Scotland and Wales. Policy 
processes and outputs which demonstrated the existence of 'goodwill' trust between 
actors were shown to be more common in the SEN policy area than in the ACL 
policy area in both nations during the period of study and, as a consequence, policy­
making in the former was described as being 'more joined-up' than in the latter (see 
chapter 5:100).
This chapter seeks to explain this variation by exploring the idea that conditions 
in a given policy-making context can be more or less favourable for joined-up 
governance (JUG). To this end, it examines SEN and ACL policy processes and 
outputs in the light of the set of seven key variables identified in chapter 3 as having 
the potential to influence the number and quality of trust relationships within a 
given policy context. It is shown how two of these variables -  the level of political 
sensitivity of a policy area and the level of existing consensus within a policy area - 
played out quite differently in the SEN and ACL cases (see chapter 3: 63-65). The 
relatively low political sensitivity of SEN, combined with the relatively high level of 
existing consensus within the policy area, allowed SEN actors to pool policy- and 
decision-making sovereignty in conditions that did not seriously jeopardise their
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narrow institutional interests. Crucially, participation in a joined-up SEN policy 
process in Scotland and Wales took place in conditions that were perceived to be 
'institutionally safe'.
The second section of the chapter broadens out the discussion with an 
examination of two variables that are particularly relevant for a study of JUG in the 
devolved setting; namely, the scale of the policy-making context and the age of the 
competent political institution. It is shown that the relatively small scale of policy­
making in Scotland and Wales had a major influence on the formation of trust 
relationships in all of the case studies and some clear examples are identified where 
scale was an important factor in cultivating what Jasper Eshuis and Cees Van 
Woerkum (2003) call 'individual' trust (see chapter 2: 40-43). However, it is also 
shown how the positive impact of scale was counter-balanced to some extent by the 
relatively young age of both devolved institutions. There were few relationships 
within any of the case studies which could be described as having become 
institutionalised and those forms of trust usually associated with more established 
policy-making contexts were largely absent.
The final section asks whether an appreciation of how these key variables 
influence the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and action can help move the 
study of JUG towards a predictive model in which the degree of 'joined-up-ness' in a 
given policy context -  at least with regard to its policy processes and outputs -  can 
be confidently forecast. It is concluded that, while identifying the degree of 
specificity in the chosen case studies may reinforce the legitimacy and validity of 
some generalisations drawn from their findings, further analysis must be conducted 
in a range of additional cases if a full understanding of the relationship between the 
conditions in a given policy context and the nature and extent of joined-up thinking 
and action is to be claimed.
6.1 Explaining variation between policy areas: seven key variables
The analysis in chapter 5 showed that policy processes and outputs in the ACL area 
were broadly comparable to those in the SEN policy area at the lower tiers of the 
framework developed for the descriptive evaluation of JUG, the Hierarchy of Joined-
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up Thinking and Action (HJTA). ACL policy issues were consistently framed as 
cross-cutting problems and there was evidence of a widespread recognition among 
stakeholders with both education and economic development orientations that it 
was necessary to work more closely together to find joined-up solutions. The Making 
the Connections and Changing to Deliver agendas in the two jurisdictions had some 
success in moving the way ACL policy problems and solutions were imagined in 
Scotland and Wales towards a new, more joined-up mode of thinking. It is not a 
finding of the research, then, that policy-makers in the ACL policy area in Scotland 
and Wales were more resistant to the idea of JUG than their counterparts in the SEN 
policy area or, indeed, that they were any less enthusiastic about the difference 
greater coordination and inclusiveness could make to policy formulation and 
implementation in their field. Despite this common ground, however, the analysis in 
chapter 5 also demonstrated that ACL policy actors in both jurisdictions did not 
enter into the same number of goodwill trust relationships as their counterparts 
working in SEN and consequently failed to pool policy- and decision-making 
sovereignty to the same extent. Indeed, ACL was characterised to some extent by a 
lack of goodwill trust between actors. This section considers how this important 
variation in behaviour might be accounted for.1
The starting point for the analysis is the set of seven key variables identified 
alongside the HJTA in chapter 3 as having the potential to influence the number and 
quality of trust relationships that form within a given policy context. These are 
summarised in Table 6.1. The following discussion examines the ways in which each 
of these key variables influenced the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and 
action in the SEN and ACL case studies in Scotland and Wales and considers any 
evidence of variation across policy areas, between jurisdictions and over time.
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Table 6.1 Seven key variables which may influence the conditions for JUG
Variable Potential for influencing the number and 
quality of trust relationships
Level of policy-making capacity Well-resourced actors may be forced into trust 
relationships as a way of supplementing 
capacity
Level of political sensitivity Well-resourced actors may be more likely to 
loosen control over policy-making if 
developments within the policy area are 
perceived to have few implications for party or 
electoral politics
Level of existing consensus A strong consensus may cause actors to perceive 
less risk in pooling policy- and decision-making 
sovereignty
Level of legislative competence A greater legislative competence can reinforce 
trust relationships by providing legal recourse 
for participants
Resources available to government A need to achieve efficiency savings may drive 
collaborative practice
Scale of the policy-making context Smaller scale may increase opportunities to 
develop policy relationships based on 
'individual' trust (Eshuis & Van Woerkum 2003)
Age of the competent political institution An established institutional context may allow 
greater continuity in relationships and help 
actors make trust decisions based on a settled 
reputation or known history of behaviour.
6.1.1 Variable 1: the existing level of policy-making capacity
The first variable to consider is the existing level of policy-making capacity within 
each case study; that is, the capacity within government for policy to be formulated 
and implemented effectively. The level of policy-making capacity has the potential to 
influence the number and quality of trust relationships in a given policy context 
substantially because even those government actors that are disinclined to pool 
policy- and decision-making sovereignty may be forced into trust relationships with 
other, sometimes less well-resourced actors, where there is a real or perceived dearth 
of expertise and local knowledge or, in severe cases, a simple need for greater man­
power. Moreover, it is reasonable to suggest that this kind of under-capacity would 
be a particular feature of new jurisdictions, where a robust tradition and settled 
pattern of policy-making is unlikely to have been established. For this reason, the
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pre-devolution policy-making capacity in Scotland and Wales forms an important 
part of the discussion.
The senior civil servants in the Scottish Executive who contributed to the research 
into SEN policy processes and outputs did not explain their apparent enthusiasm for 
passing parts of the policy agenda to other actors by citing a lack of capacity within 
their own departmental structures. On the contrary, all of the interviewees made a 
point of emphasising the dramatic increase in capacity and a related explosion in 
policy-making activity in their departments since devolution. As Mike Gibson, then 
Head of the Scottish Executive's Support for Learning Division, noted:
When I, as an HMI, was involved with the policy people in [the Scottish Office] there 
was about four people responsible for special needs -  and that was called a 'branch' -  
and basically all they did was look after the funding of seven grant-aided special 
schools which we still have ... there wasn't a lot of proactive policy formulation at all.
And now, moving from about three or four people to about twenty five, this is a very 
active policy-making environment.
(Interview 18)
Despite this, there is some evidence that the Scottish Executive developed links with a 
number of specialist organisations in the third sector in order to build its policy­
making capacity, particularly around the more specialised issues within the SEN 
policy area. As Ann Auchterlonie, the Director of Afasic Scotland, a leading speech 
and language therapy (SLT) organisation, explained:
It's maybe a bit strong to say that the Scottish Executive relies on us exclusively ... but 
what I would say is that it relies on a range of organisations like ours ... and it realises 
that the expertise in these areas for formulating policy ideas is not always available 
through traditional channels.
(Interview 14)
There is a stronger case to be made for a lack of policy-making capacity acting as 
motivation for government actors to develop close relationships with third sector 
organisations in Wales. Andrew Davies, formerly the Assembly government 
Minister for Economic Development and now with the Finance and Public Service 
Delivery portfolio, suggested that 'devolution was more of a challenge for civil 
servants [in Wales] than it was for politicians' precisely because there had been 
virtually no policy-making capacity in the Welsh Office before 1999 (Interview 10). 
The new Welsh civil service, he argued, found it more difficult to develop its policy­
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making capacity than its counterpart in Scotland because it had been even more 
reliant on (or beholden to) Whitehall for its policy lead. This was compounded, he 
argued, by a comparative poverty of resources:
There have been some real big challenges in Wales that I don't think the Scots have 
had. The Scottish Office always has been more generously funded than the Welsh 
Office -  it's had more civil servants -  and this has continued into devolution'
(Interview 10)
This point of view was echoed by one official during Alistair Cole's (2003: 228) 
research into the new National Assembly civil service in 2001-02:
During the Welsh office days, we were staffed as an off-shoot of Whitehall, relying 
on the lead department of Whitehall to do the bulk of the legwork. We tuned 
government policy to the Welsh perspective. We are now being asked to act as a free­
standing government
Cole (2003: 228) further drew attention to the 'sense of being over-burdened' that 
was reported in the interviews, along with 'the belief that resources had not 
increased commensurably with responsibilities', particularly with regard to a new 
policy development role.
Of course, policy-making capacity is about more than the number of civil servants 
at the disposal of the responsible department. Just as important is the experience of 
those civil servants, both in government as policy-makers and in the specific context 
of the jurisdiction and policy area in question.2 From this point of view, the level of 
policy-making capacity in Wales seems to have been particularly low. This can be 
seen as in some ways an inevitable consequence of a new pattern of governance and 
the close relationships government actors developed with some voluntary sector 
organisations -  among them NIACE Dysgu Cymru, Autism Cymru and Afasic 
Cymru -  may be indicative oT those government actors attempting to develop the 
policy-making capacity within their jurisdiction. While most interviewees chose not 
to offer a view on the role of policy-making capacity in specific relationships with 
other actors, there is some evidence to suggest this was indeed an important factor. 
The relationship between, on the one hand, ministers and senior officials in a 
number of Assembly government departments, and, on the other, the Chief 
Executive of Autism Cymru, might be taken as an example of this effect (see chapter
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5:116). The civil servant responsible for taking forward ASD policy in the Assembly 
Government explained that Autism Cymru's undoubtedly influential involvement in 
die development of the All Wales ASD Strategy began as a result of a lack of 
expertise within the Assembly government in what is a highly specialised area but, 
crucially, developed into a close trust relationship during the course of the work 
(Interview 12). Similarly, the way in which both the Assembly government and the 
Scottish Executive welcomed and encouraged the influential SEN policy reviews 
instigated by the respective committees in the Scottish Parliament and National 
Assembly demonstrated a need for an actor other than a government department to 
take some of the strain of policy formulation.3 It is important to emphasise that both 
Committees adopted clear-cut policy formulation roles in their respective reviews 
and Peter Black, the Chair of the ELLC Committee in Wales, certainly saw it in that 
way:
I think it was a very good example of a policy-making role and one which took place 
over a number of years, which in itself is actually really quite unusual ... most other 
policy reviews have more of a scrutiny role and this will certainly be more of the case 
in the third assembly.
(Interview 9)
The evidence suggests that a relative lack of initial policy-making capacity in both 
jurisdictions may have helped contribute to more favourable conditions for JUG in 
the years that followed.4 Peter Black explained that the Assembly government gave 
the ELL Committee an unusual amount of support and encouragement in what was, 
after all, a wholly independent review:
The civil service were extremely supportive of [the ELL Committee's] review and, 
although it wasn't officially a joint review, on some levels it really did operate like 
that, such was the encouragement we received from officials.
(Interview 9)
In what may seem a perverse way, then, a relative lack of policy-making capacity in 
both nations, but particularly in Wales, may have led -  or, in most cases, may 
eventually lead - to more joined-up policy processes and outputs. Relationships such 
as that involving Autism Cymru that begin as result of under-capacity can change 
over time and become relationships bom of necessity, but grown through trust.
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The main variation in the cases studies for this particular variable was therefore 
between jurisdictions, rather than policy areas. In broad terms, a greater policy­
making capacity in terms of the resources held by the civil service, combined with a 
more established policy-making tradition based around a more powerful and 
influential pre-devolution set-up in the form of the Scottish Office, meant that 
developing very close relationships with third sector actors was less of a priority for 
governmental actors in Scotland than in Wales. However, it is important not to over­
emphasise this difference and it is not a finding of the research that this led directly 
to any marked variation in the extent and nature of joined-up thinking and action 
between the two nations.5
6.1.2 Variable 2: the level of political sensitivity
The second key variable to examine is the level of political sensitivity within the SEN 
and ACL policy areas in Scotland and Wales. This is a potentially significant variable 
because government departments and other traditionally-powerful actors may be 
more likely to retreat to the safety of departmental control of policy processes and 
outputs when a policy issue is exposed to unusual public scrutiny or has direct 
electoral or party political implications.
The evidence shows that this is one of the variables where there is greatest 
contrast between SEN and ACL policy processes and outputs in both nations. 
Although SEN sometimes registers on the radar of the popular media -  often as a 
result of specific cases -  it is widely accepted among policy-makers in both nations 
that contributed to the research that it is an area of policy that is not consistently 
under the media microscope or high on the political agenda. Indeed, for Peter Black, 
the Chair of the National Assembly's Education and Lifelong Learning Committee 
(ELL Committee) that undertook a comprehensive review of SEN policy in 2004/5, it 
is not an area of work that, at the moment at least, can even be considered to be party 
political in any real sense (Interview 9). ACL, on the other hand, is inextricably 
linked to the skills agenda, is a policy area that receives regular media coverage, and 
was a high profile component of all political parties' election manifestos for the May 
2007 devolved elections. In short, the political stakes were considerably higher in
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ACL policy during the period of study.
The influence of the variable is not restricted to relationships between 
governmental actors and those in civil society. The SEN policy reviews conducted by 
the ELL Committee and its counterpart in the Scottish Parliament were both marked 
by an unusual degree of non-partisanship. Peter Black made the point:
I didn't think there were any party political divisions at all -  or even divisions of 
ideology. I don't recall any disagreement on ideological grounds at all in terms of 
doing the reports together ...
(Interview 9)
It is important to note, however, that political sensitivity is a highly volatile 
variable, as fickle and unpredictable as politics itself. A sudden change in the 
political salience of or media interest in a policy issue -  possibly driven by a 
particularly high profile case or incident - could have the effect of changing the 
nature and extent of joined-up thinking within a short period. The speed of change 
in this variable has to some extent been shown in England where, as is noted 
elsewhere, David Cameron, the Conservative leader, has reflected a renewed interest 
in the quite fundamental debate on how, where and with whom children with SEN 
should be schooled in England by introducing the subject into his highest profile 
political speeches (Cameron 2005; see chapter 4: 77-78). ACL is a further case in point. 
For many years it was a policy area with a distinctly local profile that was rarely 
made mention of in regional or national forums. However, the emergence of the 
skills agenda, and the crucial link that has been made in both Scotland and Wales 
between ACL and the need to up-skill members of disadvantaged communities in 
particular, have launched the policy area into the mainstream of day-to-day political 
debate. More pertinently, ACL has become part of a measurable commitment to 
raising skills among certain groups that exposes government actors to potential 
scrutiny from a range of sources, including the media (e.g. SE 2006; WAG 2005c).
Although there is clearly a danger of portraying the political sensitivity of the two 
policy areas as being static, it is possible to conclude that, in the specific time scale of 
the case studies, well-resourced policy actors had more to lose by pooling policy- 
and decision-making sovereignty in the ACL policy area.
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6.1.3 Variable 3: the level of existing consensus6
Chapter 3 identified the degree of existing consensus within a given policy context as 
a further variable that may help explain variation in the nature and extent of joined- 
up thinking and action. The extent to which the direction of travel in a particular 
policy area is subject to debate may condition the behaviour of all policy-actors, not 
merely that of the well-resourced. Even a well-intentioned government actor that is 
liberated from any preoccupation with its own institutional interests may struggle to
! cultivate or sustain effective trust relationships where it suspects that involving
i
| actors with divergent views on the direction in which policy should travel may result
I
in unpredictable and unwanted policy developments.
It was noted in chapter 4 that, for many years, the most debated SEN policy issue 
in the UK was whether to include children with SEN in mainstream schooling, or else 
to segregate those children in special schools or other segregated settings. This debate 
seemed to have been settled on the side of inclusion by the early 1980s, but is slowly 
re-emerging in the English context. In both Scotland and Wales, however, the 
hegemonic position of inclusion remains unchallenged and inclusion-versus- 
segregation is yet to re-emerge as a major issue within the Scottish and Welsh SEN 
policy debates. Indeed, in Scotland, the right for a child with SEN of any kind to be 
admitted to a mainstream school remains enshrined in statute in the form of the 
Education (Scotland) Act 1981. This level of consensus can be contrasted, however, 
with the contested nature of policy- and decision-making in the area of ACL, where 
policy actors with economic development and education orientations have 
competing claims not only over the nature of provision, but also over its purpose.
There was a great deal of evidence in the case studies of the impact this different
| level of consensus had in the two policy areas. The value of a high level of existing
t
consensus in the SEN policy area is demonstrated clearly by the work of the Speech 
and Language Therapy Action Group (SALTAG) in Wales and, in particular, the 
way the group was able to overcome quite serious disagreements about the detail of 
SLT provision in Wales. As a forum, SALTAG was able to work through differences 
in the details of policy proposals because participants in the process shared the same 
fundamental position; namely, that SLT provision needed to be coordinated more
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closely (see chapter 5: 116-117). There is evidence of a similar level of consensus 
having an equally positive impact on the nature and extent of joined-up thinking 
and action in the SEN policy area in Scotland. Euan Robson, the former Deputy 
Minister for Education and Young People who took the key Education (Additional 
Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act through the Scottish Parliament in 2003, was in 
no doubt that the passage of this legislation through the Parliament and, indeed, its 
reception since, was at least partly a function of the settled debates at the heart of the 
SEN policy area in Scotland:
If you were to look at a crude balance of who [was] in favour of [the direction of SEN 
policy-making in Scotland] I would say it [was] easily 85/90% in favour, possibly 10% 
with some reservations and about 2% without outright objections. Now, the 2% with 
outright objections believed in - 1 would describe them as 'extreme mainstreamers' -  
in other words, there should be no difference between any child. Now, in fact, when 
talking to them I had to say that that was the ultimate objective and that they should 
read the general duty [contained within the ASL legislation] as a step on that 
particular road and the Coordinated Support Plan as a specific measure to address 
the specific difficulties of inter-agency coordination ...
(Interview 22)
Even those interests who expressed initial opposition to the legislation and, in 
particular, to the Coordinated Support Plan (CSP) as the instrument for coordinating 
services for children with multiple additional needs, occupied policy positions close 
enough to the prevailing consensus for their objections to soften significantly over 
time:
One lady [from a particular interest group] was very much of the view that this was a 
bad idea, this whole piece of legislation, because it picked people out and stigmatised 
them ... but talking to her subsequently I do believe that she began to see that our 
intention was not to compartmentalise, pigeon-hole or single-out or stigmatise 
anybody -  quite the reverse.
(Interview 22)
This picture can be contrasted quite clearly with the situation in the ACL policy 
area, where good intentions to develop joined-up thinking and action were 
consistently undermined by a general absence of consensus on the direction ACL 
policy should move in. The Community Consortia for Education and Training 
(CCETs) in Wales are a good example. As is noted in chapter 5, the CCETs were 
quite similar to SALTAG in their remit and range of membership (albeit with a sub­
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regional rather than national focus). However, in spite of some acclaimed but 
isolated successes such as the Learning Brokers project (see chapter 4: 84-85), 
interviewees shared the view that the CCETs structure failed in large part because of 
a lack of consensus among members who had competing ideas of how policy should 
be developed (Interview 7; Interview 5). Indeed, business representatives largely 
ignored the Consortia, partly because they did not seem to fit in with their time 
commitments, but also because theirs and the views of various other stakeholders 
could not be reconciled (Phelps et al 2006). One ELWa representative told Nick 
Phelps and his colleagues (2006: 569) during an interview undertaken as part of a 
research project into business representation in Wales, that the CCETs had merely 
succeeding in exposing stakeholders' divergent positions:
The squabbles that go on if [CCET members] are in a meeting together is not really 
conducive to a bloke giving up his time from running his business to be constructive 
about the various needs in the area. And I think until we sort this out we are not 
actually going to get business people involved. I would honestly say that at CCET 
level... the business influence in what CCETs are doing is now next to nothing
6.1.4 Variable 4: the level of executive competence and legislative power
The level of executive and legislative power is one of a small number of variables 
where there is some clear and noteworthy variation between jurisdictions. Although 
both the Scottish Executive and Assembly government had responsibility for SEN 
provision in their respective jurisdictions, the former was able to support its SEN 
reforms with an innovative piece of legislation in the form of the Education 
(Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004.7 The strength of the 
Coordinated Support Plan (CSP), a key component in this legislation, as a piece of 
joined-up thinking and action lies in its power to compel agencies to fulfil their 
commitments to children with additional support needs (ASN). Although the 
progression of the CSP from policy proposal to active legislation was entirely 
dependent upon the high level trust relationships that existed in the background 
negotiations between education and health actors, the Scottish Parliament's higher 
level of legislative competence enabled the Scottish Executive to preside over what is 
arguably a more robust joined-up response to SEN than that which was seen in 
Wales.
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However, the impact of this difference in legislative competence would largely be 
detectable only in an analysis or evaluation of outcomes. The real value of the CSP as 
a statutory mechanism lies in translating joined-up thinking and action into joined- 
u p  service provision. Although an outcomes-focused assessment must be seen as the 
strictest test of how joined-up policy-making is in any context, it is beyond the scope 
of this study. As such, is not possible to elaborate further upon a variable that clearly 
has the potential to influence JUG here.
Although the Scottish Executive enjoyed a similar level of legislative advantage 
over the Assembly government in the ACL policy area, there is no comparable 
legislative measure to the CSP to discuss. However, the data is not robust enough to 
inform any assessment of whether this absence is significant. While it may be the 
case that policy-makers were unable to commit to the same kind of resource pooling 
that made the CSP possible, it may also be the case that a legislative response to the 
problems perceived in the ACL policy area was not deemed necessary or seen as the 
most effective policy response.
6.1.5 Variable 5: the overall resources available to government
As JUG is closely linked to efficiency and, therefore, to Efficiency savings', it is to be 
expected that a less generous settlement for the Scottish Parliament or National 
Assembly would potentially lead to a more enthusiastic approach to JUG. The period 
of study was a time of relative plenty for both devolved governments and there is an 
expectation that budgets for the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly will be 
far less generous in the coming Parliament. This is therefore a variable that may offer 
greater insight in a longitudinal case study.
However, the overall resources available may already be coming into when one 
considers the change in focus with regard to the 'programme bending' aspiration of 
the Assembly government's Communities First programme. Although not strictly an 
example taken from either of the case studies (perhaps indicating further the 
unhelpful arbitrariness of 'policy areas' when problems are so interconnected), the 
development of Communities First during the period of study indicates this point 
well. The architects of the programme initially chose to focus on so-called 'soft7
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outcomes; that is to say, on building the confidence and levels of engagement of 
people living in the most deprived communities in Wales. As is noted elsewhere, the 
notion of "programme bending' at this stage was restricted to being just that, a notion 
(see chapter 5:113). However, a less generous financial settlement has coincided with 
the Assembly Government attempting to refocus Communities First onto delivering 
more measurable 'hard' outcomes -  including the skills and qualifications gained by 
members of disadvantaged communities, the associated level of economic inactivity 
in those communities and, ultimately, the number of people entering employment -  
I and, crucially, programme bending has been endowed with a precious additional (or
I at least a differently deployed) resource to help achieve this in the shape of the
Communities First Outcomes Fund (see chapter 5:113).
The Family Employment Initiative (FEI), which was described in chapter 5 (113), 
is a clear example of how the Outcomes Fund is already encouraging a more 
collaborative approach to tackling low skills and economic inactivity in deprived 
communities. By requiring policy actors to pool their own resources in order to 
qualify for Outcomes Fund investment, Communities First has managed to 'procure' 
collaboration and address the low skills of members of deprived communities in a 
way that draws on expertise and experience from a wide range of perspectives. 
Crucially for the analysis in this section, it makes, its architects may argue, efficient 
use of public funds to tackle a cross-cutting issue.
This analysis of difference in the first five of the set of seven key variables has 
shown that the level of political sensitivity of SEN, combined with the relatively high 
level of existing consensus in the policy area, influenced the formation of trustI
relationships greatly during the period of study and, in turn, the extent to which 
policy actors were prepared to pool policy- and decision-making sovereignty: 
examples of resource pooling and close relationships between government and non­
governmental actors that directly influenced the nature and trajectory of policy­
making were exclusive to SEN policy area.
The implications of this finding will disappoint the more committed disciples of 
| JUG. This; is because both of these key variables deal primarily with risk: the risk of 
policy comtrol being lost and there being unwanted consequences for party or
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electoral politics (the level of political sensitivity), and the risk that the direction of 
policy may take an unpredictable and unwanted turn (the level of existing 
consensus). Crucially, policy actors that are prepared to pool policy- and decision­
making sovereignty only under these kinds of quite specific, low risk conditions can 
! be seen as behaving in what might be described as an 'institutionally safe' way. Such 
actors understand that failing to tackle cross-cutting problems will have debilitating 
effect on the effectiveness of policy formulation and implementation and broadly 
subscribe to the core principles of JUG, but are only prepared to enter into goodwill 
trust relationships where they perceive a low level institutional risk; that is, where 
they do not imagine that doing so will undermine their own position or that of any 
other actors they are particularly aligned with.8
Of course, the failure to join-up ACL policy to the same extent as SEN, and the 
lack of a normative commitment to JUG as a mode of policy- and decision-making in 
both policy areas, raises an important question about the limitations of the JUG 
doctrine in its current form: if, as the case studies suggest, well-resourced policy 
actors will only enter relationships based on goodwill trust when they perceive a low 
degree of institutional risk, how will the most acute, cross-cutting, 'wicked' 
problems (which, almost by definition, are those where there is least consensus 
within the policy milieu and a high level of political sensitivity), be effectively 
tackled? This question forms part of the discussion in chapter 7.
6.2 'Smallness', 'newness' and conditions for JUG in the devolved context
The analysis so far has been restricted to an examination of variation in the nature 
and extent of joined-up thinking and action where it occurs across policy areas and 
(to a lesser extent) between jurisdictions. However, there are two important variables 
| that may cause the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and action to vary
| between levels of government; in the case of this study, between the new devolved
and more established UK contexts. The scale of the policy-making context and the 
age of the competent political institutions in the devolved setting are clearly very 
different to, for instance, the Westminster-Whitehall setting, and the following 
section examines the influence these variables had on the nature and extent of
iI
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joined-up thinking and action in the case studies.9
6.2.1 Variable 6: the scale of the policy-making context
There are huge positives ... if you just take it at a political level, the fact that -  unlike 
in Westminster or Whitehall -  all ministers, cabinet ministers - 1 think it's still true -  
are all on the same floor in the same building ... that physical proximity makes a big 
difference. The fact that the decision-making chain is shorter is also a factor ... there 
is a complex web of inter-relationships - formal and informal -  it gives policy-making 
a certain intimacy.
Andrew Davies, Assembly Government Minister (Interview 10)
It was noted in chapter 3 that the scale of the policy-making context -  the scale in 
terms of numbers of actors involved and, indeed, of the geographic spread of actors 
-  may be particularly relevant for the individual-type trust relationships identified 
by Eshuis and Van Woerkum (2003) and discussed in some detail in chapter 2 (40-43). 
Such relationships are founded on a continuity of face-to-face contacts and the 
'orality' -  the body language, eye-contact and verbal exchanges - they contain (Bahre 
& Smets 1999). Such contacts enable policy actors to develop close relationships 
based on mutual intellectual respect, or a shared understanding of policy issues. 
They help cultivate empathy. Stereotyped ideas of certain categories of actors -  the 
'voluntary sector', say - can also be overcome in a face-to-face context (although one 
must not ignore the possibility that prejudices can also be reinforced). The point is 
that relationships based on high frequency, high quality contact often become 
'overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of ... abstention from 
opportunism' (Granovetter 1985: 490, quoted in Eshuis & Van Woerkum 2003: 381). 
A smaller policy-making context may therefore help to create a series of 
relationships within which actors 'will expose themselves [to risk] more easily, are 
more receptive to other's [sic] ideas, accept more interdependence, and have less 
need to impose control on others' (Klein Woolthuis et al 2002: 5, quoted in Eshuis 
and Van Woerkum 2003: 382). Smaller scale can provide opportunities for higher 
quality and higher frequency face-to-face contact between key policy actors than is 
possible in larger bureaucratic settings like Westminster-Whitehall.
The importance of relationships between individuals in the policy- and decision­
making process was articulated by Keith Ingham, then the Head of Children's Health
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and Social Services at the Assembly government:
Whatever structural arrangement you have -  and we have some quite effective 
arrangements in place, we're certainly less compartmentalised than Whitehall, 
whatever the proximity and the rest -  it still inevitably comes down to individuals ...
(Interview 12)
This was echoed at the ministerial level by Andrew Davies, for whom:
Scale is undoubtedly one of the critical issues -  it's the elephant in the room in this 
discussion ... I've been a minister from the very beginning ... my first contact with 
the UK government was on 'egovemment' and it just struck me, I was on this UK 
ministerial committee and in the end I stopped going ... it was just this debate, this 
argument between UK Whitehall government departments ... it just struck me that 
the sheer scale of Whitehall made a joined-up approach hugely problematic ... Scale 
is an important factor and I think the complexity of modem government is 
underestimated.
(Interview 10)
Importantly for the analysis here, there is almost the same amount of evidence of 
scale developing closer individual trust relationships in the ACL field as the 
following exchange with Andrew Davies reveals:
CL Do you find, as a decision-maker, that getting to know people on a face-to 
face level helps you 'trust' a particular organisation in a way that, if it was just 
a name and an organisation 'out there' in civil society, you would be less 
inclined to hand over part of the policy agenda?
AD Oh, without doubt - 1 think that7s been a big factor. I see [a particular head of 
a voluntary organisation identified elsewhere as being influential in the ACL 
field in Wales] formally, informally, we actually meet for coffee. So I think 
that7 s a huge advantage ...
(Interview 10)
Euan Robson, the Deputy Minister who took the key SEN legislation through the 
Scottish Parliament in 2003, also saw the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and 
action as being closely linked to the relatively small scale of the policy-making 
context. So much so, in fact, that he saw it as part of an argument for strengthened 
regional government structures south of the border:
As a Liberal you'd perhaps expect me to want to talk about regional government in 
England and I have to say that, while it could be possible to draft similar legislation 
[to the ASL legislation in Scotland] in Westminster, it would be entirely necessary for 
'buy-in' to that policy change to be delivered in a smaller, regional government 
setting. A regional government of, say, the South West of England -  population 10
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million, say -  could more easily foster the relationships and would be better placed 
to coordinate activity in a way in which it can be done in Scotland.
(Interview 22)
Just as ministers perceived the benefits of scale for building individual trust, so their 
senior officials identified smallness as a key variable. Keith Ingham, the Head of 
Children's Health and Social Services at the Assembly Government, admitted that 
the 'smallness' of the policy-making context in Wales made it possible to forge 
remarkably close relationships with non-governmental actors. In chapter 5 it was 
noted that the chief Executive of Autism Cymru claimed informal access to ministers 
and senior civil servants had given him considerable influence over the development 
of the ASD All Wales Strategy. Ingham confirmed this relationship:
CL Picking up on what you were saying about how prepared officials and
ministers are to work with people from outside the government or 
departmental setting, do you think this has influenced your relationship with, 
for example, someone like [the Head of Autism Cymru]? Could such a 
relationship be so close in the context of a larger bureaucracy?
KI Well, far less likely and I'd go as far as to say it wouldn't happen. It carries its 
risks as well. You are potentially a lot more exposed ... but fundamentally it's 
a more Welsh way of doing things.
(Interview 12)
The influence of scale, then, applies equally to vertical relationships as it does to 
horizontal, cross-departmental ones.10 Stakeholders in all of the case studies reported 
very clearly that the opportunity for frequent and high quality face-to-face contact 
with decision-makers had transformed their ability to build and sustain the kinds of 
close relationships that help them to influence policy in a way that is not a function 
of the resources they can mobilise.
One speech and language therapy pressure group working in Scotland saw the 
benefits of scale following devolution. Ann Auchterlonie, the Director of Afasic 
Scotland, noted that the organisation had suffered in the days of the Scottish Office 
from an image of being militant and problematic for policy-makers, compounded by 
limited opportunities to meet with decision-makers who were often located in 
Whitehall. Following devolution, the organisation had the chance to meet with senior
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officials from the Scottish Executive to discuss its potential contribution to policy­
making in the field:
I went in for a meeting with one of them and he had on his desk a very large file on 
us ... and I went in ... and he was very nice but he was quite guarded and we talked 
about [the organisation] and he asked me about our policy. I said to him I saw our role 
as working collaboratively in cooperation with the Scottish Executive, with local 
authorities and that we would advise parents that only when all else fails do you move 
towards confrontation, because when you do that there is something in the middle and 
that something is the child and so that for us would always be a last stage. And he 
looked at me and he put his hands on this large file, pushed it to the side and said 'in 
that case, let us talk'. And this was the file on this very 'militant7 group.
(Interview 14)
This is a clear example of how face-to-face contact, in a situation where each 
individual could make an assessment of the other based on exchanges that may be 
off-the-record or candid in some way -  Erik Bahre and Peer Smets' (1999) 'orality' - 
can make the difference between mutual suspicion and constructive collaboration. 
More pertinently, there can be no doubt that opportunities for this kind of contact 
were more frequent in the smaller setting.
Smaller organisations have taken time to get used to this situation which is quite 
different from the kinds of opportunities they enjoyed in the pre-devolution era. 
Andrew Davies has experienced their surprise:
People would often say to me, certainly when I was Enterprise minister [in the early 
part of his career as a minister], 'Gosh, I would never ever have thought I could get 
to see a minister ...'
(Interview 10)
Perhaps the clearest articulation of the importance of scale for bringing in small, 
relatively poorly-resourced actors into the very centre of the policy- and decision­
making process came from Peter Black, the Assembly Member who chaired the ELL 
Committee's SEN Review and who was formerly a Deputy Minister in the Assembly 
Government. He characterised the SEN policy milieu in particular as one where 
frequent and high quality contact with ministers and other key decision-makers gave 
some voluntary organisations influence over policy:
What I observe is that access [to ministers] here is much better than it is in England. I 
hear from policy-makers, from the voluntary sector, over and over again, that here 
you can get a meeting with an Assembly minister, you know, fairly easily -  and you
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can meet them on a social level. In fact, there may be four or five different events 
where I come across the same person. In the SEN field, I might meet someone from, 
for example, SNAP Cymru at an SEN event, a small schools event, a health event, I 
might meet the same person at a Bevan Foundation event -  all sorts of places like 
that -  so you do build up social relationships with lobbyists ... and those close 
relationships mean that they are able to influence policy much more.
(Interview 9)
Crucially, then, it is the social content inherent in frequent and high quality face-to- 
face contact that moves relationships closer to the heart of the policy- and decision­
making process and which can bring greater coordination to policy process.
It should be noted, however, that fewer stakeholders claimed to have had 
informal consultation with ministers, or an opportunity for future informal access to 
ministers should they require it, in Scotland than in Wales. Gaining access to the 
highest level of political decision-making seemed to be outside what some Scottish 
stakeholders saw as achievable. So, for example, Afasic Scotland had access to 
ministers formally in the public forum of their annual conference and through 
restrictive formal consultation structures, but had not made ministers a target for 
their informal lobbying work. This had been focused almost exclusively on senior 
civil servants:
Although ministers have opened our conferences and been available there to speak 
with members and with myself and my colleagues it would be fair to say we haven't 
sought direct access to influence ministers ... we've tended to work primarily through 
the civil servants.
(Interview 14)
There is a possibility, then, that even the quite modest difference in scale between 
Scotland and Wales (certainly when compared with Whitehall) has implications for 
the number and quality of trust relationships that are formed. Afasic Scotland's 
counterpart in Wales had also not deliberately sought out ministers, but had 
nonetheless developed the possibility of informal access through, in the main, 
having 'bumped into' the minister and her deputy on a number of occasions 
(Interview 1). The term 'village' is often applied to politics in Westminster, but in 
Cardiff Bay the 'villagers' include the full range of policy actors, not only 
governmental actors.
There was even evidence from some senior interviewees that that most enigmatic
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of notions, a "Welsh Way' of approaching the business of policy- and decision­
making, had been impacting on the policy process even before devolution:
Wales is a small country and people get to know each other. And in the same way 
we get to know each other 'across interests' as well. But I think there is a culture of 
engagement in Wales that predates devolution anyway -  there is a more 
collaborative ethos in a sense -  to the extent that policy officials in Wales are far more 
likely to go out and speak to and meet the people who deliver services. They ring 
you up and you talk to them about issues.
(Interview 12)
To portray scale as an exclusively positive feature of the policy-making landscape 
in Scotland and Wales would, however, be a mistake. While many relationships 
were reinforced and qualitatively changed over time by individual trust, there were 
some that were undermined by individual mistrust. Both are cultivated in the same 
hot house of small scale policy-making. A number of interviewees gave examples of 
relationships soured and potential influence emasculated by face-to-face contact - 
examples where an organisation's representative had appeared unprofessional, 
uncommitted, uninformed or intellectually unimpressive -  but understandably did 
not want any details placed on-the-record. Less directly related to JUG, but still a 
point worthy of making, is the impact small scale may have had on the quality of 
policy-making.
But ... there's a big down side and that is I've felt very strongly that very intimacy 
can have an upside and a downside. The orthodoxy can be established very quickly 
and it can become quite stultifying ... There is a danger that a cosy 'consensuality' 
can emerge whereby -  although it may not be articulated -  the challenge to the 
orthodoxy is not there ... and that maintaining the relationships becomes the policy 
objective ...
(Interview 10)
If one of the benefits of JUG is that it opens the policy- and decision-making process 
to the widest possible range of perspectives, it is not clear that smaller scale delivers 
a particularly 'heterogeneous' policy-making milieu.11
6.2.2 Variable 7: the age of the competent political institution
The final key variable to discuss is the age of the competent political institution 
within a given policy context. This is particularly important for Eshuis and Van 
Woerkum's (2003) institutional-type trust relationships because these develop
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between actors over time. Such relationships require a period of incubation. 
Institutional trust is of particular interest for this study because it flows from, in 
large part, many of the characteristics that actors in the new context of devolved 
government are unlikely to be able to demonstrate: longevity of participation, 
continuity of interaction, proven track record.12
As is noted above, there is more evidence of continuity between a pre- and post­
devolution policy context in Scotland than in Wales and there are examples where 
Scottish policy actors have relationships which span the period of constitutional 
change. Euan Robson explained how he inherited an embryonic form of the eventual 
ASL legislation (though something quite some way from being a bill) when he 
arrived in office. SEN, he argued, had been the subject of some limited, Scottish- 
specific policy activity for some years before devolution, principally as a result of 
Scotland having had its own education system:
There had been a long history -  I mean even as a layman I knew that there were 
difficulties with 'special educational needs'. The civil service - and Mike Gibson [the 
Head of Children's Health and Social Services] could without question be able to 
verify this -  had been working on this whole area for quite a long time. I mean in the 
old Scottish Office days -  the pre-devolution days. So Peter [Peacock, then Minister 
for Education and Young People] and I inherited a corpus of work focussed sharply 
on this area.
(Interview 22)
However, all of the interviewees with some knowledge or experience in this area 
accepted that devolution had created a different Scottish Civil service that was 'new' 
in terms of its responsibilities and scale of operation and that the new structure in 
Wales amounted to the formation of the 'first civil service for Wales' (Interview 12)13 
The key point here is that, while devolution has created a smaller scale -  with all 
of the largely positive implications that brings for the formation of trust relationships 
and the preparedness of actors to pool policy-and decision-making sovereignty -  it 
has also created a new policy context in which institutional trust is more difficult to 
detect. However, unlike the age of the competent institution, scale is not a time- 
sensitive variable: the policy-making context in Scotland and Wales will always 
benefit from the greater intimacy and closer physical proximity of policy actors. The 
age of the political institutions is, of course, time sensitive and it is to be expected
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that institutionalised relationships will emerge as devolution moves into its second 
decade. Therefore, the net impact of the two variables most closely associated with 
the devolved setting is likely to be a positive one for better joined-up thinking and 
action.
6.3 Towards a predictive model of JUG?
The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that, in the absence of a 'culture of 
collaboration' founded on a universal normative commitment to the principles of 
JUG, the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and action in the chosen case 
studies was dependent, to a large extent, on a number of key variables. Put simply, 
where there was an opportunity for a well-resourced actor to demonstrate a 
commitment to JUG without jeopardising its own narrow institutional interests, that 
opportunity was generally taken: control over the nature and trajectory of policy was 
handed to a range of actors in civil society and the legislature; budgets and other 
resources were pooled. But to what extent can these findings be extended to policy­
making in other policy areas and jurisdictions, and to other levels of government? 
Can an understanding of the conditions in which JUG thrives in a small number of 
policy areas in a particular institutional setting be extended into a predictive model?
The answer depends on the extent to which the degree of specificity of the chosen 
case or cases can be detected and, indeed, the sophistication of how the role of the 
variables in the SEN and ACL cases is understood. The finding that, for example, 
policy actors are more likely to enter into trust relationships when the policy area in 
question is of relatively low political sensitivity is not, in itself, enough to say with 
confidence that all policy areas of low political sensitivity will be characterised by 
these kinds of relationships. Rather, there is a complex inter-connectedness between 
the seven key variables discussed above. It is not clear, for example, whether low 
political sensitivity is only significant when it occurs in combination with high 
existing consensus and small scale. As with all case study research, generalisation is 
fraught with danger and claiming a predictive model would require more detailed 
research in a large number of differently located cases in order to uncover the 
relationship between variables. The conclusions reached in this chapter can only
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therefore be used with confidence to predict the nature and extent of joined-up 
thinking and action in those cases which mirror quite closely the quite specific 
! conditions in the SEN and ACL cases.
i
|
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the broad question of variation in the nature and extent 
of joined-up thinking and action. To this end, it examined SEN and ACL policy­
making in Scotland and Wales in the context of a set of key variables identified as 
having the potential to influence the number and quality of trust relationships that 
form in a given policy context. This analysis is summarised in Table 6.3. In two of the 
variables, the conditions for JUG were shown to be significantly better in the SEN 
policy area. The relatively low political sensitivity of SEN, combined with the 
relatively high level of existing consensus in the policy area (reinforced by some 
under-capacity in SEN policy-making in both of the nascent devolved institutions, 
particularly in Wales), allowed well-resourced policy actors to demonstrate a 
commitment to JUG, in conditions that did not seriously jeopardise their narrow 
institutional interests.
Government actors' decisions to enter into a joined-up SEN policy process in both 
nations were therefore described as being 'institutionally safe' - as JUG, but only on 
their terms - and this point is reinforced when one considers that some of the 
government actors operating in the SEN policy area were also operating in the ACL 
policy area and, in the case of ministers, were sometimes represented by the same 
individuals. That the same actors chose different modes of behaviour in different 
policy areas indicates that the conditions within a given policy context strongly 
influence the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and action.
The chapter then turned to two variables that have particular relevance to the 
| devolved context. It was shown how scale was an important explanatory factor in 
the close working relationships and influential policy roles some relatively poorly- 
resourced actors achieved, particularly in the SEN policy area. The kind of one-to- 
one, face-to-face interactions that are vital for individual trust to develop between 
policy actors were shown to occur on a more regular and frequent basis than is
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possible in larger bureaucratic contexts and it was argued that this intimacy -  while 
not without some negative dimensions, including the possibility that familiarity may 
stultify policy innovation - represented a particular condition for JUG that was very 
favourable. The temptation to describe devolution as providing highly favourable 
conditions for JUG was resisted, however, by identifying the 'newness' of the 
devolved jurisdictions as precluding the formation of many institutionalised trust 
relationships.
The chapter concluded by considering the utility of this understanding of how a 
set of key variables influenced the formation of trust relationships for predicting the 
nature and extent of joined-up thinking and action in other policy contexts. However, 
it was explained that, while the degree of specificity in the SEN and ACL policy 
areas in Scotland and Wales was made clearer by the analysis of the key variables, 
this was not sufficient to understand how each of the variables related to one another. 
Indeed, this level of sophistication in the analysis was beyond the scope of the 
research and was not supported by the robustness of the data.
j
I
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Table 6.2 A nalysis o f  conditions for joined-up governance
Conditions for JUG in ACL policy area
Variable Scotland Wales
1. Level of existing policy-making capacity Neutral Good
2. Level of political sensitivity Poor Poor
3. Level of existing consensus Poor Poor
4. Level of legislative competence Good Neutral
5. Level of resources available to government Neutral Neutral
6. The scale of the policy-making context Good Good
7. The age of the competent political institution Neutral Poor
Conditions for JUG in SEN policy area
Variable Scotland Wales
1. Level of existing policy-making capacity Neutral Good
2. Level of political sensitivity Good Good
3. Level of existing consensus Good Good
4. Level of legislative competence Good Neutral
5. Level of resources available to government Neutral Neutral
6. The scale of the policy-making context Good Good
7. The age of the competent political institution Neutral Poor
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Notes to chapter 6
1 This variation in behaviour is particularly stark when one considers that, 
particularly among political and ministerial actors, some of the same individuals and 
departments were active in both policy areas.
2 A further consideration is the quality of civil servants at the disposal of the 
responsible department. However, while some interviewees did raise concerns that 
the best talent was often lost to Whitehall and equally that experienced Whitehall 
officials were generally disinclined to relocate to Cardiff or Edinburgh, this question 
did not form part of the semi-structured interview schedule. As a result, the data 
collected on this potentially significant dimension of policy-making capacity is not 
sufficiently robust for any clear research findings to be arrived at here.
3 Those relationships which demonstrated clear trust between actors may have been 
initiated as the result of government actors being forced to engage through a lack of 
capacity, but it is important to note that they may equally have been initiated as a 
result of a new commitment to meaningful engagement with non-governmental 
actors. Evidence of the former gathered during the interviews is actually quite 
limited.
4 It is important to draw a distinction here between close trust relationships bom of a 
need on the part of government actors to supplement policy-making capacity and 
those relationships which develop between actors in Rod Rhodes7 ideal-type policy 
community (1988; with Marsh 1992; see chapter 2: 26-29). The former are bom of 
necessity -  they are "forced marriages7 -  while the latter involve choice on the part of 
participants and the mutually beneficial exchange of resources -  they, then, are 
"marriages of convenience". For a discussion of Rhodes7 typology of policy networks 
and the mechanism of resource dependency, see chapter 2: 26-29. The possible 
implications of JUG for the way policy relationships are conceptualised in the 
network literature is discussed in chapter 7:173-176).
5 This variable may have considerable additional explanatory utility if it were used to 
inform analysis in any comparison between policy-making in the devolved context 
and in a larger scale, more established context, such as Westminster.
6 This variable was considered as a potential influence on JUG during the design of 
the research. It formed an important part of the rationale for choosing SEN and ACL 
policy processes and outputs as the key case studies in Scotland and Wales as the 
plainly visible differences in existing consensus between the two policy areas made 
sure that the case studies would represent quite different tests of JUG. This is 
discussed further in chapter 3 (56-57).
7 It should be noted that the Scottish Parliament did have greater executive 
competence over education than the National Assembly. However, the point to be 
made here is that the greatest difference -  and the one that made the clearest impact
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on the JUG response to SEN in the two nations -  was the capacity to introduce 
primary legislation.
8 Where collaborative practice represents any risk that the core function of a 
government actor will be compromised in any way, that actor will move away from 
collaboration. In this sense, the kind of JUG in evidence in the SEN policy area does 
not represent a set of policy processes and outputs that in themselves indicate that 
functionalism has been overcome.
9 No attempt is made here to conduct any rigorous comparative analysis between 
policy processes in Scotland and Wales and those in Whitehall. Rather, the aim is to 
examine what effect scale and age had on the formation of trust relationships in the 
two devolved nations and whether these defining features of meso-govemment 
make the conditions for JUG more or less favourable.
10 Peter Black suggested that scale also had an effect on breaking down or, as the case 
may be, preventing the formation of departmental silos in the devolved jurisdictions:
There are silos in the Welsh Assembly Government ... when officials from the 
education department approached me and advised that we needed some Health 
officials involved [in the ELL Committee's review of SEN policy], we need to get 
health officials to give evidence to the review, I got the clear impression that they 
were saying to me, 'look, we've been banging our heads against a wall with them for 
long enough, maybe the politicians can sort them out!' But there's certainly less of 
this than at a UK level, simply because the scale is so much smaller.
(Interview PB)
However, this was not a perspective shared by many other interviewees and there is 
not sufficient data to make this a finding of the research.
11 It is also worth considering the potential impact of JUG on the quality of policy­
making. If proponents of JUG hold up opening the policy- and decision-making 
process to the greatest number of stakeholders as a means to an end (the end being 
better policy-making), there a danger that, in achieving a joined-up policy process, 
the policy goal can become focused on maintaining it; on keeping the all of the policy 
actors within the process. In this way, JUG can become an end in itself. Of course, 
whether or not this has any negative, or indeed, measurable impact on the 
effectiveness of joined-up policy initiatives is something that can only be examined 
through an assessment or evaluation on policy outcomes. This, as is mentioned 
elsewhere in this study, is beyond the scope of the research design, but could be 
explored in future work.
12 It is important at this point to draw a clear distinction between variable 7 (the age 
of the competent political institution) and variable 1 (the level of existing policy­
making capacity). Relationships between policy actors that are the consequence of 
under-capacity are non-elective in the sense that (usually) government actors are
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forced to trust other actors in order to proceed with the business of policy-making. In 
contrast, the age of the competent political institution affects relationships that are 
qualitatively quite different. Institutional trust is a function of time; a continuity of 
interaction between organisations, a shared experience of a policy problem, a 
common heritage of achievement. There is some superficial overlap between the 
variables that can not be ignored. For example, the greater continuity between, on 
the one hand, the Scottish Office and the Scottish Executive and, on the other, the 
Welsh Office and the National Assembly, has influenced both the policy-making 
capacity of the Scottish Executive and the possibility of institutionalised relationships 
spanning the period of constitutional change. However, it does not follow that 
greater policy-making capacity leads to more institutionalised trust relationships or 
vice versa. The two are in fact mutually exclusive. For this reason they are included as 
separate variables.
13 It is, of course, technically inaccurate to talk in terms of a 'Welsh' or 'Scottish' civil 
service as both remain branches of the UK system, sharing its recruitment processes 
among many other features.
7
Theoretical reflection: is a joined-up governance 
approach a challenge to the network paradigm?
The analysis in chapter 5 identified a number of key policy processes and outputs in 
the special educational needs (SEN) policy area in Scotland and Wales as examples 
of joined-up government (JUG) in action. Although there was no evidence of a 
normative "culture of collaboration' in either nation, policy actors of all descriptions 
entered into 'goodwill' trust relationships and pooled policy- and decision-making 
sovereignty in a variety of ways. While this finding has clear empirical significance, 
particularly as an indicator of the conditions which influence the nature and extent 
of joined-up thinking and action in a given policy context, it also raises some 
important theoretical and conceptual questions: what motivates policy actors to 
collaborate in this way? How can close trust relationships between powerful 
governmental actors and small, relatively poorly-resourced groups be explained? 
And, more broadly, does the principle of resource exchange -  the basis of the 
network approach - provide an adequate account of interaction within joined-up 
policy processes? This chapter reflects on the contribution a JUG approach can make
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to the way tine policy- and decision-making process is described, explained and 
conceptualised.
The first section of the chapter re-examines SEN policy processes and outputs in 
Wales through the conceptual lens of the network.1 It is argued that the National 
Assembly's Education and Lifelong Learning Committee (the ELL Committee) acted 
as such a pro-active and effective decision-maker during the period of study that it 
may legitimately be positioned alongside government actors in what is termed the 
'policy-making centre'. There then follows a detailed examination of the 
relationships between the centre and the various groups seeking to influence SEN 
policy in Wales. It is shown that the great majority of those groups observed the 
'rules of the game' and sought to operate from a position 'inside' the policy process. 
However, it is also shown that, despite following the same broad strategy, such 
groups did not enjoy the same status; the centre was more receptive to some 
'insiders' than others and there were clear differences in group effectiveness as a 
consequence. An attempt is then made to explain these differences in effectiveness in 
terms of resource exchange, and some of the most effective groups are shown to 
have been able to access or mobilise a variety of resources which helped the centre 
formulate and implement policy in different ways. On this basis, and following 
Grant Jordan et al (1992; see chapter 2: 33-34), the groups involved are divided into 
less influential, 'peripheral' insiders and more influential, 'specialist' insiders. It is 
cautiously concluded that SEN policy actors in Wales participated in a network 
which shared some important features of Rod Rhodes' (1988; with Marsh 1992) 
'producer' type.
The second section of the chapter argues that the mechanism of 'resource 
dependency', which is central to the network approach and acts as the conceptual 
glue which holds actors together in 'producer' networks, only partially explains a 
number of key relationships within the SEN policy network in Wales, particularly 
those between small, relatively poorly-resourced groups like Autism Cymru and 
powerful government actors. It is argued that the network approach does not 
therefore provide an entirely satisfactory account of policy processes and outputs in 
the case study.
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However, the final section restates the finding in chapter 6 that powerful actors, in 
particular, chose to pool policy- and decision-making sovereignty in all of the case 
studies only when they perceived limited institutional risk. Even where there was 
strong evidence of joined-up thinking and action, institutional interests remained the 
main dynamic of interaction between policy actors. For this reason, a JUG approach 
is described as a useful way of viewing the policy- and decision-making process 
under certain conditions and one that complements, rather than fundamentally 
challenges, the network paradigm.
7.1 SEN policy processes and outputs through the conceptual lens of the network
This section re-examines SEN policy processes and outputs in Wales through the 
conceptual lens of the network. The central aim of the section is to describe and 
classify the SEN policy network in Wales by referring to the typology of networks 
posited by Rhodes; that is, to position the SEN network somewhere between Rhodes' 
'policy community' and 'issue network' poles (1988; with Marsh 1992; see chapter 2: 
27-29).
The starting point for the analysis is the role of the legislature in the SEN policy 
process in Wales. Chapters 4 and 5 showed the ELL Committee to be a key player in 
the SEN policy process, acting pro-actively when taking the decision to undertake its 
review of SEN policy, and acting effectively in that its recommendations were 
accepted by the responsible Minister and subsequently translated into real policy 
change (see chapter 4: 75; chapter 5: 117-121). Although it is necessary to emphasise 
the role of the ELL Committee in this way, it is important not to do so at the expense 
of the Assembly government. The Minister for Education and Lifelong Learning and, 
to a lesser extent, the Minister for Health and Social Services, also acted as effective 
decision-makers, jointly developing a number of key policies quite independently of 
the ELL Committee. Indeed, in accepting and acting on the ELL Committee's 
recommendations, the Assembly government made a clear choice to co-operate with 
the legislature; as such, the ability of the ELL Committee to perform its policy­
making function was to some extent dependent on its good working relationship 
with Ministers. For these reasons, the ELL Committee can be positioned alongside the
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Assembly government in the 'centre' of the SEN policy network: though both 
demonstrated their capacity to act autonomously, they also showed willingness to 
co-operate.
As is noted elsewhere, both the government and legislative actors occupying this 
centre demonstrated a broad commitment to engage with a full array of policy actors 
(see chapter 5: 75-80). In doing so, however, they became the focus of a range of 
lobbying strategies.
7.1.1 Interest groups and the centre: strategies and status
If the basic criteria are used to test for 'insider' status, then the great majority of 
groups seeking to influence SEN policy in Wales during the period of study passed 
the test with some ease. All of the groups that took part in the consultation exercises 
that formed part of the ELL Committee's review, for example, were willing to take 
part on the ELL Committee's terms and, more importantly, were clearly 'regarded as 
legitimate' by the ELL Committee (Grant 1999: 19). Indeed, when the formal and 
informal consultation exercises commissioned by the Assembly government are also 
taken into account2, it is clear that there were literally scores of groups and 
organisations within the SEN policy network with some kind of 'consultative 
relationship' with the centre. This, of course, is not altogether surprising. It was 
noted in chapter 2 (32-33) that the principal weakness of a simple insider-outsider 
distinction is that it often fails to draw any real distinction at all: the great majority of 
groups strive for insider status and, when its basic definition is followed, find it 
relatively easy to achieve (Page 1999).
It is clear, however, that some groups within the SEN policy process had closer 
relationships with the centre than others. The links between Afasic Cymru and the 
centre have already been noted, but are worth briefly re-emphasising as an example 
(see chapter 3, p.37). Afasic Cymru was involved at every stage of the ELL 
Committee's review of SEN policy, both in its own right and in its capacity as a key 
member of the Welsh Advisory Group on Special Educational Needs (WAGSEN) 
and the Special Educational Needs Reference Group (SENRG). It was also closely 
involved in the Speech and Language Therapy Action Group's (SALTAG) influential
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work on speech and language therapy (SLT) provision in Wales. As such, Afasic 
Cymru enjoyed considerable formal access to both ELL Committee members and 
Ministers and was fully incorporated by the centre. Claire Moyle, the organisation's 
Director, also confirmed in an interviewee conducted as part of the research that she 
had  enjoyed a close relationship with key decision-makers in Cardiff Bay during the 
period of study and was a familiar face to a number of ministers (Interview 1). As if 
to confirm this close, fully incorporated status, the group announced in February 
2005 that the Assembly government is now its most significant source of funding 
(Afasic 2006a).
Afasic Cymru is joined by a small number of insider groups who can also 
justifiably claim to have the ear of the centre. One such group is SNAP Cymru which, 
as well as being a key contributor to all of the consultation exercises discussed so far, 
had an influential presence as a member of both the SENRG and WAGSEN. 
Furthermore, its director, Denise Inger, was a main signatory on most SENRG and 
WAGSEN documents submitted to the ELL Committee (e.g. ELLC Apr 1 2004). As 
such, SNAP Cymru's representatives acted as expert advisors to both the ELL 
Committee and the Assembly government on every aspect of SEN policy in Wales, 
giving the group unrivalled access to elite policy-making circles.3 The NAS was also 
a ubiquitous presence in consultations and was similarly well-represented on 
advisory groups. As such, it can also be said to have been fully incorporated by the 
centre (although there is less evidence that its senior representatives enjoyed a close, 
informal relationship with the centre).
The increasing closeness of these groups' relations with the centre is reflected in 
the rapid development of each of their organisational bases since devolution. Afasic 
and SNAP had no permanent offices in Wales prior to devolution but their new 
Welsh sub-divisions have quickly established regional offices in North Wales as well 
as central headquarters in Cardiff (Afasic 2006b; SNAP 2006). The NAS has stopped 
short of creating a dedicated Welsh sub-division, but nonetheless has seen its 
number of offices in Wales increase since 1999 to the extent that its network of 
volunteers now operates in every region of Wales (NAS 2006). Moreover, Afasic and 
SNAP have both established dedicated annual conferences in Wales which have
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opened up new forums for policy discussion and created new opportunities for 
formal and informal consultation with policy-makers. In this way, these highly 
regarded groups have been able to cultivate their relationships with policy-makers 
by actively engaging the centre.
All of this can be contrasted with the relationships between the centre and the 
majority of other insider groups. For example, the Welsh Initiative for Conductive 
Education (WICE) was involved in the ELL Committee's review of SEN policy and 
was invited to speak briefly at one ELL Committee meeting (ELLC Mar 5 2003). It 
was not, however, involved at any other stage of consultation, did not sit on any of 
the key advisory groups and could not claim any informal access to key decision­
makers.4 As such, WICE, like the majority of insider groups, was only partially 
incorporated by the centre.
It is apparent, then, that both the ELL Committee and the Assembly government 
held some groups to be more reliable and more authoritative than others, and that 
they granted those groups elevated status in the SEN policy process by consulting 
them more regularly, in a greater variety of contexts and by giving their 
representatives high status seats on the various advisory groups. A key question, 
however, is why such groups were so closely consulted.
7.1.2 Pressure groups and resource dependency
The delivery of SEN provision in Wales, as in the whole of the UK, depends to some 
extent on the expertise and specialist services provided (or otherwise facilitated) by 
voluntary organisations (see e.g. ELLC 2004a: para. 3.2). Without the specialist SLT 
services provided by organisations like Afasic Cymru, the unique advocacy package 
offered by SNAP Cymru or the Welsh-specific expertise of Autism Cymru, the 
quality and effectiveness of provision of SEN services in Wales would be diminished. 
Indeed, the crucial role played by the non-governmental sector in SEN provision in 
Wales has been expressly recognised by the Assembly government on a number of 
occasions, with voluntary service providers described as 'major players', whose 
main attraction is that they are 'in touch with local communities' and 'able to
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provide flexible and responsive services which the market and the statutory sectors 
cannot adequately provide /  (NAW 2000).
The main resources groups possess in the context of SEN policy can be classified 
as follows:
• Expertise refers to a group's specialist knowledge of a given policy area and, just 
as important, to the extent to which that knowledge is in dem and. Where a 
particular brand of expertise is at a premium, those who possess it have a 
particularly valuable resource.
• Service refers to the specialist services groups may be able to deliver and the 
extent to which those services can only be obtained through that group. A group 
may offer a service that the centre identifies as being vital for the effective 
implementation of a given policy and, moreover, that service may be uniquely 
provided  by that group.
•  Support refers to the ability of certain groups to legitimately speak on behalf of a 
section of society that will be directly affected by a given policy. This resource 
can be particularly valuable if the centre is convinced that a group has the 
legitimacy and wherewithal to 'sell' a policy to a particular audience.
Among the large number of groups knocking on the door of SEN decision-makers 
in Wales were a small number who possessed resources of this kind. Although the 
door seemed to be open to all, it was only these groups that were invited inside. It is 
no surprise to find that the highly regarded groups identified above each possessed 
one or more key resources (see Table 7.1). However, of equal importance to the 
possession of resources is what groups did with them. The way groups made the 
link between what they wanted what they had to offer is thus a key focus for analysis.
7.1.3 Pressure groups and the language of bargaining
Beifore turning to the rhetorical strategies pursued by the representatives of groups, 
it iis necessary to note the effect the public nature of consultation exercises had on the 
kind of language used. Not only were all ELL Committee meetings open to public 
galleries, they were transcribed and published online, occasionally televised and 
regularly 'webcast7.5 Under this kind of public scrutiny, the basic language of 
bargaining -  of Til scratch your back, if you scratch mine' -  inevitably gave way to 
mcore sophisticated forms of negotiation.
Most contributions to the ELL Committee's review of SEN policy took place on an 
informational level. That is to say, representatives detailed 'on the ground'
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experiences of how particular SEN policies work (or fail to work) in practice. Much 
of the evidence provided by local authorities took this form: representatives of 
Denbighshire LEA and Conwy and Denbighshire NHS Trust, for example, detailed 
the problems of 'under-resourcing' in SLT provision in North Wales and described 
their successes in using the Flexibilities Support Grant (FSG)6 to fund collaborative 
projects in Rhyl. However, there was no evaluation of the current situation and no 
recommendations were made as to how SEN provision might be improved (ELLC 
Jan 28 2004).
Table 7.1 Selected SEN pressure groups and their principal resources
Group (selected) Principal resources
National Autism Society 
(NAS)
Support -  the NAS claimed to be 'uniquely positioned' 
to comment on SEN policy because it could 
legitimately claim to represent children with autism, 
their families and carers (NAS 2005).
Special Needs Advisory 
Group (SNAP) Cymru
Services and Expertise -  it is fair to say that without 
SNAP Cymru's specialist advocacy services, many of 
the policy innovations discussed in this study would 
be entirely unworkable in practice. This is certainly
recognised within government. When Jane Hutt was 
Minister for Health and Social Services she regularly 
praised SNAP Cymru's 'well-established track record' 
in providing a vital means of helping parents 
overcome 'the complex administrative procedures 
[they] have to confront' (NHS Wales 2000).
Afasic Cymru Expertise, services and support -  Afasic Cymru is a 
leading authority on SLT, the key provider of SLT 
services and training in Wales and the main 
representative of those children and young people 
with SLCD, their families and carers.
By contrast, contributors representing groups with resources tended to use the 
review as an opportunity to lobby the ELL Committee. The following contribution by 
Derdse Inger, the director of SNAP Cymru, is a case in point:
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Assessments should take place at integrated centres ... where specialists come to 
them ... where parents receive information,, advice and support from the 
independent supporter services only SNAP provides.
(ELLC Apr 20 2005)
Even from this brief excerpt (and taking into account the public nature of the 
proceedings), Inger's strategy is clear. She begins by identifying a lack of co­
ordination in the assessment of the needs of children with SEN as a policy problem; 
she then puts forward the creation of integrated assessment centres as a preferred 
policy solution; significantly, she concludes by suggesting that this change can only 
be effected with the support of SNAP Cymru, in the form of the unique advocacy 
and information service it provides.
Outside the framework of the review, pressure groups employed similar 
strategies. Consider as an example the following recommendation made to SALT AG 
by the NAS:
It is recommended that local authorities should consider the option of regional 
planning to create specialist [SLT] provision for children requiring support in 
resourced provision. The NAS would like to see the implementation of regionally co­
ordinated provision for children with autism.
(NAS 2005)
This found its way almost verbatim into SALT AG's report on SLT services in Wales 
which, as has been noted elsewhere, greatly influenced the Assembly government's 
decision to set up regional SLT schemes in Wales (SALTAG 2003). More pertinent, 
however, is the fact that, immediately prior to making this recommendation to 
SALTAG, the NAS very carefully set out its credentials as the 'voice' of autism 
sufferers and their carers in Wales and explained how this put it in a 'unique 
position' from which it could legitimately 'comment on matters of public policy 
relating to autism' (NAS 2005). In other words, the NAS's recommendation came 
with an implied promise that it could 'sell' the proposed policy to some of those it 
was most likely to affect: namely, its own members.7
Some statutory bodies used their own more considerable resources in similar 
ways. For example, in giving evidence to the ELL Committee, Estyn made the 
following recommendation:
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More initial and update training is needed for teachers to help them to identify and 
assess needs and pupil progress. A particular 'SEN focus' is needed on curriculum 
differentiation, performance measurement and target setting. Teachers need training 
in those specific strategies which do work for many children.
(ELLC Oct 16 2003)
This found its way into the ELL Committee's own recommendations to the Minister 
for Education and Lifelong Learning:
The Assembly Government ... should give particular attention to the need for all 
newly qualified teachers to have a better understanding of SEN; particularly in 
techniques for early identification
(ELLC 2004a: para. 3.31)
It is certainly arguable that Estyn was successful in its aim to develop policy that 
would improve the standard of SEN teacher training and, more pertinently, that this 
success was firmly founded on its unique expertise. Indeed, the ELL Committee 
stated as much on a number of occasions, explaining that many of its 
recommendations, including that reproduced above, reflected Estyn's 'indisputable 
expertise' (ELLC Oct 16 2003).
The large number of insider groups seeking to influence SEN policy in Wales can 
therefore be divided into a majority of less influential, 'peripheral' insiders and a 
minority of more influential, 'specialist' insiders (Jordan et al 1992; see chapter 2, 
p.20). The former have few resources, relatively low status within the SEN network, 
and little bargaining power. The latter are seen by the centre as reliable and 
authoritative, have resources which the centre needs for the effective 
implementation of policy and, most significantly, are able to successfully translate 
both those things into something that it is tempting to describe as a bargaining-based, 
or 'exchange' relationship with the centre.8
7.1.4 A segmented, 'producer7 network?
The SEN policy network in Wales shares some key features with Rhodes' 'producer' 
type (1988; with Marsh 1992). It was explained in chapter 2 that such a network is 
characterised by a series of interdependent relationships between the centre and a 
small number of non-governmental actors, or 'producers', who deliver the services 
and provide the expertise on which the centre depends for the effective formulation
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and implementation of policy. The SEN network in Wales is certainly characterised 
by the same kind of relationships, with specialist insiders possessing the same kinds 
of resources.
However, there are also a large number of peripheral insiders in the SEN network 
which do not feature in Rhodes' ideal-type. These groups are not entirely excluded 
by the main players, as would be the case in a policy community, but are instead 
partially incorporated by the centre. It is important not to ignore these groups because 
they are undoubtedly involved to some extent in SEN policy-making and, as such, 
form part of the SEN network. For this reason, this section develops the concept of a 
segmented producer network, in which there is a 'core' of centre-producer 
relationships and a more loosely integrated 'periphery', inhabited by a larger 
number of less influential groups.9
7.4.1.5 The centre-producer core
At the core of the SEN network are the ELL Committee and the Assembly 
government and a small number of specialist insiders, or producers (Fig. 7.1). The 
centre and the producers have relationships that are to some extent based on 
resource exchange. However, there are no such relationships between the producers 
themselves. Afasic Cymru and the NAS, for example, did not have an exchange 
relationship as neither was dependent on or interested in the other's resources. As 
such, the core of the network is not as highly integrated as a policy community, in 
which all actors develop mutually dependent relationships (see chapter 2: 27-29).
An important part of analysing policy networks is the stability of core 
membership (see chapter 2: 26). However, it is difficult to assess the stability of core 
membership in this case because there has not been a sufficient period during which 
SEN policy has been made at the devolved level. For that reason, what follows 
necessarily takes the form of speculation. Some actors, like Afasic Cymru, SNAP 
Cymru and Estyn, have been routinely involved in the various initiatives, 
consultations and reviews that have taken place since 1999. As such, the 
relationships these groups and organisations have with the centre are as close to 
being institutionalised relationships as one could expect to find after so short a period
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of time. However, the apparent permanency of these relationships (with the possible 
exception of Estyn) may be misleading. Within the area of SEN policy it is to be 
expected that the focus of policy-making will change over time. The focus in the 
period covered in this study was very clearly on SLT and ASD, and Afasic Cymru, 
by far the best-resourced SLT pressure group in Wales, along with Autism Cymru, 
the only indigenously-Welsh ASD organisation, assumed positions of prominence 
and solidity within the network based largely on the contribution they could make 
to policy in those specific areas.10 However, it is likely that the focus will move away 
from SLT and ASD at some point in the future. Somewhat perversely, this is more 
likely should the policies Afasic Cymru and Autism Cymru has been influential in 
shaping be successful. If such a shift should occur, the bargaining position of Afasic 
Cymru and Autism Cymru will be greatly weakened and their status as a highly 
regarded specialist insiders may be eroded. Smith (1993: 229) makes the general 
point:
Even in the case of the most apparently influential groups ... they only establish 
institutional relations once state actors have decided, for a range of reasons, to adopt 
a particular policy ... frequently [such groups are] used to achieve state goals'
By definition, specialist insiders thrive in very specific conditions and changes in 
those conditions can lead quite quickly to their demise as influential policy actors. A 
consequence of this is that some fluctuation in core membership is likely to occur 
over time and, on this basis, the boundary of the core is best described as being 
porous to some inward and outward movement. That there should be some 
fluctuation in the membership of a producer network is entirely consistent with 
Rhodes' classification and the porous nature of the boundary between the core and 
the periphery is significant because it creates the possibility that groups can move 
between the two.
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Fig. 7.1 The network 'core'
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At the core of the SEN policy network is a series of interdependent relationships 
between the 'centre' (the Assembly government and the ELL Committee) and a 
number of specialist insiders, or 'producers', from the voluntary and statutory sectors 
(a selection of these actors is shown). The boundary of the core is porous to a degree 
due to the potential that a change in policy focus by the centre would decrease its 
dependence on the expertise and services provided by particular specialist insiders.
7.1.6 The periphery
Beyond the core is a hinterland inhabited by a large number of partially incorporated, 
'peripheral' insiders (Fig 7.2). Accounting for the existence of this periphery is 
difficult, as it is not clear what difference its absence would make to the nature of 
SEN policy processes and outputs. It may be that peripheral insiders are not really 
part of the network at all and that their partial incorporation is the result of a mere 
rhetorical commitment to consult with stake-holders on the part of the centre; maybe 
as the result of a superficial attempt to present themselves as being committed to 
JUG, However, it may also be the case that among these groups are some insiders 
waiting for their own particular specialisms -  their own resources - to be required by 
the centre. It is plausible that a shift in policy focus towards motor disorders, for 
example, would quite quickly result in groups like SCOPE Cymru, WICE and the 
NNATPIP being more fully incorporated by the centre and taking up positions 
within the core. Although there is no evidence that this has happened in the short 
history of devolved SEN policy-making (there is also no evidence of a change in
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policy focus), it may be beneficial to conceptualise the periphery as a kind of 
'recruiting ground' for specialist insiders. The partial incorporation of peripheral 
insiders may be a means by which the centre can maintain relations with groups in 
anticipation of their resources may be needed in the future.
Fig. 7.2 The SEN policy network in Wales: a segmented,'producer' network?
The SEN policy network in Wales is 
a producer network at its core. 
However, the network is segmented. 
Its periphery is inhabited by a large 
number of partially incorporated 
groups with little bargaining power 
and negligible influence on policy­
makers - peripheral insiders who are 
more casually engaged by the centre 
than their specialist counterparts.
It is also important to note that some actors had relationships with the centre that 
were so infrequently consummated by consultation that those actors are best 
positioned 'beyond' the periphery of the policy network. The groups whose 
involvement was restricted to the written consultation exercises of the ELL 
Committee's review are possible examples. The individual schools and parents who 
contributed in this way had no resources with which to bargain and, just as 
important, had none which are likely to put them in a position from which to 
bargain in the future. Though consulted, these groups were not part of the SEN 
network.
It seems from this analysis that the mechanism of resource dependency and 
principle of resource exchange go some way to explaining policy relationships 
within the SEN policy network. However, it is far from clear whether the influence 
of some actors and their closeness to key decision-makers was proportional to (and
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therefore entirely a function of) the resources they could access or mobilise. Was the 
place reserved at the top table of policy-making for, for example, Autism Cymru or 
SNAP Cymru, really due to the bargaining chips they had with which to play the 
game? Or was their relationship with the actors in the policy-making centre based on 
some other characteristic of those organisations? The following section asks whether 
an interests-based account of SEN policy-making in Wales is adequate and considers 
the contribution a JUG approach can make to a more nuanced understanding of 
policy relationships in a joined-up context.
7.4 Does an interests-based approach adequately explain SEN policy-making?
Chapter 2 asked whether evidence of a genuinely joined-up policy-making 
'universe' might represent an empirical challenge to the network literature. The basis 
for this question was the apparent inconsistency between, on the one hand, a 
network literature that explains policy relationships in terms of the resources actors 
use to bargain with and, on the other, a JUG doctrine that seems to require actors of 
all descriptions - regardless of their resources - to pool policy- and decision-making 
sovereignty. It was concluded in chapter 5 that a 'culture of collaboration' has not 
emerged in any of the policy areas taken as case studies and, as such, a joined-up 
policy-making 'universe' can not be detected. Such a normative commitment to JUG 
would clearly have represented a significant challenge to the network paradigm as it 
would have replaced the role of resources within networks with collaboration as a 
function of a normalised and embedded set of rules for good governance. In the 
absence of such a culture, however, some of the close policy relationships in the SEN 
policy area in Wales require more detailed consideration.
The key point to make here is that, while the resources of actors in the SEN policy 
network do, to some extent, explain their relationships with the policy-making 
centre, there are a number of relationships which do not have the same simply- 
defined producer relationship. Uppermost in this list is the relationship between the 
Assembly government and the ELL Committee at the policy-making 'centre'. Why 
should this relationship exist? It is not based on the resources the ELL Committee 
brings to the table (aside, perhaps from some sort of democratic legitimacy) and
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therefore can not be accounted for adequately using the network approach.11 Just as 
significant is the apparent imbalance between the high levels of influence certain 
third sector actors had on policy and the tiny resources they were able to access or 
mobilise.
There are two highly instructive comparisons which can be made here. The first is 
between two Autism charities working in Wales; namely the NAS and Autism 
Cymru. Both had similar resources, both were consulted formally in precisely the 
same way during, for example, the ELL Committee's SEN review, but both did not 
have a similar degree of informal access to decision-makers or influence over policy. 
It was argued in chapter 6 (135-136) that the very close relationship between Autism 
Cymru and a number of key policy- and decision-makers in the Assembly 
government (including the Minister and civil servant taking ASD policy forward at 
that time) was 'overlaid with social content7 and had an inter-personal as well as 
inter-organisational dimension. Crucially, there is no evidence that NAS had built up 
the same kind of relationship based on individual trust. The second comparison is 
between Afasic Cymru and Afasic Scotland. Again, these two SLT organisations 
were similarly resourced and were consulted formally in similar ways. However, 
while the Welsh variant had a close relationship with key policy- and decision­
makers in the Assembly government, Afasic Scottish, in sharp contrast, had only 
enjoyed (and only pursued) ministerial contact in formal settings. In the same way, 
this difference in influence may be accounted for by differences in the social content 
within the two organisations' relationships with decision-makers. Although Ann 
Auchterlonie, the Director of Afasic Scotland, did not make the connection expressly 
during the interview conducted for the research, she indicated that her location in 
Dundee, as opposed to Edinburgh, made it difficult for her to benefit from the 
smaller scale in Scotland in the same way as some of her peers (Interview 14). This 
was not a problem for Claire Moyle, Auchterlonie's counterpart in Wales, for whom 
the key policy- and decision-makers were located literally on the same street as her 
own office and were 'almost on first name terms' with her as a result. Moyle was in 
no doubt that individual trust was at the core of her close relationship with decision­
makers (Interview 1).
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This variation in the kind of relationship with government actors developed by 
similarly resourced actors operating in the same policy area makes it necessary for 
the segmented 'producer7 network identified above -  and, more specifically, the 
'centre-producer core7 that was identified within in - to be reconsidered. Within the 
core (membership of which was said to be determined by the resources producers 
could access or mobilise) some actors had closer, more influential relationships with 
key decision-makers than others, despite their having no obvious advantage in terms 
of resources. These, then, were members of a more exclusive, 'inner core7 (Fig 7.3). 
Crucially, membership of this inner core relied on the policy relationship becoming 
overlaid with social content. It is clear that the role of individual trust is therefore an 
important variable and potentially a conceptually useful mechanism, particularly in 
a policy context where policy actors are demonstrating a commitment to JUG.
Some accounts of the policy process, like that put forward by Rhodes, tend to 
conceive of "atomised7, faceless policy actors operating with a corporate mindset. 
Such accounts have been criticised for being 'under-socialised7 (Granovetter 1985: 
481). Clearly, there is a danger in analysing policy relationships down (quite literally 
in the case of Afasic Cymru) to street level, that one may 'over-socialise7 the account 
of policy- and decision-making.. However, the analysis here has shown that 
individual trust helps to account for policy relationships which the network 
literature finds impossible to fully explain in resource terms.12
Fig. 7.3 The social dimension to the SEN network: an 'inner core'?
Admission to the centre-producer 
core is determined by the resources 
an actor can access or mobilise. 
However, some actors with similar 
resources have qualitatively 
different relationships with key 
decision-makers. The case study 
research suggests that the closest 
kinds of relationship are 
characterised by and founded upon 
social content, as well as the 
exchange of resources. These two 
factors combine to admit actors to 
what is described as an /inner core'.
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It may not be over-exaggerating the significance of these relationships in the 
inner-core to say that they are a function of the JUG doctrine becoming established 
as a set of legitimised (if not yet embedded or normalised) rules for good governance. 
The only thing which brings some organisations into the very heart of the policy- 
and decision-making process is a choice on the part of powerful government actors 
to behave in that way.
Of course, there are important limitations which restrict the utility of this 
explanation and prevent individual trust being put forward as a serious challenge to 
resource exchange. The analysis in chapter 6 reached the conclusion that, in the ACL 
case studies in both nations, actors of all descriptions perceived there to be an 
unacceptably high level of institutional risk involved in pooling policy- and 
decision-making sovereignty. In this sense, powerful actors made the choice not to 
open out the policy- and decision-making process in the name of JUG. Put 
differently, the institutional interests, particularly of well-resourced actors -  the very 
core of the network approach -  remained the principal motivating factor in the way 
policy actors behaved. Where actors perceived there to be limited institutional risk in 
the SEN case studies, a commitment to the principles of JUG led them into the kinds 
of close policy relationships that do not necessary have an interests-based 
explanation. However, the first consideration of all policy actors remained their own 
interests.13
7.5 What are the implications of a JUG approach for the network paradigm?
The key overall finding for this chapter is that policy actors behave essentially in line 
with the interest-based explanation set out in the policy network literature. However, 
where actors feel little jeopardy -  that is, they are confident they can enter into trust 
relationships with other, often less well-resourced actors, without their own 
institutional interests or broad expectations for the nature and trajectory of policy 
development being adversely affected -  they are prepared to pool policy- and 
decision-making sovereignty. In these conditions, the dynamics of resource exchange 
cease to be an adequate way of explaining the nature of policy-making.
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The analysis in chapters 5 and 6 showed that these conditions were more likely to 
happen in small scale policy contexts where there is an opportunity for policy 
relationships to become overlaid with social content and, therefore, enhanced with a 
social dimension. This means that a JUG approach - while not representing a 
challenge to the core, interests-based explanation contained in the network literature 
-  does, nonetheless, provide an additional theoretical framework for engaging with 
the behaviour of policy actors under certain conditions. In short, the more joined-up 
policy making is, the more a JUG approach is required to understand the policy 
relationships involved.
Conclusion
This chapter has considered the explanatory utility of a JUG approach by first 
examining the SEN case study in Wales through the conceptual lens of the network. 
It was argued that, while the mechanism of resource dependency and principle of 
resource exchange go some way to explaining the SEN network in Wales as a 
segmented 'producer' type, this approach does not offer an adequate explanation of 
some close policy relationships that are not proportional to the resources involved. It 
was argued that a JUG approach can help explain these relationships by locating 
them within a collaboration agenda and by identifying high levels of individual trust 
as an important variable.
However, the chapter concluded that the explanatory utility of a JUG approach 
does not amount to a challenge to the network paradigm. Actors are only prepared 
to pool policy- and decision-making sovereignty with poorly-resourced actors where 
they perceive limited institutional risk. As such, an interests-based explanation of the 
policy process remains the most convincing. A JUG approach, far from challenging 
the network paradigm, can complement it by helping identify and explain close 
policy relationships where there does not appear to be a clear resource basis.
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Notes to chapter 7
1 The Welsh case study is chosen as the principal focus in this chapter because the 
policy relationships identified within it in chapters 5 and 6 appear to be the most 
qualitatively distinct and, as such, represent the greatest potential challenge to the 
interests-based account of the policy process put forward in the network literature. 
SEN in Scotland shares many of the features of the Welsh SEN network and is not 
considered separately in the interests of brevity. The ACL case studies are not 
reanalysed as the analysis in chapter 5 showed clearly that ACL policy processes and 
outputs in both nations were not particularly joined-up. While there is considerable 
scope to deepen understanding of JUG through a consideration of why obstacles to 
JUG existed in this policy area, ACL does not represent a challenge to the 
paradigmatic way of conceptualising, describing and explaining the policy process in 
any way. In simple terms, actors in the ACL policy area in both jurisdictions acted in 
ways that correspond quite closely with the network account - that is, they declined 
to pool- policy and decision-making sovereignty precisely because of the perceived 
risk to their narrow institutional interests - and further analysis can therefore 
contribute little to any theoretical refection.
2 The consultation undertaken in the process of drafting the All Wales ASD Strategy 
is perhaps the best example.
3 The influence of members of the SENRG on the shape of SEN policy in Wales was 
emphasised in the interview with Peter Black, the Chair of the ELL Committee:
I'm not sure that any evidence-giver was held in higher regard than any other. What I 
will say, however, is that sifting through the evidence involved subjective assessment . 
of what was and wasn't a suitable proposal and we were very much led through that 
process by key members of the [SENRG].
(Interview 9)
Mr Black also emphasised the close relationship and influential policy-making role 
of SNAP Cymru during the interview (see chapter 6:148-149).
4 It may indicate the regard in which WICE was held by the ELL Committee that it 
does not appear that its contribution to the review was published.
5 See www.webcastingwales.org
6 For the purpose and funding arrangements associated with the FSG, see chapter 1: 
75.
7 The NAS's aims in producing such recommendations are beyond doubt. All of its 
contributions to consultation exercises (including those reproduced in this study) 
appear on its website under the unambiguous headings of 'Influencing Government' 
and 'Influencing Parliament' (NAS 2006).
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8 It is necessary to note at this stage that the resources available to many of these 
third sector organisations and the very close, influential relationships they developed 
with key policy- and decision-makers in Wales during the period of study do not 
seem to be necessarily proportional. Denise Inger, the Director of SNAP Cymru, is a 
case in point. She may have used the language of bargaining in her evidence to the 
ELL Committee, but the resources she pointed to can not be used to fully explain the 
kind of relationship Inger had with, for example, Peter Black, the Chair of ELL 
Committee. Inger was chosen by Black in part of the interview reproduced in chapter 
6 (148-149), as an example of certain individuals who were very close to ministers 
and other senior individuals and able to influence policy greatly as a direct 
consequence. It does not seem that it was simply the bargaining chips Inger had with 
which to play the game that brought SNAP Cymru to the top table. This points 
towards a different dynamic in these particular relationships between policy actors 
and the question of how these close relationships can be explained is explored below, 
pp. 173-176.
9 This periphery may well be a function of the JUG doctrine. Whereas actors with no 
resources would once have been excluded from the process of consultation, 
government actors now engage in a process of consultation that at least places the 
views of such actors on the record. While these actors can not be credited with any 
individual influence on the nature and trajectory of policy- and decision-making, it is 
reasonable to suggest that they may form part of a collectively influential voice in 
some cases. Crucially, any influence of this collective voice could not be explained in 
terms of resource dependency or resource exchange.
10 Indeed, SLT is the only specific area of SEN provision that is mentioned in The 
Learning Country (NAW 2001). As such, it has been a key SEN policy focus 
throughout the short lifetime of the Assembly. However, it may be hasty to explain 
the influence of Afasic as being a result of a chosen policy focus; it can not be 
discounted that the organisation was at least partially responsible for shaping this 
focus in the first place.
11 It is interesting to note that, had a similar re-examination been conducted of SEN 
policy processes and outputs in the Scottish context, the same close relationship 
between the Scottish Executive and the Education, Culture and Sport Committee of 
the Scottish Parliament would have been identified. It is difficult to account for these 
relationships in resource terms and, as is noted above, the government actors in both 
case studies had a clear choice whether or not to cooperate closely with the 
legislature. That they chose to do so may well have been motivated by a commitment 
to JUG, in which case it is necessary to add an additional layer of analysis to a 
straight-forward interests-based network approach.
12 It is important to note here that the role of individual trust and the salience of JUG 
as a concept are inextricably linked. Those actors who enter into close trust 
relationships that have this kind of additional social dimension do so not simply to 
service that relationship, but also from a basic recognition that JUG is equal to good
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governance. This is not the same as a 'culture of collaboration' being at work -  as is 
noted elsewhere, such a culture requires actors to act with normative trust and does 
not require actor-specific knowledge which is, after all, the bedrock of individual 
trust -  but it does hint at the power of the JUG doctrine for informing the kinds of 
relationships that emerge when the conditions are right.
13 It may be worth speculating, however, that there was a degree of institutional risk 
involved in working so closely with these groups in the SEN policy areas. As Keith 
Ingham, the Head of Children's Health and Social Services at the Assembly 
government admitted in the interview conducted as part of the research, trusting 
groups like Autism Cymru to take forward policy in an acceptable way, almost on 
the government's behalf, 'carries its risks' and leaves '[the government] potentially a 
lot more exposed ...' (Interview 12). Depending on how much one chooses to read 
into this comment, the idea that a genuine commitment to the principles of JUG 
could act as an explanatory mechanism within the network may become more 
plausible.
8
Conclusion
The devolution literature, while providing a range of insights into the nature and 
impact of a new pattern of governance in Scotland and Wales, does not sufficiently 
interrogate claims that the devolved context in the two nations is a better site for 
coordinated, inclusive policy-making (see chapter 1: 4-6). This study has examined 
the impact of devolution on policy processes and outputs in Scotland and Wales in 
order to test the thesis that a distinctively holistic' policy style will emerge in the 
new, meso-level institutional setting. In particular, the study has focused on 
attempts to /join-up, policy processes and outputs in Scotland and Wales, taking the 
broad policy area of education and lifelong learning as a key case study (see chapter 
1: 10-11). This concluding chapter draws together the main strands of analysis and 
considers the extent to which the study has been successful in achieving its central 
aim and filling an important gap in the literature.
The chapter begins by describing the framework which was developed to 
effectively measure the relative 'joined-up-ness' of policy processes and outputs in 
Scotland and Wales. This section returns to the working definition of joined-up 
governance (JUG) posited in chapter 2 and reviews the innovative framework for the 
descriptive evaluation of policy processes and outputs from a JUG perspective 
outlined in chapter 3. It is shown that, by arranging policy processes and outputs 
according to the type of inter-personal or inter-organisational trust that must exist 
for policy actors to agree to pool policy- and decision-making sovereignty, it was
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possible - arguably for the first time - to conduct systematic, comparative analysis of 
JUG across policy areas, between jurisdictions and over time.
The chapter then explains how this "JUG approach' was used to examine policy 
processes and outputs in the policy areas of special educational needs (SEN) and 
adult community learning (ACL) in Scotland and Wales between 1999 and 2007. It is 
shown how a marked variation in the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and 
action in the two policy areas was the starting point for an analysis of seven key 
variables which may influence JUG. This section pays particular attention to the 
variable of scale, both in terms of the numbers of actors involved in the policy- and 
decision-making process and their physical proximity to one another. It is claimed 
that the relatively small scale of the devolved context has created conditions that, on 
balance, are favourable for JUG. The main research finding is that the emerging 
policy styles in the devolved jurisdictions demonstrate some distinctively inclusive 
and holistic features which are to some extent a function of 'smallness'.
The chapter then turns to an important research question which focuses on JUG as 
an administrative doctrine more generally. This section asks whether the case studies 
offer any evidence that JUG represents a real departure from previous attempts to 
coordinate the business of policy- and decision-making. It is argued that, while a call 
for cultural change marks out the rhetoric of JUG from that associated with previous 
attempts at coordination, there is scant evidence that a set of behavioural rules which 
make pooling policy- and decision-making sovereignty a normalised and therefore 
expected mode of behaviour has become embedded. As such, the existence of a 
'culture of collaboration' is not supported by any robust empirical data from the case 
studies. However, it is argued that JUG has found a place in the collective 
consciousness of the policy-making community in Scotland and Wales and that 
'collaboration' is now an established synonym for 'good governance': policy actors 
in both nations see JUG as an ideal state to which to aspire, even if that aspiration is 
only translated into action under certain conditions.1
The final section considers the ways in which the empirical and theoretical study 
of JUG and public policy in the devolved context might be taken forward. Care is 
taken not to endow the findings of what must be seen as isolated case studies with
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significance beyond their quite specific situation and a call is made for additional in- 
depth case study research to be conducted in a range of policy contexts so that the 
ways in which key variables influence the nature and extent of joined-up thinking 
and action can be better understood (particularly where they exist in combinations 
different to those identified in the SEN and ACL cases). It is also argued that 
potential linkages between a JUG approach and the paradigmatic network literature 
should be explored in order to deepen understanding of policy relationships in 
contexts where there is evidence of joined-up thinking and action.
8.1 Defining JUG: a question of trust
The discussion in chapter 2 identified the lack of consistency and clarity in the way 
JUG is defined in the practitioner and academic literatures as an obstacle to the 
effective evaluation of policy processes and outputs from a JUG perspective. 
Although the term is used frequently by Whitehall modernisers - and there is 
evidence that this has led to some vague understanding among policy actors that 
JUG refers to agencies working together to tackle problems that do not correspond to 
the traditional boundaries of government departments - there is no systematic 
approach to identifying the kinds of activities and institutional arrangements that 
could make policy- and decision-making more joined-up. Furthermore, there is no 
thorough-going attempt in this literature to examine the changes policy actors must 
make (or, indeed, have made) to their mode of behaviour in order to bring about or 
effectively operationalise the necessary cultural and structural changes (see chapter 
2: 45-47).
In order to develop a precise working definition of JUG and move towards a 
better understanding of the kinds of interactions that might take place within a 
genuinely joined-up policy process, a best practice-based approach to evaluating 
JUG in action was developed, based in part on Christopher Pollitt's (2005) analysis of 
the practitioner literature (see chapter 2: 47-48).2 Assembling examples of best 
practice made it possible to identify a common requirement for all joined-up 
working; namely, the pooling of what was termed 'policy- and decision-making 
sovereignty'. It was argued that all joined-up thinking and action - from combining
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budgets, to giving stakeholders a say in the nature and trajectory of policy, to 
sharing key personnel in the delivering of services on the ground -  places some 
demands on policy actors to pass aspects of control over their own resources or 
policy- and decision-making independence to others. To some extent, this requires 
policy actors to behave in a way that values the perceived benefits of collaboration 
more highly than their own, more narrowly-defined institutional interests.
This way of conceiving of joined-up policy processes and outputs was a 
breakthrough which enabled inter-personal and inter-organisational trust to be 
identified as the key to understanding relationships between policy actors from a 
JUG perspective. In order to pool policy- and decision-making sovereignty, it was 
argued, policy actors of all descriptions must trust other policy actors to act in ways 
that do not undermine their institutional interests. There must be a certain degree of 
confidence that others will agree, as Mark Granovetter (1985: 431) puts it in his study 
inter-organisational trust, to 'abstain from opportunism' (see chapter 2: 40-43).
Crucially, while all of the examples of best practice identified required the pooling 
of policy and decision-making sovereignty in some form (and, therefore, a need for 
some degree of trust to exist between the policy actors involved), it was clear that 
different policy processes and outputs were associated with different trust-types. 
Consulting an outside expert in the development of policy, for example, may require 
a certain degree of trust that he or she will not use their status or profile within the 
policy area as the basis of an attempt to seize control over the nature and trajectory 
of policy-making, but this is a less onerous trust than that required between actors 
who agree, for example, to pool departmental budgets; that is, to allow another to 
trespass on that most sacred of ground, their departmental 'tu rf. This meant it was 
possible to arrange policy processes and outputs in what was termed a Hierarchy of 
joined-up thinking and action (HJTA), depending on whether the actors involved 
were required to demonstrate 'prudential', 'contractual' or, at the highest tier of the 
Hierarchy, 'goodwill' trust (6 et al 2002; see chapter 2: 42). The HJTA also made 
provision for some acknowledgement of joined-up thinking and action which relies 
merely on better communication or dissemination of information for success. This
184
Devolution and public policy: a joined-up governance approach
type of activity was classed as an 'informational' tier of the HJTA, ranked below 
prudential trust.3
The HJTA framework is a potentially important innovation as it makes it possible 
to conduct a descriptive evaluation of JUG in any given policy context and, critically 
for a comparative study of JUG in two jurisdictions and two policy areas, allows 
comparison to be made between more or less joined-up contexts (see chapter 3: 61- 
65). Alongside the HJTA, chapter 3 also identified a set of seven 'moderating 
variables' which it was suggested may influence the nature and extent of joined-up 
thinking and action within a given policy context. This gave the HJTA an additional 
dimension by making it possible to explain -  or at least account for -  variation in 
JUG between policy contexts. This toolkit for conducting comparative analysis from 
a JUG perspective made it possible to begin to explore the conditions which are most 
favourable for JUG.
The HJTA therefore represents a degree of innovation in that it brings together 
two good ideas -  Pollitt's (2005) best practice examples and 6 et al's (2002) typology 
of trust relationships -  to create a composite tool for conducting effective descriptive 
evaluation of policy processes and outputs from a JUG perspective.4 This, then, 
amounts to a 'JUG approach' to examining the policy- and decision-making process. 
The following section reviews the way this approach was used as the basis of an 
examination of policy processes and outputs in Scotland and Wales.
8.2 JUG in the devolved context: the cases of SEN and ACL
The description and analysis in chapters 4, 5 and 6 focused on JUG in the devolved 
context and on some of the specific impacts devolution and the new Scottish and 
Welsh policy-making landscapes have had on the conditions for JUG. More 
specifically, these chapters examined attempts at JUG in the SEN and ACL policy 
areas in both nations.
The analysis in chapter 5 found a marked variation in the nature and extent of 
joined-up thinking and action in the two chosen policy areas during the period of 
study. Policy processes and outputs which demonstrated the existence of goodwill 
trust between policy actors were found exclusively in the SEN policy area in both
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nations. These findings are summarised in Table 5.3 (see chapter 5: 127). A key 
feature of the SEN policy processes in the two nations was the relationships formed 
between powerful government actors and small, relatively poorly-resourced groups, 
often from the third sector. Groups that included Autism Cymru, SNAP Cymru and 
Afasic Cymru in Wales and Afasic Scotland and the SNIP in Scotland enjoyed formal 
and informal contact with key decision-makers (including ministers in some cases) 
and had a major influence on the nature and trajectory of policy. By way of contrast, 
the ACL policy area in both nations, while including a number of examples of best 
practice at the lower, prudential and contractual levels of the HJTA, was 
characterised by an absence of goodwill trust. Although some groups did have close 
relationships with decision-makers they could not be said to have been as influential 
as their SEN counterparts.5
Chapter 6 sought to explain this variation between cases by examining how the 
set of seven moderating variables played out in each policy area. It was shown that 
the greater political sensitivity of ACL, combined with the relatively low level of 
consensus within the ACL policy milieu, led powerful policy actors in particular to 
perceive greater institutional risk in pooling policy- and decision-making 
sovereignty with other actors. This was an important finding because it 
demonstrated that, despite the very best intentions on the part of ACL policy actors 
(the Community Consortia for Education and Training (CCET), for example, were 
designed to bring disparate interests together), the perceived benefits of 
collaboration lost out to narrowly-defined institutional interests.
The same chapter chose to examine more closely two of the seven moderating 
variables that seem to be most closely linked to the devolved context; namely, the 
scale of the policy-making context -  both in terms of the number of policy actors and 
their physical proximity to one another -  and the age of the competent political 
institution. The results of this examination were particularly interesting and the 
explanatory utility of scale, in particular, was shown to be considerable. The analysis 
demonstrated indubitably that smaller scale was an important factor in the 
cultivation of qualitatively distinctive, close trust relationships in both nations and 
showed that these relationships were often not between equally-, or even similarly-
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resourced actors. It was shown how regular, high frequency and high quality face- 
to-face contact between actors in the Village' settings of Edinburgh and Cardiff had 
contributed to a reservoir of individual trust dammed in by social interaction. The 
following extract from an interview with Peter Black, the Chair of the National 
Assembly's Education and Lifelong Learning Committee during the period of its 
review of SEN policy in Wales and a former Deputy Minister in the Assembly 
government, was included in chapter 6 as the best available articulation of the role of 
scale. It is provides sufficient insight to warrant being reproduced here:
What I observe is that access [to ministers] here is much better than it is in England. I 
hear from policy-makers, from the voluntary sector, over and over again, that here 
you can get a meeting with an Assembly minister, you know, fairly easily -  and you 
can meet them on a social level. In fact, there may be four or five different events 
where I come across the same person. In the SEN field, I might meet someone from, 
for example, SNAP Cymru at an SEN event, a small schools event, a health event, I 
might meet the same person at a Bevan Foundation event -  all sorts of places like 
that -  so you do build up social relationships with lobbyists ... and those close 
relationships mean that they are able to influence policy much more.
(Interview 9)
The importance of scale extended beyond vertical relationships between 
government actors and groups in civil society. Chapter 6 also identified the close 
working relationships between ministers, deputy ministers and senior civil servants 
in a number of departments of the Scottish Executive as the key to the resource 
pooling that made possible the Coordinated Support Plan (CSP), arguably the most 
complete example of JUG in action discussed anywhere in this study (see chapter 4: 
77-78; chapter 5: 108-109; chapter 6: 140-141). Significantly, it was the participants in 
these relationships who themselves chose to highlight the importance of scale in 
their preparedness to trust each other and pool policy- and decision-making 
sovereignty in this most onerous of ways.6 Interviewees who were involved in the 
policy process as politicians chose more than any other group of contributors to 
highlight the role that the close physical location of other key decision-makers had 
made.
Just as important as the existence of such relationships in Scotland and Wales, 
however, is the impression that they are not a feature of the much larger 
bureaucratic context of Westminster-Whitehall. It was suggested in the majority of
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interviews conducted for the research that the kind of face-to-face contact required to 
build and regularly confirm individual trust is as inevitable in Scotland and Wales as 
it is impracticable in the UK context. Although no direct comparison was sought 
with the Westminster-Whitehall context (and no data were collected there) 
interviewees were clear about the change that had occurred since the focus of most 
policy formulation activity (and for SEN and ACL, it is accurate to say the majority 
of that activity) has been trained on the new devolved institutions. One of the most 
significant findings of the research, therefore, is that the smaller scale of policy 
formulation and implementation in Scotland and Wales has the potential (and, in 
some cases, is already showing how it can be realised) to cultivate the kinds of trust 
relationships that can, in time, move the policy- and decision-making process closer 
towards JUG. It may even be true that these kinds of relatively small contexts are 
some of the few arenas where a real "culture of collaboration' has any chance of fully 
emerging.7
There are some aspects of smaller scale, however, that may have undermined (or 
may undermine in the future) the potential benefits of JUG. The achievement of a 
joined-up policy process, in which the full array of policy actors takes a full part in 
influencing the nature and trajectory of policy in a given area, may not necessarily 
lead to more effective policy-making. This is because the achievement of such a 
joined-up network -  and, perhaps more pertinently, the maintenance of such a 
network -  can mean that, instead of being a means to an end, JUG can become an 
end in itself. Particularly where policy relationships have an individual, social 
dimension, the competition that some argue is vital if policy is to remain fresh and 
innovative may be replaced by cosy consensus. This is clearly an important question 
for future research and is discussed further below.
Despite the actual and potential disadvantages of scale, however, the remarkable 
'intimacy' of policy-making in the devolved setting was without question an 
important factor in helping both Scotland and Wales move closer to the vague 
aspirations to develop a more inclusive and holistic policy style described in chapter 
1: in both the SEN and ACL policy areas, actors in civil society were brought into the 
heart of the policy process; there was an intention to involve the legislature as an
188
Devolution and public policy: a joined-up governance approach
important policy actor which was seen through with action in some cases; and there 
was an awareness that it was necessary to ensure there were multiple perspectives 
involved in policy formulation. Furthermore, it was argued in chapter 6 that, 
alongside 'smallness', the other defining characteristic of devolved jurisdictions - 
'newness' -  will diminish over time as a restricting variable and the benefits of small 
scale will be reinforced by the institutional trust that inevitably emerges in more 
established institutional settings (see chapter 6:150-153).
The HJTA was an import tool for facilitating this analysis and can be applied 
equally to any policy context. However, the HJTA is a framework which deals with 
trust in its predictive sense. If one uses a stricter definition of JUG and takes a view 
that pooling policy- and decision-making sovereignty must take place within a 
'culture of collaboration' in order for the principles of JUG to develop into a mode of 
policy- and decision-making, it is necessary to also consider trust in its normative 
sense. This is the main focus of the following section, which considers the extent to 
which JUG can be seen as a distinctive administrative doctrine.
8.3 How distinctive is JUG? In search of cultural change
The discussion in chapter 2 highlighted three possible features of JUG that may set it 
apart from previous attempts to overcome the compartmentalised nature of policy- 
and decision-making. These were, briefly: the unprecedented continuity and 
prominence of the doctrine as an idea with some salience and currency in the 
administrative and political spheres; the potentially distinctive requirement that 
government actors should collaborate with actors located in civil society; and, 
perhaps showing the potential for the greatest genuine departure, the requirement 
for cultural change to take place alongside structural change. But what is the 
empirical evidence that any of these potentially distinctive features of JUG, 
particularly the requirement for cultural change, exist outside the rhetoric of JUG 
enthusiasts?
There is certainly evidence that the prominence and continuity of JUG within the 
policy agendas of the Scottish Executive and Assembly government over an 
extended period of time has consolidated the place of the doctrine (setting aside for a
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moment the question of whether or not it is a qualitatively new idea) in the 
consciousness of policy actors of all descriptions. The Making the Connections and 
Changing to Deliver agendas respectively helped establish words like 'partnership', 
'collaboration' and 'joined-up' as synonyms for good governance in Scotland and 
Wales. The doctrine's core principles are universally acknowledged as A Good 
Thing, an ideal state to which all participants in the policy process should aspire. 
Some actors have attempted to be conspicuous collaborators, indicating that 
collaborative working carries with it a certain amount of cache, and those who have 
not been able to demonstrate collaboration have on occasions felt compelled to offer 
an excuse for such a failure. Significantly, a lack of joined-up thinking and action has 
become a source of guilt for some.
There is also very strong evidence to suggest that the additional dimension of 
vertical coordination between government and civil society is being seen through 
with concerted action. The case studies are littered with examples of organisations in 
civil society being brought into the heart of the policy- and decision-making process 
and, more importantly, of organisations operating in more than one area of interest 
being courted equally. The education department of the Assembly Government took 
care to ensure that, for example, business interests were be incorporated into the 
CCET structure and that organisations ostensibly with a health orientation were 
brought into both the Speech and Language Therapy Action Group (SALTAG) and 
the Special Educational Needs Reference Group (SENRG) (see chapter 4: 70-71). This 
indicates a strong sense of awareness of the cross-cutting nature of policy problems 
and of the kinds of solutions required'. Importantly, this kind of activity took place 
outside of any kind of prescribed institutional framework and generally represents 
an unregulated desire to explore joined-up solutions where possible.
However, there is, of course, a considerable difference between what policy actors 
are convinced is the way they should be acting and the way they actually do behave. 
There are clear examples from the case studies where actors were more interested in 
presenting an image of collaboration than in actually pooling policy- and decision­
making sovereignty. This is where the third potentially distinctive feature of JUG
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comes in. The existence of a 'culture of collaboration' turns on good intentions being 
formed into embedded and normalised forms of behaviour.
One of the key innovations in the thesis is that it explored what proponents of 
JUG mean when they call for such a culture to emerge. It was suggested that the way 
forward was to think of the existence of such a culture as being demonstrated by the 
existence of relationships between actors founded on normative, rather than 
predictive trust. To this end, Martin Hollis' (1998) definition of normative trust was 
taken as the basis for a description of an imagined joined-up policy-making 
'universe' in which all actors trust all other actors to behave in line with the core 
principles of JUG and to do so, crucially, without relying on any knowledge of the 
specific characteristics of the other actors. In this sense, a 'culture of collaboration', as 
opposed to mere collaboration, relies on there being an embedded and legitimised 
set of rules that normalise the pooling of policy and decision-making sovereignty to 
the extent that policy actors can expect other actors to behave in ways that 'abstain 
from opportunism'. This attempt to define what proponents and practitioners of JUG 
mean when they refer to a 'culture of collaboration' made it possible to search for 
evidence of its existing in empirical reality.
There is no reliable evidence that normalised trust relationships were a feature of 
policy-making in the case studies chosen for study. Where joined-up thinking and 
action was in evidence, it was restricted to policy processes and outputs that 
demonstrated trust in its predictive sense. So, where there was evidence of 
'goodwill' trust between actors, the existence of that trust relationship was explained 
either by a track record of behaviour which cultivated confidence that actors could 
predict how certain identified others would act, or by the social content of policy 
relationships which were forged on individual trust.8 Although it was argued in 
chapter 5 that the existence of a large number of goodwill trust relationships in a 
policy area like SEN may form a base or 'shared behavioural heritage' from which 
collaboration could over time become embedded as a set of legitimatised, 
normalised 'rules of the game', at this stage this is not supported by any empirical 
data and remains speculation.
191
Devolution and public policy: a joined-up governance approach
However, it is important to note that the definition of JUG developed in this study 
does not mean that an absence of normative trust relationships is the same thing as 
an absence of JUG.9 It is difficult to describe the CSP in Scotland, for example, as 
anything other than an example of JUG in action. However, the lack of any empirical 
data to indicate the presence of an emerging /culture of collaboration' in any case 
study does diminish the strength of any claim that JUG represents a genuine 
departure in public administration; policy actors clearly subscribed to the doctrine's 
core aims and were keen to demonstrate their commitment to collaborative working 
but were still motivated by their own, narrow institutional interests.
8.4 The explanatory utility of a JUG approach
The discussion in chapter 7 considered the explanatory utility of a JUG approach by 
first examining the SEN case study in Wales through the conceptual lens of the 
network. It was argued that, while the mechanism of resource dependency and 
principle of resource exchange go some way to explaining the SEN network in Wales 
as a segmented 'producer' type, this approach does not offer an adequate 
explanation of some close policy relationships that are not proportional to the 
resources involved. It was argued that a JUG approach can help explain these 
relationships by locating them within a collaboration agenda and by identifying high 
levels of individual trust as an important variable (see chapter 7:176-177).
However, the chapter concluded that the explanatory utility of a JUG approach 
does not amount to a challenge to the network paradigm. Actors are only prepared 
to pool policy- and decision-making sovereignty with poorly-resourced actors where 
they perceive limited institutional risk. As such, an interests-based explanation of the 
policy process remains the most convincing. A JUG approach, far from challenging 
the network paradigm, can complement it by helping identify and explain close 
policy relationships where JUG is cited as a motivating factor and there does not 
appear to be a clear resource basis.
8.5 Summary of key findings
The preceding sections have brought together the main strands of discussion and 
analysis and detailed the key research findings. Although the findings are
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necessarily restricted by the case study method, they indicate there has been some 
success in finding answers to the main research questions (Table 8.1).
Table 8.1 Summary of key research findings
Research finding Location of main 
discussion and analysis
1 It is possible to examine policy processes and outputs 
from a JUG perspective.
Chapters 2 and 3
2 A JUG approach can be used successfully as the basis of 
systematic comparative analysis of policy processes and 
outputs between policy areas, across jurisdictions and 
over time.
Chapters 2, 5 and 6
3 Using a JUG approach to examine policy processes and 
outputs in the SEN and ACL policy areas in Scotland and 
Wales uncovers marked variation in the nature and extent 
of joined-up thinking and action between the two policy 
areas.
Chapters 5 and 6
4 There are a number of variables which influence the 
nature and extent of joined-up thinking and action and it 
appears that policy actors are more willing to collaborate 
where they perceive low levels of institutional risk.
Chapters 3 and 6
5 One of these variables -  scale -  has particular explanatory 
utility in the devolved context, where it has helped build 
individual trust.
Chapter 6
6 The policy styles that are emerging in Scotland and Wales 
exhibit some distinctively inclusive and holistic features in 
line with the expectations associated with a new, meso- 
level institutional setting.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6
7 There is no evidence of a 'culture of collaboration' in the 
chosen case studies, but JUG is recognised as an indicator 
of good governance and policy actors aim to collaborate 
where there is low institutional risk.
Chapters 5, 6, 8
8 A JUG approach does not represent a challenge to the 
network paradigm, but may be used alongside the 
interests-based account of the policy process where 
joined-up thinking and action is detected or resource 
exchange does not provide an adequate account of policy 
relationships.
Chapter 7
The final section asks how these findings can be improved and built upon, and 
how the study of both JUG and public policy in a devolved context can be taken in 
new directions. It asks: how can the policy styles of the devolved institutions be 
further explored and more robustly tested? How can the empirical study of public 
policy in Scotland and Wales be advanced, particularly using a JUG approach? And
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how can the way scholars understand JUG as an administrative doctrine be 
deepened?
8.6 Avenues for further research
The wider significance of a number of the research findings summarised in Table 8.1 
is restricted by the fact that they have been arrived at through a case study research 
method. There are certain well-documented and, it must be recognised, well- 
founded criticisms of this research method which focus on the extent to which case 
study researchers generalise their findings beyond the particular case or cases they 
have chosen to study (Bryman 1992; Gillham 2000; Stake 1995; see chapter 3: 57-59). 
With this in mind, there is no attempt made here to claim that any of the research 
findings which cite case study evidence have any certain application outside of the 
situation of the particular conditions within the SEN and ACL policy areas in 
Scotland and Wales.
However, the analysis is chapter 5 and 6 was conducted with this problem in 
mind and an attempt was made to uncover the 'degree of specificity7 in each case by 
examining how a set of seven variables played out. This analysis means that some of 
the findings may have an application beyond the chosen case studies where 
conditions can be identified as being broadly similar. So, for example, a similar 
policy subject which is located in a meso-level policy context and also shows a high 
degree of existing consensus among policy actors may be expected to share some 
features of the SEN case studies in Scotland and Wales. The real degree of specificity 
of the chosen case studies can only be properly revealed, however, if additional case 
study research using a JUG approach is conducted in a range of policy contexts. This 
would be help to generate a sophisticated and reliable understanding of die 
conditions in which joined-up thinking and action might be expected to exist.10
This point raises a further, probably more important, focus for future research. 
When this study has described 'joined-up thinking and action' it has necessarily 
been restricted to policy processes and outputs. JUG is, of course, a doctrine whose 
principal focus is on outcomes, on effectively tackling 'wicked' problems. There is a 
clear danger that research which focuses on process and outputs alone becomes
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blind to situations where JUG has become process- rather than outcomes-focussed. 
Clearly, a joined-up policy process or output is of precisely no use if it is not seen 
through to a positive result. The work started in this study therefore needs to be 
taken forward to incorporate outcomes-based evaluation. A JUG approach which is 
able to integrate an analysis and descriptive evaluation of the impact of an attempt at 
JUG would also be ale to develop a more sophisticated and useful library of best 
practice examples.
The importance attached the variable of scale also requires additional data to be 
considered robust. More specifically, it would be potentially highly illuminating to 
carry out a comparative case study in a larger bureaucratic setting. This would place 
the importance of scale as an explanatory factor into further comparative context and 
demonstrate more clearly the extent to which the defining relationships of a more 
inclusive, holistic policy style are indeed distinctive. There may also be value in 
returning to the SEN and ACL case studies after a suitable period of time to consider 
how (and, indeed, why) the nature and extent of joined-up thinking and action may 
have changed. It would be particularly interesting to examine the role institutional 
trust plays in the SEN and ACL policy processes as devolution enters its second 
decade.
Finally, the JUG approach to public policy research developed in this study needs 
to e refined further and integrated with the network literature. Although, in the 
absence of a "culture of collaboration', Jug does not represent a challenge to the 
network approach, considering the possibility that some policy relationships may be 
explained as forming part of a 'collaboration agenda' may bring added 
sophistication to interests-based thinking.
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Notes to chapter 8
1 A further question emerged during the research: has devolution affected the 
relationship between local government and the centre, specifically from a JUG 
perspective, and in what ways? The salience of this question flows from the received 
wisdom among local government actors and, indeed, commentators, that a great deal 
of good practice in JUG at the local level is often scuppered by the inflexibility and 
rigid departmental mode of policy-making exhibited by Whitehall (see e.g. Arblaster 
et al 1998; Richards et al 1999). Gerry Stoker (2005:161) makes the point:
... in contrast to central departments, local agencies and authorities [i.e. those at a 
level below the centre, though not, it should be added the devolved level, which can 
act as a 'regional centre'] are rather good at doing joined-up. They have the 
commitment, skills, and capacity to make joining-up work and the main block on 
progress is the heavy hand of the centre ...
The flow of JUG from policy formulation, at the centre, to policy implementation, at 
the local level, has therefore been disrupted. If, as has been suggested on a number of 
occasions in this study both the relative success of local government and the relative 
failure of central government in attempting to join-up their activity are at least 
partially functions of scale, then clearly a change to a smaller scale 'centre', in the 
shape of the Scottish Government and Assembly government, may make a 
considerable difference to this flow from formulation to implementation. As this 
question emerged during the course of the research, however, it must remain an 
interesting focus for future research into JUG across levels of government.
2 It is worth noting that the best practice-based approach did not preclude any 
innovative activity or institutional arrangement from consideration. Indeed, any 
policy process or output which required policy actors to pool policy- and decision­
making sovereignty was examined as part of the research.
3 This is not to say that joined-up thinking and action at this informational level is 
mere rhetoric. There is certainly potential for, for example, the Policy Integration 
Tool discussed in chapter 4 (106) to lead to a more coherent form of policy 
development that removes overlap or duplication. Furthermore, it has been shown 
how Making the Connections and Changing to Deliver have been successful in making 
collaboration a synonym for good governance and moving policy actors towards that 
mode of behaviour as an ideal.
4 The utility of this framework for descriptive evaluation depends, of course, on 
whether one accepts the particular reading of JUG it seeks to measure. JUG is a 
sufficiently vague doctrine for there to be almost unlimited scope for interpretation.
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The definition put forward here places some emphasis on vertical collaboration 
between governmental actors and the array of actors in civil society. This view may 
not be shared by those who take a narrower, more technocratic view of the doctrine 
and consider its application to be restricted to inter- or intra-departmental structures 
and relationships.
5 Examples include NIACE Dysgu Cymru and the Scottish Adult Learners' 
Partnership (SALP).
6 The fact that budget pooling was at the heart of the CSP's passage through the 
Scottish Parliament is significant in itself as an example of actors pooling policy- and 
decision-making sovereignty, but it is the specific role of scale in this relationship 
which makes it a potential example of a distinctive devolved policy style.
7 Indeed, the research suggests that an effective strategy for small organisations 
wishing to influence policy- and decision-making in Scotland and Wales is to aim to 
build social content into their relationships with key decision-makers.
8 Individual trust is, of course, entirely founded on actor-specific knowledge, even if 
that knowledge is sometimes little more than impressionistic.
9 Indeed, to adopt such a puritanical position would seem to go against the 
essentially pragmatic outlook of the 'joiner-uppers'.
10 Further case study research in a range of policy areas should take a variety of 
forms. The connections between the key variables for influencing JUG requires more 
detailed empirical work to understand their impact in different combinations to 
those found in the SEN and ACL cases.
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